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ABSTRACT 
Deleuze opposes ethics to Morality. He claims that an ethics develops immanent criteria 
to evaluate modes of existence, while a Morality imposes transcendent principles. This 
thesis explores the question of ethics, and I invcstigate the possibilities of an ethics of the 
pre-individual. Consequently this enterprise involves the development of an alternative 
ontology of becoming corresponding to a philosophy of difference. By taking this 
trajectory, I seek to show that an anti-human human-ism is possible and demonstrate ho\"- 
this might work. 
Deleuze and Guattarl always emphasise the practical and concrete nature of philosophyl 
therefore, in order to situate their concepts I begin the thesis with an examination of 
different theoretical approaches to the question of difference. However, I suggest that 
difference and heterogeneity cannot be simply affirmed in and of themselves since ne,, -%- 
forms of domination also affirm difference. Mv next chapter follows up on this idea bN 
interrogating the allegation that philosophies of difference have made a political covenant 
with global capitalism. I draw on a distinction between power (Potentia) and Power 
(Potestas) in order to explain how different modes of social organisation and domination 
can minimise the creative and transformational capacities of humans. By analysing a 
number of theoretical accounts of capitalism I demonstrate how and why it differs from 
other social formations. Nonetheless, I conclude that philosophy can indeed be 
distinguished from capitalism. Philosophy, as the art of inventing concepts, develops the 
conditions for real experimentation and new ways of thinking, being and existing. 
By turning to Spinoza's Ethics I propose that by thinking about the human differeiitiallý', 
as a part of nature, we can develop an immanent ethics. I explain how Spinoza's ontology 
operates especially in terms of its renovated conception of the human. In generating an 
ontology that is not centred on the individuated individual but grasps instead the 
individual as both relational and a degree of power, the pre-individual and transindividual 
dimensions of the human are emphasised and she is opened up to her non-human 
becomings. 
Simondon's account of metastable being explores this in greater detail. He argues that we 
ha\, e tended to extrapolate from the individuated individual in order to try to understand 
its conditions of existence. Alternatively, we have relied upon a principle of individuation 
that pre-exists the process of individuation. By intertwining his focus on the process of 
individuation with his idea that being is more than unity, more than identity and 
fundamentally incompatible with itself, I present SiMondon's account of an ontology of 
becoming and his correlative conception of a pre-individual field. Residing at the core of 
his endeavour is a theory of difference and disparateness that understands identity to be 
emergent, partial, relative and derivative. 
Simondon's emphasis on disparateness recurs in Deleuze's work Difference and Repetition. I 
mobilise this idea in order to distinguish between a created possible and a realisable 
possible, and to elucidate the ethico-political implications of this distinction. The concept 
of the 'image of thought' that rests on a series of non-philosophical pre-suppositions 
helps us to critique dominant modes of thinking and acting. In addition to critique, I seek 
to construct other , vays of thinking and existing. Once again I focus upon the pre- 
individual and transindividual dimensions of the human vvlien in my concluding chapter I 
m, ap the different conceptions of ethics and subjectivitý, that emerge once we transform 
our understanding of ontology. An ethics of the pre-individual relies on ii-ni-nanent 
criteria for evaluating modes of existence, does not fetishise the human, and ultimatelý- 
constructs the possibilitý, of things being othetwise. 
Introduction 
IXTRODUCTION 
i. disequilibrium 
The process of hominisation "takes" in us, the way a crystal undergoes a phase 
change and solidifies: does becoming human consist of forever unbinding so as 
to be elsewhere and otherwise? 
Nfichel Serres, The Nlafural Contract. (1992: 10 1). 
We need to have a contract With the world. The incessant pollution, technological 
mastery, and expropriation of the resources of the earth have left a vold that 
responsibility must fill. Such is Michel Serres' diagnosis. We need a natural 
contract of symbiosis and reciprocity, rather than continuing to exist parasitically; 
vampires upon the earth. "In fact, the Earth speaks to us in terms of forces, 
bonds and interactions, and that's enough to make a contract" (Serres, 1992: 39). 
Economists create their models to assess resource management using models of 
timeless, competitive equilibrium, and forget to factor in the indeterrmnac)- of the 
future (Ormerod, 1994: 75-6). They conclude all is fine with the world. Three- 
quarters of humanity hovers on the verge of starvation; the rest hover on the 
verge of humanity. ' An atmosphere of cynicism that is an 'enlightened false 
consciousness' (Sloterchjk, 1987: 5) pervades the domains of those who need to 
alter their behaviours and values. A stranglehold of exploitation shackles the rest. 
The system may teeter on faulty foundations but no-one will rock the boat. Serres 
thinks that perhaps more than even a morality, this calls for a religion to attach 
(refigare) us to this world, so radical and tumultuous is the necessity for the 
fabrication of a new series of relations with all beings, animate and inert, 
microcosmic and cosmic. In essence, we need a global philosophy to face global 
"Like the tail of a comet, throwbacks or continuations of an ancient objective necesslt\ 
still linger - misery, hunger, and diseases, both new and residual, ravaging the third and 
fourth worlds, growing exponentially. And those who should be held accountable - those 
livim, in the brilliant head of the comet, leavinL, this abject misery in their \\ake and 
rnultiplý ing it - are the \ ery ones (and I am one of them) who seek this \ý isdom. This is a 
second responsibility. a neN\ obligation, more conditions issuing frorn the results of our 
actions - the latest blo\\ to the collective narcissism of the wealthy nations" (Serres, 1990: 
176). 
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dangers. 
Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, humankind has known that it holds the power to 
destroy itself From that time, science has dominated other spheres of knowledge. 
But science knows too little of culture. Philosophy, for Serres, is a constructive 
enterprise; by inventing the conditions of invention (Serres and Latour, 1990: 86), 
it asks questions about everything. However, he is concerned that we are hurtling 
toward an era which is centred increasingly on domination and mastery which we 
ourselves cannot master. 
Imperialistic thinking imposes a single method upon any problem. By employing 
a meta-language, it does not try to approach local and singular problems with 
methods that are re-cast each time. That would be an exercise in composition that 
gets close to the singularities that are its material. For Serres, substantives and the 
verb to be violently impose their presence with regularm,, erasing these 
singularities. Their constant recurrence in different texts horrifies him. "Sterile, 
facile. There is nothing new under such a sun. In such a way the atomic bomb 
vitrifies the plain over which it explodes" (93). Diverse and multiple rolling hills 
appeal to him; that is pluralism (93). 
A vectorial operation of thinking that does not seek to dissolve but to create 
relations or rapports is what Serres proposes. It seizes and sustains movement. A 
verb or substantive (substance) cannot effect or describe such processes of 
becoming, he claims, so another understanding of relations is called for. Invoking 
the image of a glacial river's percolating basin, brimming with relations and 
networks that fluctuate and freeze, he suggests that this turbulence and 
fluctuation interspersed with crystallisation and the carving of corridors or 
passages is a more adequate manner of thinking these difficult ideas (105). 
PlOrmesis, pra. %7'S and 1ýletis, the ancient Greek combinations of improvisational 
action and cunning, foreshadow his example of the maritime map where every 
route must be invented while an absolute fragihtý- and vulnerability traverses this 
space of risk. 
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As we know, his method of abstracting no longer relies on the substantivC or 
N, erb, such asfteedom and beiq. (104). Instead it begins with the relation, a relation 
in movement, like a x-ector or a diagonal, that is not captured at any point. 
Likewise, the billowing and metastabihty of the flame evades capture and 
'existence' by always remaining far from equilibrium (105). A tWe-position 
('toward', 'between' or 'With', for example) resists capture, gliding, dancing and 
tracing relations in flux rather than fixing them. Instead of solid perception these 
notions operate in a realm of liquid or gaseous perception. Solidity emerges from 
a temporary coagulation or viscosity in this play of relations. 
Bergson and Lucretius catapulted us into movement and turbulence. Different 
relations criss-cross, surge forth, become possible and fade away. Time throws 
everything out of equilibrium. We thus avoid the imposition of spatiality that a 
phrase like 'network' carries with it. "Relations spawn objects, beings and acts, not 
vice versa. So - stand up, run, jump, move, dance! Like the body, the Mind needs 
movement, especially subtle and complex movement" (107). 
Concepts are often used to totalise, demarcate, and obfuscate, argues Serres. He 
worries about philosophers taking on the role of public prosecutor, criticising, 
judging, tripping up and catching out. This kind of enclosure of concepts has a 
particular relation with law and geometry since it presupposes the permanence 
and stability of an outline and a fiXity of values in the ascribed attributes and 
properties. Serres wants to create concepts in fuzziness and fluctuation. This 
makes them anexact but they remain rigorous. At stake is the invention of a 
transcendental space which opens up the conditions for possible 'inventions of 
the future (117). We are then equipped, as Serres says, to cast off 
Michel Serres expresses with evocative poetic (and scientific) imagery a number 
of the themes that are kcý- to the chapters that follow Not only does he transtTnt 
the movements of a philosophy of becon-nng, as opposed to a metaphysics of 
solids, but he demonstrates a thought of external relations that, as William Jarnes 
3 
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(1912) emphasises, remain irreducible to their terms. Serres' work differs greatly 
from what follows in this thesis, but as a 'shortcut', it communicates q#&-filely 
some of the concepts that we will explore. His resolute status as bntvlelff, 
gathering diverse materials to assemble and invent concepts, displays an 
irreverence found in Deleuze's and Guattari's works. His wandering relations and 
vagabond essences have echoes of Spinoza. 
ii. technophobia and nature 
Without history, becoming would remain indeterminate and unconditioned, 
but becoming is not historical. 
Gflles Deleuze and F61lx Guattarl, ll, "hat I'S Philosoply? (1991 a: 96). 
What is it to be human in this world? Is there an ineffable essence of the human, 
or a human nature? Can we look to geneticists, behaviourists, psychologists for a 
set of human characteristics? How do abstract human rights affect concrete 
human existence? Can we construct an ethics without a theory of the essence of 
human nature? We will not forget the human; humans are at once the things most 
useful and most harmful to one another, as Spinoza once said. But employing an 
abstract category of the 'human' is a fetish and tells us very little about the 
possibilities of the human. Is it possible to pull the human from its 
anthropomorphic pedestal to return it to its place as bomo natura? This is the 
challenge that is set before us. Only now it has an urgency that is unsurpassed; 
one that Spinoza could not have imagined. 
We will seek to situate the human within complex settings of relations, examining 
the different processes of subjectification 2 that shape the image of what humans 
think thcy (and others) are. We will talk of a N-ariety of ways in which humans 
articulate questions of difference and di-versity, arguing in turn that Nve need to 
I in this thesis I do not examine alternative theories of the subject. Subjectivitý. for Guattarl. 
entails a process that is ontologically prior to the subject and object and is not confined 
\N'ithin the boundaries of the subject. It is closer to Simondon's accounts of processes of 
individuation. This Nvill be made clear in my conclusion. 
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think býtbre and beyoild the human condition in order to understand the emergence, 
and the potentials, of humans. Rather than delimiting a frame that would capture 
the essence of the human, -\x-c will develop a theory of affectivity and an ed-Ucs of 
singularities that displace the centrality and unity of the human by showing how 
this is the ýffea of a power take-over3. 
Nature and artifice together name the process of production of the real. A 
narcissistic and anthropocentric separation of humanity from nature will no 
longer hold water, and appeals to the sanctity and uniqueness of buviati 
consciousness will be challenged. Samuel Butler remarks, 
'Plants [ ... ] show no sign of interesting themselves in human affairs. We shall 
never get a rose to understand that five times seven are thirty-five, and there is 
no use talking to an oak about fluctuations in the price of stocks. Hence we say 
that the oak and the rose are unintelligent, and on finding they do not 
understand our business conclude that they do not understand their own. But 
what can a creature who talks in this way know about intelligence? Which 
shows greater signs of intelligence? He, or the rose and oak? ' 
Samuel Butler, Erewhon (1872: 170). 
Although contemplations upon consciousness will be largely implicit in this 
thesis, Butler's hilariously controversial passage helps us to re-consider the 
presuppositions we bring to any examination of the question of subjectivitV. 
Significantly his 'Book of the Machines' announces that Man is a machinate 
mammal, scattering his limbs on the earth, some near and some far away (160). 
Technology is not a tool but part of a machine (or assemblage) that modifies the 
human (which is another element of this assemblage). His Witty and remarkable 
descriptions of prosthetic devices herald the birth of the cyborg and are 
suggestive of many contemporarý- approaches to Artificial Intelligence. He notes 
that as one grows older one utihses lots of 'extra-corporeal members', placing 
one)s memorý- in a pocket-book and brandishing 'see-en ines' (160). 91 
With Butler, sLiblectivity undergoes a radical twist. His writings generate a strange 
-1 See related to this, Deleuze and Guattari ( 19722a. 26-7). 
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idea of subjectivity and the human that no longer focuses steadfastly on inter- 
human relations. Instead, we need to come up with other ideas of the human that 
no longer prioritise the integritý, and self-identity of the organism to the exclusion 
of all else. Deleuze says in his seminars that he and Guattari never imagined that 
the organism would become defunct. The point is to consider both the varied and 
complex conditions that constitute certain patterrungs and sedimentations of 
relations, and to create other forms of relationality. They reiterate that we are all 
, groupuscules, we are all multiplicities. Humans must no longer beheve themselves to 
be cut off from the world, transcendent and isolated. A new ethics must rest 
upon an anti-human humanism. 
iii. thinking otherwise than being 
This non-human pre-personal part of subjectivity is crucial since it is from this 
that its heterogenesis can develop. It would be to misjudge Deleuze and 
Foucault - who emphasised the non-human part of subjectivity - to suspect 
them of taking anti-humanist positions! 
F6hx Guattarl, Cbaosmosis. (1992a: 9). 
One always has to make a strategic decision when writing about Deleuze; his 
philosophical repertoire is vast. The rhizomorpl-iic nature of his philosophising 
makes it easy to lose one's focus chasing the trails of his concepts through the 
labyrinthine wanderings of both his own work, and those texts written with 
Guattari. By trying to cover everything, one can end up saying very little. Deleuze 
and Guattari aim to develop a practical philosophy. They think that philosophy is 
the art of inventing concepts. In the spirit of their enterprise, I seek to stage 
productive encounters between a number of their concepts and those of 
Simondon and Spinoza; Deleuze and Guattan call this process one of 
crhizomatising' concepts, bringing different concepts together in unexpected 
wa), s. Mý- ultimate aim is to show how an in-imarient ethics of the pre-individual 
might operate, and whý- it is necessary to think of ethics in this Nxay. I readilý- 
admit that other trajectories might have been taken to develop these ideas, such as 
through I-eibniz. Trý-ing to negotiate between critical commentar)- and 
6 
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constructive concrete philosophy is a precipitous path to follow, fraught with risk. 
Critical commentaries have focused on Deleuze's work on Nietzsche, on the idea 
of a minor literature, on the concept of 'becoming-woman, and a renaissance of 
Bergson has also been precipitated, in part, through Deleuze's readings of 
Bergson. However, Deleuze's relation to the Spinoza/ Simondon axis remains a 
severely neglected area of study (as does Simondon's own work). In fact, 
Deleuze's reading of SiMondon only warrants a few scattered pages in the entire 
secondary literature in both English and French. It is for this reason that I have 
concentrated on these thinkers. This focus makes this thesis a novel and original 
one. 
The theme of the pre-individual is central to the philosophies of Deleuze, 
Guattari, Simondon and Spinoza. I show why addressing this theme constitutes 
an important critical and constructive endeavour. The idea of an ethics of the 
pre-individual is closely interwoven with Deleuze's own philosophy of difference. 
Therefore, I begin my first chapter by discussing some contemporary approaches 
to the problem of difference. However, the capitalist embrace of difference and 
diversity highlights the fact that difference cannot be positivised in and of itself. 
Understanding the relation of capitalism and philosophy has to be of vital 
importance for anyone trying to provide a concrete philosophical account of 
ethics. I continue to examine this theme throughout the thesis, while providing a 
positive account of an immanent ethics of the pre-individual through the work 
of Spinoza and Simondon. 
By critiquing the assumed centrality of the individuated individual that pervades 
many philosophical accounts, I seek to displace a conception of the human as 'an 
empire within an empire'. The concept of the pre-indivIdual not only helps us to 
understand the embedded relationahtý- of the individual, but also provides a 
svsternatic and rigorous account of a philosophy of becoming. The critical and 
trans forma tiona I dimension of this ethics of the pre-individual is demonstrated 
in chapter 5 on the 'Image of Thought' as I explore the ideas of the 'disparate' 
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and the 'treated possible'. If we presuppose an identity, rather than understanding 
it as emergent and contested, we set up what Deleuze and Guattari call an 
exclusive disjunction; an identin- locked in on itself An individual is, never closed 
on itself Its pre-individual and transindi-vidual dimensions constitute key 
dimensions of its realin-, opening it to diverse registers of alterin-, alloN-v-ing it to 
affirm dissensus. 
"We cannot conceive of a collective recomposition of the sociUs, correlative to a 
resingularisation of subjectivity, without a new way of conceiving pohtical and 
economic democracies that respect cultural differences - without multiple 
molecular revolutions" (Guattari, 1992a. 20-21). In certain respects Deleuze and 
Guattari's pro)ect reactivates Marxist problematics, especially in the context of 
their critique of capitahsm. However, they challenge a conception of the human 
as 'Master of the Universe, proposing instead that the human is a part of nature. 
They explore the non-human becorMngs of the human that constitute its 
potential for transformation. The human is not presupposed in their accounts. 
Marcuse's 'One-Dimensional Man14 was symptomatic of the impasse that the 
Frankfurt School arrived at. Its futile turn to aesthetics in order to disrupt the 
capitalist movement of generalised equivalence was a forced gesture. It became 
difficult to see how a quahtati'\Te transformation of modes of existence might be 
effected. Like the Frankfurt School, Deleuze and Guattari develop an ethico- 
aesthetic paradigm that focuses on immanent processes of creation; however, their 
system is always at odds with itself, metastable, disparate and brimming with 
potentials. The ethical task is to produce disparities - inclusive dis)unctions - that 
open up transversal connections. "There is no return to nature, but only a 
political problem of the collective soul, the connections of ý, x-hich a society is 
4 At those tirnes that I use the term 'rnan' and 'he' to stand in for all humans in this thesis it 
is because I arn paraphrasing the words of other philosophers. Although a critique of the 
ethnocentric and sexist assumptions of different authors is necessary. this would constitute a 
thesis in itself. I have decided to see how their concepts can be activated in the ser% ice of 
both critical and transformational strategies, rather than revealing their own shortcomings. 
This is, of course, a shortcoming in rný own Nvork, ho, ýNever. in order to illustrate the 
necessitý of an ethics of the pre-indi\ idual in detail, it \\as a decision I was forced to make. 
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capable, the flows it supports, invents, leaves alone, or does a,, ý-ay Nvith" (Deleuze, 
1993a: 52). 1 will continue to explore these idcas throughout the rest of this 
introduction. 
From his earliest works, Deleuze was keen to construct a philosophy purged of 
transcendence. Arguing from a Spinozistic perspective, he indicates that only a 
philosophy of immanence can serve to put ethics on a new footing, but this 
requires another way of thinking about the subject, or more specifically about 
processes of subjectification. The reason this seems necessary to him is because 
of the sad passions and ressentiment induced by forms of social organisation and 
existence which serve to stifle a "logic of multiple affirmation and therefore a 
logic of pure affirmation and a corresponding ethic of joy" (1962: 17). 
This thesis explores the difficulties engendered by this philosophy of im-manence. 
Deleuze and Guattarl have been accused of philosophical idealism' and it is easy 
to see why this Might be the case. Their philosophy rhapsodises about nomads, 
becoming, singularities, forces, abstract machines, haecceities; a vast array of 
philosophical fabulations. It also seems to operate at a level and in a domain verý, 
far removed from people's everyday experiences and cornmon-sense 
understandings of themselves. It is sometimes as though the actuality of the 
world has been dissolved in favour of endless fluxes, flows and forces. ' The 
solidity of the subject and the framework of a systern of morality vanish 
vanquished, and all we are apparently left with is a play of forces and discourses. 
Ethics consequently appears impossible. Such readings fail to grasp the radicahtý, 
of Deleuze's and Guattari's understanding of ethics and subjectivity. I will show 
the critical, concrete and constructivist nature of their philosophy in chapter 5. 
5 See Keith Ansell Pearson (1999: 185-9) and Franqois Laruelle (1986: 58-9). 
6 These kinds of readings are so wide-ranging it is impossible to indicate all the authors. 
They range fi-om introductory texts on so-called 'post-i-nodernism' to Judith Butler (1987: 
'10ý-217) to anything written by Terry Eagleton. This kind of interpretation appears to 
emerge from a particular reading of 'desire' in Anti-Oedipils as erotic. hedonistic, 
spontaneistic and primordial. 
71 do not include Keith Ansell Pearson's and Franqois Laruelle's assiduous critiques in this 
cateoorv. 
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Like Serres, Deleuze strives to oust the donunance of the verb 'to be'. He thinks 
philosophy has remained rooted in the problem of being - IS - and wants to 
reflect on conjunctions and relations (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 56-7) - By 
supplanting 'to be' with an ontology of becoming, alternative logics and physics 
of bodies and relations become possible. This philosophy, like that of Serres, is a 
logic of multiplicities (Deleuze 1990a: 147; Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: viii). This 
logic of multiplicities does not rest on a formula, or set of principles; it is not 
reductionist. It does not try to dissolve heterogeneity but operates through 
symbiosis or sympathy. Its syntheses are not unified: they gather clusters of 
differenciated8 relations. 
This is not a philosophy of fragmentation but of fragility. Serres claims that the 
mechanics of materials teach us that a philosophy of fragments would be 
conservative (1990: 120). By shattering an object into tiny fragments ý-ou create 
tiny localities that are incredibly resistant. "So a philosophy of fragments is 
hyperdefensive; it is the result of hypercriticism, of polemics, of battle, of 
hatred" (120). Some of the philosophers we will draw upon have been accused of 
this hyper- fragmentation; a fragmentation that shatters the subject so much that 
ethics becomes impossible. 
On the contrary I want to emphasise that terms like 'partial objects' do not imply 
division or fragmentation. Instead they develop ways of thinking about how new 
connections and relations can be fostered and new syntheses and symbioses 
emerge. A hyper-differenciation that encourages the proliferation of different 
groups, each appealing to an essentialist and eternal identity, will not create ncN-, - 
connections and modes of being. A capitalist appropriation of diversity seeks to 
contain those differences within relative limits, valorising them in accordance N6th 
its (mlý- universal: moneý-. \Vc will discover how these ideas work throughout the 
rest of this thesis, demonstrating how tlicý- can provide a different Nx-aý- of 
thinking about ethics. 
8 Deleuze's concept of different ciation is explained on p 144 of m. \ thesis. 
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Deleuze's philosophy of difference rests, according to Franýois' Laruelle, upon a 
thought of the inclusive disjunction - the relation of the non-relation (1986: _13). 
This inclusive disjunction is at the core of Deleuze's claims to be at once a 
philosopher of immanence, a thinker of unrs,, ocity, and a pluralist, empiricist and 
advocate of polyphony and dissensus. One of the Nvays in -\,, -hich Deleuze and 
Guattari express this is through the concept of the assemblage. 
Sometimes this concept is interpreted as a temporary and static clustering of 
heterogeneous elements. It may be that Brian I\fassUMI's (1987) translation of 
qgencement as 'assemblage' has meant the dynamism and activity of this term has 
lost its impetus in English. It is for this reason important to emphasise that the 
concept of assemblage entails a way of thinking about an active relationality that 
is not simply the affirmation of an aggregate of distinct terms. Instead terms can 
only be understood in the context of how theý, work, what they do, in a given 
assemblage. This becomes especially clear in the chapter on Spinoza. The ethical 
problem of dual use technology has always emphasised the importance of the 
assemblage that the technology is to be a part of In other words, things have to 
be understood in their milieu rather than in abstraction. And the addition of 
another element may entirely transform the nature of the assemblage. 
To state what a 'thing' is is to speak of it in abstraction, as though it existed 
isolated, immutable and self-identical. A set of properties is thus ascribed, and 
possibilities of existence and transformation are delimited and ordered. 
Furthermore, the genesis of its being, as well as the historical and social 
formations and geological sedimentations of power that mould it, are ignored. 
(Foucault taught us that power is diffuse and operates in networks of relations of 
forces. ) 
Deleuze denounces Hegel for ridiculing pluralism as a naive consciousness saying 
'this, that, here, no, \x-' (1962: 4). Fvery 'thing' has multiple senses depending on 
what relations it is caught up in and the aff1hations or destructions that these 
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relations bring. Every 'thing' is a multiplicityý I explore this thought of 
multiplicIty, a thought that is, unsurprisingly, irreduciblv complex. I Nvant to see 
what the implications of such a thought are for ethics and for subjectivity. The 
concepts I draw on are a function of this problematic. 
Consequently the conjunction AND plays a keý- role in the theory of 
assemblages, )ust as the prefix 'pre-' provides us with a way of thinking about the 
non-human dimensions of humanity. It does tl-lis by decentering the human from 
the heart of its investigations, by no longer presupposing the human as the origin 
or telos of these investigations, in order to think all the better the potentials of 
humans. 
A logic of multiplicities displaces the centrality and primacy of individual terms 
in order to grasp the reality of relations, a reality that is no longer elposten*ofi. It is 
grounded in the thought of a multiplicity in which the multiple is no longer an 
adjective but a substantive. With this concept of multiplicity the One is no longer 
opposed to the Multiple, but multiple terms enter into a symbiotic relation that 
resists unification or the imposition of identity (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972a: 42). 
By focusing on this logic of multiplicities we can explore many of Deleuze and 
Guattarl's concepts ranging from the concept of 'difference -in-its elf' to those of 
the 'virtual' and the 'assemblage'. This logic of multiplicities critiques the image 
that thought gives to itself of what it is to think; it constructs a thought without 
image. 
iv. activating concepts: philosophy and resistance 
Thinking is always experiencing, experimenting, not interpreting but 
experimenting and what we experience, experiment with, is always actuality, 
what's coming into being, what's new, what's taking shape Without histon, 
the experiments would remain indeterminate [ ... 1. 
Gilles Deleuze, A'(gotiations (1 990a: 106). 
Donna Hara,, N-aN- says that "A comn-ntment to mobfle positioning and to 
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passionate detachment is dependent on the impossibility of innocent 'identity' 
politics and epistemologies as strategies for seeing from the standpoints of the 
subjugated in order to see well" (1991: 192). This shift in perspective is evident in 
Deleuze's work. He admits in his televised inter-, -lc, \x-s with Claire Parnet (1994-5) 
that all his works have tried to discover the nature of the event, since such a 
concept could undermine the domination of the verb 'to be'. I have indicated the 
ethico-political implications of such a move throughout this introduction. 
Haraway warns us that to see from below is a problem; it is not an innocent 
position, even though 'subjugated' standpoints are to be preferred (191). Even an 
attempt to 'see well' still blinds Deleuze to his own ideolog cal position as a "f st- 1 ir 
world intellectual masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter who lets the 
oppressed speak for themselves", according to Gayatri Spivak (1988: 292). 
Spivak's hostile reading of Deleuze (and Foucault) presents them as thinkers who 
consistently ignore both "the episten-nc violence of imperialism and the 
international division of labour" (289). She accuses them of constructing a 
homogeneous Other (of third-worldism) (288-9). Because these philosophers 
have no truck with the concept of ideology, she feels they do not consider the 
relation of desire, power, subjectivity and cannot therefore articulate a theory of 
interests (273). 
She is, of course, correct to note that Deleuze and Guattan eschew the concept 
of ideology Peleuze and Guattari, 1972a: 104). They argue that when the masses 
act against their own interests, it is not because they are subject to an illusion but 
concerns rather the unconscious investments they make from the position of 
desire. This is not the same as speaking of a subject wbo desires. Their renovated 
relation of desire, power, subjecti-, 7-itA, and interests operates differentl)- to theories 
of ideologý-- It does not presuppose the identities it speaks of, but exanuines the 
conditions for the emergence of certain collective inN-estments of desire (for 
example the case of fascism, which cannot be simply explained by an appeal to 
ideologý)- 
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Like Spinoza, they simultaneously affirm that i en the series of causes that havc 911- 
produced any given reality it is as perfect as it can be - even if that means 
populations are at the lowest ebb of their activity - and strive to transform that 
reality through an etl-iics of liberation. These positions are not contradictory bUt 
rest on a Bergsonian critique of the retrospective illusion of the 'possible' 
(Bergson, 1889). The realisable possible extrapolates the future from a present 
condition. The future then seems to pre-exist as a ready-made solution to a givcn 
problem. Deleuze introduces the concept of the 'virtual' to avoid the mechanism 
of resemblance that we perceive in the 'possible-real' relation. The virtual is 
opposed to the actual but is absolutely real. In this context, the virtual operates as 
the real condition for the creation of new modes of existence as a t-reatedpossible. 
These do not pre-exist their actualisation in the guise of models or plans. Their 
resistance to the notion of ideology stems from their idea of the virtual as a 
t-reated possible as it is conjoined with the conception of pluralism and logic of 
multiplicities that we discussed earlier. 
Creating is a form of resisting, claim Deleuze and Guattarl. Their clusters and 
networks of concepts challenge the dominant orders of thinking. They oppose a 
rhizomatic thought to an arborescent thought which is hierarchical and 
representational. A rhizome operates in the fashion of a network without any 
unifying point or organisational principle. Its raison dWre is to seek connections, 
and to be quahtatively transformed once certain immanent thresholds have been 
reached. This is life as experimentation. 
The arborescent image of thought (Deleuze, 1968a: 129-167) not only has a 
philosophical importance but describes a principle of organisation, what terms, 
concepts or values are privileged, NNhat is exclude& A thought that rests upon 
U11lVersals and assimilates differences, reducing them to its categories, cannot 
grasp singularities. Everything has already been set out in advance. All that 
"belongs to a thought without image - nomadism, the xvar-macl-: iine, becomings, 
nuptials against nature, capture and thefts, interregnums, minor languages or 
guage, etc. -s crushed and denounced as a nuisance" stammering of Ian 11 -)eleuze 
14 
INTRODUCTION 
and Parnet, 1977: 14). The art of creating taxonomi*es and classifications will not 
shudder to an early end if principles of universahn- are not made to bear down 
upon them, but will operate differently, finding new relations of non- sub sump tive 
commonality. 
Spinoza explains with joy the importance of composing different rela ions and ti 
finding the relations and activities that suit you, as well as the ways that these are 
expressed. His understanding of a philosophy (and ethics) of immanence as one 
of force (puz*ssamelpotenfiq) and not of properties or propositions is absolutely 
crucial to Deleuze's argument that Being is univocal. It also helps us to further 
our understanding of a lo ic of multiplicities. Deleuze says, "Human forces 91 1 
(having an understanding, a will, an imagination, and so on) have to combinewith 
other forces: an overall form arises from this combination, but everything 
depends on the nature of the other forces with which the human forces become 
linked" (1990a: 117). 
Deleuze and Guattari invent new ways of understanding processes of 
subjectification and singularisation. In tandem with this is the blossoming of 
another kind of ethics. Throughout their works they draw upon the conception 
of a pre-individual, pre-personal field of singularities in order to grasp a 
dimension of being (becoming) that is no longer individual nor personal nor 
universal. This is important not just to trace the genesis of the individual, a 
movement that has the individuated being as its telos, but to comprehend the 
domain of transformation that cannot be designated in energetico-spatio- 
temporal terms. This domain does not fulfil the criterion of being a condition of 
possibility for experience, but offers the conditions for the invention of the new. 
This transformation of the waý- that we think about the individual feeds into our 
understanding of the subject, thought and being. The kind of 'subject' that 
Deleuze and Guattari talk about (on the occasions they use the word) concerns 
processes of subjectification and singtdarisation that are no longer personal. 
Reahtv is dvnarnic, processLial and creative and thev create mobile concepts in 
accordance with this. 
15 
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V. singular transformations 
A singularity is a threshold point; the moment N-, -here everyd-iing is transformed. 
These transformations make a bistog but the event is the imperceptible and 
critical point of transformation. Deleuze quotes P6guy, 
Events have critical points just as temperature has critical points - points of 
fusion, congelation, boiling, condensation, coagulation and crystallization. And 
even within the event there are states of surfeit which are precipitated, 
crystallized, and determined only by the introduction of a fragment of a future 
event. 
Charles P6guy quoted in Gilles Deleuze, TI)e Louic of Sense. (1969: 53). 
I want to concentrate on the incorporeal, transformational and critical aspect of 
an event in this thesis. This is not to denigrate or disn-niss history (and memory)l 
as unimportant. This would be ludicrous (and unhveable). If to create is to resist, 
as Deleuze and Guattari assert, it is to create from a situation with a set of 
materials and limitations. They talk at length about 'assemblages' and 'machines' 
(the Feudal machine, the Capitalist machine ... ) that produce different kinds of 
subjectivity, power formations, modes of existence and relationality. "If you tie 
someone up and say to him 'Express yourself, friend', the most he will be able to 
say is that he doesn't want to be tied up" (Deleuze and Parnet, 1977: 96). In 
essence, they want to tap into, and create, other ways of being and capacities of 
expression. 
A singularity is a bifurcation point. Things are no longer as they used to be... Our 
language is filled with expressions speaking of these states - 'I'm cracking up'... 'It 
9 Deleuze writes a great deal on memory. His book Bergsonism (I 966a) explored this theme 
in depth. His chapter on 'Repetition' in Difference and Repetition (I 968a) explores different 
kinds of tirne and memory (and the constitution of different selves) from the passive 
contractile habits of the present, to the virtual memory of Bergson that makes time pass, and 
the Nietzschean eternal return that is a repetition of the future. In Cinema L- The . 1101, CI)IC171- 
It? 7age (1983) he draws upon this Bergsonian image of the virtual \vhole and describes an 
ontolo,, ical conception of mernory. In Anti-Oedipus (1972a) with Guattari, he mobilises 
Nietzsche's theatre of cruelt\ to discuss a memory embedded in the flesh that marks a 
collective rnernorisation. 
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has reached breaking point... 'under pressure'... 'enough is enough'. These 
phrases express an intolerable situation, the point where something has to give. 
'I'l-iis may take place on the grand-scale - imagine a society arrives at such a 
supersaturated state that a minor incident triggers a revolution (or a war). The 
aftermath of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a nineteen year 
old student illustrates this. Ri idified and routinised existence can also be utterlý- 91 
transformed by the addition of a new, apparentlý, banal element to one's 
existence. Suddenly everything changes and possible worlds are actuahsed. 11' 
Guattari. spent a great deal of time figuring this out when working with 
schizophrenics in La Borde chnic. " If creation is resistance,, it attempts to 
transform concrete conditions and to create a space for other modes of 
valonsation and existence. If a rhizome is an anti-memory it is because it escapes 
don-unant modes of identification and invents new connections and relations. 12 
vi. the engendering of the virtual 
Deleuze explains how this strange ontolog), that we have been exploring might 
function by developing a difficult but revelatory theory of difference in Dý1, 
. 
1ýrent, e 
and Repelition (1968a). From his 1956 essay on 'Bergson's Conception of 
Difference' Deleuze had tried to show the necessity for developing a concept of 
'difference -in-its elf'. I will argue in chapter 5 that there is not Just a philosophical 
motivation for this exercise but an ethico-political one. " 
10 This idea has resonances with contemporary researches into chaos theory that speak of the 
famed 'butterfly effect'. See also Prigogine and Stengers, (1988). Entre le temps et 
VýIcrnitj. Librairie Arth&me Fayard. 
'' Guattari worked at La Borde clinic with Jean Oury and Franqois Tosquelles (who himself 
worked with Frantz Fanon for a long time). 
I) See Keith Ansell Pearson (1999: 223-4) on history and politics in relation to the event. 
13 Like Paul Gilroy, I try to hold together ethics and politics in order to set out a practical 
philosophy. He argues that we need to get beyond nationalism in order to reevaluate the 
significance of the modern nation state, and to examine closely political and economic 
relations in the context of the relationship of the politics of information and the practices of 
capitalist accumulation. He goes on to say "Its effects underpin more recounisably political 
changes like the growing centrality of transnational ecological movements which. throu, -, h 
their insistence on the association of sustainabilivy and justice, do so much to shift the moral 
and scientific precepts on which the modern separation of politics and ethics was built" 
(1993): 7). See also Paul Patton (2-1000) and Ian McKenzie (1997) for sorne ideas of ho\\ 
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Deleuze was fascinated with the concept of 'becoming'. He revelled 'in the , -, -a)- 
that this notion eluded all Plato's attempts to capture and contain it - Alice getting 
bigger (than she was) and smaller (than she will be) simultaneously. The slippery 
nature of such an idea resounds with the notions of intensitýy and singularity that 
we will examine in detail in chapter 4. A temperature, redness, a wind, to run, a 
laugh... all of these transmit his idea of becoming and intensity because they 
cannot be captured, identified and delimited. They are pre-personal and pre- 
individual. 
We saw earlier the importance of symbiotic relations in Deleuze's and Guattarl's 
thought. The concept of symbiosis is connected to the idea of a becoming 
because it gives reality to the relation between two terms in a way that does not 
make it simply an effect of the encounter of those terms. In that encounter there 
is a qualitative transformation. Butler showed us how humans are modified bý- 
their prostheses. We will see how this kind of idea relates to concepts of 
becoming and intensity in chapter 6. 
Deleuze mobilises and 'synaesthesises' all of these ideas in order to articulate his 
conception of a pre-individual transcendental field in 'Immanence: A Life... ' 
(1995). Here, he demonstrates clearly that this idea of transcendental philosophy 
does not signify a quest to map the conditions of possibility of experience, but is 
concerned with the conditions for the production of reality and the invention of 
the new In this vein of thought, he remarked of the will to power that, 
if it constitutes a superior empiricism, this is because it is an essentially plastic 
principle that is no wider than what it conditions, that changes itself with the 
conditioned and determines itself in each case along with what it determines. 
The will to power is, indeed, never separable from particular determined forces, 
from their quantities, qualities and directions. 
Gilles Deleuze, A'ielýsche and Philosopý)),. (1962: 50). 
Deleuze's and Guattari's concepts might impact upon political theory and the field of 
political philosophy. 
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Earlier we looked briefly at the concept of the virtual in relation to the conditions 
for the production of the new When we come to speak further of the role of the 
virtual in this philosophy in relation to a 'transcendental empiricism', the 
circuitous nature of a kind of 'auto c ataly tic' feedback between it and the actual 
must be borne in mind. There are many virtuals operating in Deleuze's 
philosophy]4 but I want to suggest a couple of points of contmonahty between 
them. The virtual never operates in a transcendent manner; it always names a 
space of potential or transformation, whether it be the diagonal Ariadnean thread 
that makes the Whole open in Cinema /: The Movement Image (1983), the field of 
potential of DýJýrente and Repetition (1968a) or the event of 11"bat 1S P&losopl! y? 
(1991a). The aspects of the virtual that I want to concentrate upon relate to my 
concern to show how Deleuze's and Guattari's philosophies of inunanence work. 
The virtual/actual relation so key to DýJýren(-e and Repetition does not, as Alain 
Badiou (1997) would have us believe, imply a Platonism of the virtua115. Instead it 
forces us to think of the possibilities that can be unleashed within a system, the 
subjective and affective relations that emerge once we rupture a donuinant image 
of thought that subsumes difference under, or conjoins it to, identity. In effect, it 
exhorts us to move from a 'common-sense' understanding of reality, that thinks 
in accordance with a representational model of thought and operates in 
accordance with a principle of recognition, to the thought of a pre-individual 
field. T I-Lis opens up a space for a politics of transfiguration, and an ethics 
premised upon immanent criteria that can invent new modes of existence. 16 
vii. the pre-individual as state of excess 
Gilbert Simondon haunts all of Deleuze's work right until his final article 
'Immanence: a Life... '. His understanding of protvsSes of individuation rests on the 
14 See Keith Ansell-Pearson (forthcoming) for meditations on this theme. 
Neither does it correspond directIN NvIth a sensiblelintelligible dichotomy. 
Gilroy (1993a: 37) takes this term from Seyla Benhabib as he asks ho%v utopias are 
concei\ ed. 
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initial articulation of a transcendental field harbounng pre-individual singulanties. 
Writing just after the publication of Prigogine's groundbreaking "vork on 
dissipative systems, he is attuned to many of Prigogine's ideas. He blended 
physics, biology, chemistry, sociology, technology and philosophy into a fantastic 
concoction. This absolutely captivated Deleuze, ',, and Simondon's theoretical 
apparatus would be key to Deleuze's enterprise of constructing a transcendental 
empiricism refreshingly and resolutely bereft of appeals to any transcendent 
realm. 
SiMondon claimed that by solely focusing on the individual or group we linger on 
the verges of an impoverished reality. With this observation he strikes close to the 
heart of Deleuze's and Guattari's philosophical adventures. He explains that we 
need to understand the pr&, esses of individuation and we will fail to do so if we trý, 
to explain the genesis and becoming of the individual by extrapolating from traits 
or characteristics of the already individuated being, or by appealing to principles 
of individuation such as hylomorphism or atomism. He introduces the concept 
of the pre-individual field in order to describe a 'zone' that cannot be explained 
by appeals to categories pren-nsed upon a pre-existing subject or object. 
This understanding of pre-individual singularities, married with the differential 
ontology proposed by Deleuze and Guattarl, reveals to us how these ideas are 
fundamental to re-thinking subjectivity and ethics. Indeed Etienne Bahbar couples 
SiMondon and Spinoza and argues that Spinoza, contrary to Hegel's claims, is 
only ever thinking about prot-esses of individuation. In chapter 4,1 seek to show 
how all these themes resonate by clarifying further the concepts of the pre- 
individual and transindividual that, Bahbar believes, make Simondon a Spinozist. 
SI pinoza, like Sffnondon, will be revealed to be a philosopher of immanence and 
force. He proposed an understanding of the individual and relationahtý- that is 
processual, dynamic and collective, concealing an heretical understanding of the 
relationships of mind and bodv, and individual and Nature. His theorv of 
17 344 n. 3) and (I 968a: 146). Scc Deletize (1969: 104-5,1 - 
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affectivjtý, and philosophy of force are central to our task of re-imagining ctliics 
(and subjectivity). 
Spinoza understands the imagination to be impressionistic. It reveals the state of 
our body (and mind) as it is affected by other bodies (and minds). An abstract 
phrase or image will evoke different images depending on how a body has been 
shaped by the relations it has entered into. Spinoza says that a soldier who sees 
the tracks of a horse will think of the rider and of war, while a peasant will think 
of a plough and a field JI. pr. 18. sch. ). This is a passive and reactivc mode of 
existence that indicates the state of our bodies rather than cultivating relations of 
com. monality that enhance our powers of existing, helping us to discover our 
thresholds. Only through an ethics of experimentation can we learn what is good 
for us. Abstraction as generalisation erases the specificity of different bodies and 
minds. An essentialism that can neither cope with those specificities, nor engage 
with bodies in their activities and diverse formations and compositions, provides 
a fertile ground for reactive stereotyping and prejudice, or in-group claims to 
superiority. 
Spinoza's conception of essence is nod-iing other than such a dynamical and 
relational activity. He calls it conatus JIL pr. 7), which relates it to his philosophy of 
power (Potentia) J. pr. 34). In chapter 3 we will learn how Spinoza's ethics is one 
of singularities, expressed both in terms of power and in terms of the 'network' 
of relations with other existing modes. "' This conception of reality as processual 
and relational calls for fluid taxonomies, no longer premised upon principles of 
resemblance or homology, but on the commonality of singularities. (SiMondon 
writes some beautiful passages on the need for a new logic that grasps and 
comprehends differences. He calls it 'transduction'. ) Finally, Spinoza volunteers a 
critique of Power (Poteslas). Power strips individuals of their capacities to foster 
multiple affects and connections, denuding them, by imposing an abstract image 
18 1 realise I arn introducing sorne unfamiliar terms here, terms I will explain later. but I do 
this to draw attention to this radical re-working of the concept of the indi\ idual. It may be 
that such a teri-n is no longer appropriate. 
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that serves to deny and block diversity and movement. 
I will examine Spinoza's EMICs in some detail and show how he thinks about a 
praxiology of liberation that rests on new forms of association. In chapter 61 
will fuse these ideas with Deleuze's and Guattarl's complex theories of 
relationahty and emergence. Their ethologIcal and musical motifs lead us toward a 
philosophy of praxis that seeks to compose new relations and invent new 
possibilities of existing. By displacing the centrality of the human they accentuate 
the reality of a non-human nature that traverses humanity and makes ethics 
possible. I try to tl-iink, along with Nietzsche, beyond the human condition and to 
suggest other ways of d-tinking about subjectivity, relationahty, and consequently 
ethics. 
This pre-occupation with the question of difference led Deleuze to cultivate, in 
his own writings and his work with Guattari, a veritable bestiary of concepts 
clustering about this idea of 'difference-in-itself'. Maný- of these concepts are 
unfamiliar, counter-intuitive (or intuitive if you are a Bergsoman) and force a 
radical shift in the ways we think about the emergence of subjectivity. Vincent 
Descombes (1991: 120) says that the penchant for critiquing the subject and 
subjectivity amongst French philosophers remained limited to critiquing the 
t'oncepts of the subject and subjectivity. T want to show that Deleuze and Guattari 
would agree the element of critique is futile if it does not have as its correlate 
transformation and construction of new possibilities of thinking and being. We 
are swept into an atmosphere in which the subject is displaced in favour of 
processes of singularisation, an idea we will explore in further detail. 
It is sometimes difficult to understand why Deleuze and Guattarl make frequent 
use of monstrous concepts such as 'assemblages' (qgenivments), 'abstract machines' 
and 'transversal communication'. These neologisms do not constitute a feeble 
desire for obscurantism but are an integral part of their understanding of v, -hat 
philosophy is. Philosophy does not seek to expose an underlying reahty or to 
represent and mediate experience. It invents, and thinks in, concepts. The non- 
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philosophical presuppositions that shape the dominant image of thought of a 
society are laid bare in order to create new possibilities of thinking (and 
consequently of acting). Deleuze ah,,, ays insisted that thought and existence were 
restricted by the prevailing dogmatic image of thought and continued to expand 
on this theme until the end of his life. 19 
Although Deleuze seldom speaks of ethics at length, an ethics rumbles along the 
cracked surface of all his writings. Moreover, despite the fact that his specific 
allusions to a new thought of subjectivity remain somewhat guarded and 
sporadic, (although this is always animplicit motivation in all of his writing) the 
proliferation of concepts he introduces - haecceities, singularities, desiring- 
machines... - are all implicated in this different understanding of the potentials of 
subjectivity. Guattari also develops a conception of processual subjectivity and an 
ethics of singularities in his own work. Again we will see how this operates in our 
final chapter. 
viii. the appropriation of difference 
We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in 
itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist. 
Europeanization does not constitute a becoming but merely the history of 
capitalism, which prevents the becoming of subjected peoples. 
Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, Wl'hat is Philosoply? (1991 a: 108). 
In the meantime, however, I want to ground my theoretical apparatus. I am 
reticent to launch into the full flight of philosophical abstraction when Marx and 
Engels' scathing remarks echo to the present day. In The German IdeolqV (1932) 
they comment with disdain upon the way that philosophers attempt the 
'liberation' of 'man' through abstract phraseology, ignoring the real struggle of 
real liberation in the real world. This is \N-hy I want to spend rny first two chapters 
situating this debate concerning the question of difference, a debate that has real 
ethico-political implications. 
19 See Deletize (1962 and 1968a). 
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The invocation of so maný, difficult and unfamiliar terms can only be Justified if 
they serve to break existing habits of thought that limit possibilities of thinking 
and existing. These operate, like most sanctions, as an invisible and inaudible 
realm that springs to life in the face of transgression. The sedimentation of 
social, political, cultural, economic and psycholo ical structures, or NvaN-s of being, 1 91 
cannot be considered without an understanding of power relations. In my first 
chapter I want to explore some of the ways that difference, in the broadest sense, 
has been silenced and also the ways that it has come to voice. I want to positivise 
difference, dissensus and diversity, but not in a way that ignores the specific 
realities of different power formations, and not in a way that appeals to 
essentialism in any absolutist (and particularist) manner. 
I believe Deleuze and Guattari's critique and invention of concepts rests to a 
large extent upon an opposition to what bell hooks calls White Capitalist 
Patriarchy. In my first chapter I will examine some of the ways that people haN-e 
articulated their thoughts, concerns and ideas about 'difference'. This is not 
simply to contextuahse my own problematic but also serves to communicate the 
concrete nature of the philosophising I am engaged in. 
In chapter 2,1 contend that a fruitful way to grasp the radical nature of Deleuze's 
and Guattari's responses to these questions is to situate their work in the context 
of global capitalism. Although I recognise both the limited (and polemical) nature 
of my exposition of this area, I feel that it is clear that this was a major bone of 
contention for both thinkers. After all, they wrote two volumes on 'Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia'. In fact, Deleuze once said, "I think F6hx Guattan and I have 
remained Marxists, in our two different ways, perhaps, but both of us. You see we 
think that aný- political phflosophý- must turn on the analysis of capitalism and the 
waý-s it has developed" (1990b: 171). 
Guattaris final book ChaoswoSIS (1992a) was written in exphclt opposition to what 
lic understood to be the mass-mediatisation of society and the restricted and 
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deformed nature of capitalist subjectivitýý Subjec i ity for Guattari, i tivi 1 is never pre- 
existent but is produced. Deleuze also pinpointed a shift in the machination, of s 
societies from 'societies of discipline' to 'societies of control' (1990c); the latter 
signifies a mutation of capitalism into a society of communication based on 
immaterial labour and modulating operations of power. Antonio Negri and 
Michael Hardt take up this analysis of global capitalism in their book Empire 
(2000). My analysis of this text is primarily concerned with the processes of 
subJectification and the flUldity and fle ibility of the 'new' capitalism that they xi 1 
delineate. I also exarrune the commodification of difference. I want to show wllý- 
the capitalist appropriation of difference and diversity does not signal a death- 
knell for an ethics of liberation. 
As I have indicated the rest of the thesis will seek to lay out a philosophical 
framework that emerges from these problems. I will conclude by showing how 
Deleuze's and Guattari's concepts opens up new ways of thinking about 
subjectivity, identity and ethics by showing not only the necessitý- for 
transformational praxes, but how these can be composed and, as Serres says, cast 
off 
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I. i. philosophical underpinnings 
What follows is not pure philosophy. (What philosophy ever isý Contan-unation 
and symbioses are enriching. ) It gravitates about two central themes - subjectIvAN, 
and ethics. These are familiar, even well-worn, themes in philosophical discourse. 
My aim is not one of synopsis, overview or criticism of these fields. That would 
be hubn's. Rather I engage in a positive and constructive endeavour, trying to 
extract the ethico-political ramifications of a certain series of philosophical 
concepts. My presentation of ethics may seem foreign since I will seek to show 
how the thought of an emergent and partial subjectivity necessitates putting aside 
philosophical approaches that rest on a presupposition of either subject or object 
(phenomenology, positivism ... ). 
However, rather than rushing headlong into the minutiae of the strange ontology 
that Deleuze and Guattari elaborate, it is important to situate their problematic. If 
philosophy is invention, shot through with an element of the fantastical, this does 
not banish it to idealism. It is also a pragmatics, concerned with transformations 
of social practices. Such a pragmatics requires, as we will see, an understanding of 
the virtual, the potential of transformation. 
Franýois Laruelle believes that all of Deleuze's work is a 'prodigious' variation on 
the one theme of a Nietzschean concept of difference (1986: 7). For Laruelle, 
Difference (La Dýffýren(-e) names a constellation of thinkers and a particular 
problematic (15) arising from nowhere to fight a battle on several fronts, 
including those of phenomenology and dialectical contradiction. Difference has 
dominated the philosophy of the twentieth century (17). It concerns a distinctive 
waý- of articulating philosophical language by expressing the autonomy of 
Difference from the principles of Being and Unin-, raising it, in the case of 
Deleuze and Nietzsche, to the po-\x-cr of a principle (18). As a philosophical 
decision, not onlý- is it a sN-ntax, but it expresses a particular understanding of the 
real, and is also a certain experience of the real (16). Laruelle takes issue NX-1th the 
presuppositions and circularity of this mode of thinking (39), something I shall 
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return to later. I think, however, that in the above insights he offers an acute 
diagnosis (and critique) of the symptom of difference. 
The question of difference constitutes an implicit starting point for this 
exploration of subjectivity and ethics. A philosophy that can think 'difference-in- 
itself', rather than always situating difference in relation to "forms of 
representation which reduce it to the Same [ ... ]" (Deleuze, 1968a: xix) finds itself 
more capable of comprehending emergence, process and the invention of new 
modes of existence. 
relevant or relative 
Paul Patton (2000) reminds us that Deleuze does not write political philosoph) 
but shows instead how philosophy is inherently political. Dý zfi 11 is . 
)ýrent'e and Repe io 
not simply a philosophical treatise on the interrelations of difference and 
repetition but contains the lagged beauty of untamed thought that vies with 
formahsm. in order to give birth to a possibility of thinking and being otherwise. 
Deleuze, as Laruelle intimates, posits difference as a principle and gives it a 
primacy over identityý Previously the concept of difference had been reduced to 
cmerely' a conceptual difference (difference-ftom). 
This giddy affirmation of difference and intensities provokes a whole new way of 
thinking about the subject. This is a world of pre-personal singularities and non- 
personal individuations that is not diluted into an elusive spiritualism but is 
thrown instead into practice. It is an exciting doubling in philosophy that explores 
the interrelation of virtual and actual. The detective work of tracing these 
concepts takes place in a future that awaits creation. 
But another question foflo,, xs in these tracks that asks what the illicit pre- 
philosopl-ýcal presuppositions that shape the understanding of what it is to think 
(and what can be thought) are. The dominant and dogmatic image of thought 
hinges upon a modcl of recognition that seeks to assirmlate difference to the llý 
I Iti e eL zc, 1968a: xv). catcgorlcs ()f identitv, slMllaritv, analogy and oppos' 'on ý) Ii 
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This addresses many of the questions about representationalism and universalism 
that traditional political theorists refuse to acknowledge. 
Deleuze's work interrogates a philosophit'al concept of difference, N-et it shares 
many of the concerns and criticisms of those thinkers whose writings we will be 
examining shortly. A subversive Nietzscheamsm runs through Deleuze's oeuvre 
that endeavours to re-evaluate all values. The upheavals that trail in the "X-ake of 
his thought do not stem from a postmodern obduracy on his part, but from a 
refusal to submit to conventional ways of seeing and questioning. 
Deleuze never tried to get rid of the concepts of identity and sameness but "was 
concerned with the question of how identity is constituted, and what forms it 
takes" (Patton, 2000: 29). He sought to escape from the mechanisms of a 
structure of representation, burrowing through its architectonics to create new 
entry points and exits. I will argue that this ambition is at the kernel of his logic 
of multiplicities and will show the ethico-political implications of this. This 
constitutes an argument with the organisations of Power that attempt to seal off 
thoughts and practices that fundamentally challenge their modus operandi. 
Otherwise variation and invention are only permitted within certain limits. 
In addition, we will consider the striking situatedness of Deleuze and Guattari's 
philosophy of the political. We must read their collaborations in the context of 
global capitalism. They do not shrug off the challenge to critique and create 
escape-routes or 'lines of flight' from the labyrinthal interspersals of neo- 
archaisms and relative 'deterritorialisations' of capitalism(s). Uncannily, and 
disconcertinglý- for some, they summarily refuse to approach the question of the 
human in accordance with traditional (or even contemporarý-) norms as when 
theN- claim, "Human rights are axioms. The\- can coexist on the market with manN- 
other axioms, notably those concerning the security of property, which are 
unaware of or suspend them even more than theý- contradict them [ ... ]" (1991a: 
107). Is this an indifference to the fate of humanity, satisfying their critics that an 
thesc two philosophers desired was immersion in the NN-omb-hke cocoon of their 
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own desiring- flows 
Contrary to appearances, at stake here is not the assumption of an anti-human 
stance that repudiates humanity. Remarkably enough, the opposite is true. Let us 
take an example to show where their real concerns he. Democracies are 
majorities, say Deleuze and Guattari (1991a), so we need to ask about the 
elements of a democracy that elude its grasp; its 'becomings-tn . noritanan'. The 
material and incorporeal universes that strip humans of dignitý- create a zone of 
intoleration - the threshold point that we came across in our introduction - and 
potentially the transformation of a miheu. By discovering and inventing 
'problematics' which result from a disparateness, a tension in a sN,, stem, they 
construct their inunanent philosophy of the political. But this philosophy is one 
founded in critique. As Eric Alliez stresses, their philosophy is an etho-ontology 
(1997: 85). 
Spinoza's Ethics rests upon at least one negative (i. e. empty) - though fundamental 
- proposition about human nature. We could go so far as to say that the crux of 
Spinoza's ethical theory is located in the proposition that humans are nomhere born 
free and are everywhere in chains. Ethics for him is a ceaseless process of 
liberation. Liberalism, that posits a discrete or atomistic individual, and 
con-imunitarianism, that abstracts a 'common good', are challenged by Spinoza's 
complex account of individuation and relationality (though he too believes that 
democratic forms of organisation and association best nourish the potentials of 
humans). 
Deleuze and Guattarl radicalise these ideas, mobilising his theory of affectivity in 
f', 
I'%Tour of a theory of assemblages, and accounts of becomings and multiplicities. 
These terms are prior to form and structure, object and subject. Thcy displace the 
centrality of the subject and re-imagine the question of subjectiITJty. An eagerness 
to invent a new- conception of subjectivity that travcrses domains from 
technology to poetry, quilt-making to basket-weaving and ancient mythology to 
ecology, reveals the extraordinarily ambitious and unusual nature of their \x-()rk. 
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Like Michael Hardt (1993) and Paul Patton (2000), 1 believe Deleuze and Guattan 
are gesturing toward a radical democracy by proposing a concept of critical 
freedom. The radical nature of this democracy does not sImply address the 
question of inclusion. Tt is a mutant mosaic of figures from Alarx and \Lffl to 
Butler and Aristotle. 
Although Deleuze and Guattarl have coherent theoretical accounts of the 
emergence and operations of over-coding of the State, as well as a rigorous 
theory of capitalism, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss these 
elements in the detail they deserve. My work will concentrate on the 'utopianism' 
of their philosophy by trying to set out how this operates in the context of the 
State and capitalism. In order to articulate the radicahty of their venture it is 
important to situate it alongside other theoretical approaches. 
I. M. theory and practice 
A non-evaluative definition of democracy presents it as a "system of decision- 
making in which all those who are subject to the decision have equally effective 
power to determine the political outcome of the decision-making" (Hyland, 1995: 
81). Although I can understand the concerns about 'moral imperialism' and 
'relativism' that precipitate such a definition, the formalism of this account of 
democracy leaves something to be desired, even as it purports to include 
previously excluded groups. Athenian democracy is often posited as qualitatively 
superior to contemporary democracies despite its exclusion of much of the 
populace. But Aristotle had legendarily postulated that no man who needs to work 
for a living could be an effective citizen. Does democracy in mass capitalist 
societies hijack the qualitative superiority of Greek democracy to mask its own 
Solely quantitatwe face? Or do -\N-e have to re-think the question of democracy 
altogether? 
Like many ferninist and post-colonial critics I Nvant to contend that the exclusions 
of democracies cannot be dismissed as innocuous, unfortunate, but ultimately 
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incidental to the actual functioning of a democracý. "11 The co-option of 
differences under the umbrella of universahsm still retains a thought of 
difference as deviation from a norm, refusing to re-imagine democracy through 
diversity. As Slavoj Zizek often surnUses, marginalised groups are 'included out'. 
Political theorists have consistently failed to interrogate the processes of 
normalisation of a system which has traditionally upheld as an invisible constant 
or standard the "aN-erage-white-heterosexual European-male- speaking a standard 
language [ ... I" (Deleuze and Guattan, 1980: 105). Humanism has an insidious 
underbelly of racism, classism and sexism, and has been tainted by these 
practices. This cannot be ignored. 
Human rights say nothing about the immanent modes of existence of people 
provided with rights. 
Gflles Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, If "hal is Philosoply? (1991 a: 107). 
The final passages of Fanon's The [Vrelthed qj' tl)e Eartl) decrý, the inhumanity of 
Europe's humanism. He says "Leave this Europe where theýý are never done 
talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them [ ... 1" (1961: 311). 
The 
recklessness and hypocrisy of Europe are not to be rewarded b)- making Africa a 
new Europe. For Fanon this could be the opportunity to create a renovated 
humanity, one no longer shrivelled, amputated and enslaved bý- raciolo ical 91 
discourse and practice. The challenge is then not to oppose the whiteness of 
Europe with a reinvigorated blackness of Africa, but to invcnt a new concept of 
humanity. He remarks, "When I search for Man in the technique and the stý, Ie of 
Europe, I see only a succession of negations of man, and an avalanche of 
murders" (312). The terrors of modernity have been well- documented, and 
challenges to the universalisms it purported have been sustained. In the spirit of 
Fanon's work, I seek to imagine other possibilities of the human. 
Ways of understanding or constructing differences arise from specific 
problematics, and are therefore theorised in different v, -avs. Some conceptions of 
20 '-, ee Carol Paternan (1988), GenevieN e Lloyd (1984) and Molra Gatens (I 996a). 
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difference even require a theoretical position of 'ustification - the discrin-uinatorv 
practices of racisms, for instance (Bahbar and Wallerstein, 1988: 19). By 
examining how difference is mobilised and articulated as a category, we NX-111 
consider how difference can be mobilised as a principle and a force of 
transformation. Exploring texts relating to "race", gender, ethnicitv, culture and 
nation does not conflate these different zones but will, I hope, draw out the 
richness of relations and complexity between and within these domains, both 'in 
terms of critique and the constructions of new waý, s of being. 
The very category of the human needs to be re-thought. Humanism has been 
consolidated and tainted through a systematic inhumanity (Gilroy, 2000: 18). 21AU 
of the critical work I discuss should be read as complementary to Deleuze and 
Guattarl's own work, although much of it differs insofar as non-human 
beconlings of the human constitute a major part of their particular 'utopian' 
.Q 22 pragmatics. 
The well-being and the progress of Europe have been built up with the sweat 
and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs and Indians, and the yellow races. We 
have decided not to overlook this any longer. 
Frantz Fanon, The lf, "retched of the Earth (1961: 96). 
Straqe Mulfiplicio: Constitutionalism in an -,, Ige of Diversio maps a critical and 
constructive enterprise that highlights a number of the presuppositions and 
blindspots in the dominant constitutional traditions; i. e. nationalism, liberalism 
and communitarianiSM. 23 In this book, James TuUN, negotiates the unstable 
I It is for this reason that Gilroy (2000) unearths the links between raciological thinking and 
hurnanism and emphasises the necessity to construct an anti-race humanism. Although the 
concrete realities of raciological thinking and practices are apparent and must not be 
ignored, this does not mean that ýve should not try to "free ourselves from the bonds of all 
raciology in a novel and ambitious abolitionist project" (2000: 15). Fanon had long before 
shown the de-hurnanisation that accompanies raciological categorisation, for both black and 
white people. His rallying cry is 'toward a neýN, humanism'. 
22 See Deleuze and Guattari (1980: 99-100) on utopia and its relation to Sarnuel Butler's 
Ei-eii, hon. 
2 ', The Lakota Sioux Elder, Luther Standing Bear saýs. "Did a kind, wise, helpful and 
bene\ olent conqueror bring this situation about? Can a real, true. genuinelý superior social 
order NNork such havoc? Did not the native American possess human qualities of worth had 
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territory of conflicting claims for cultural recognition in the context of Canada. 
Adopting a method of historical cultural critique, he identifies those 
presuppositions and conventions that haN-e informed the debate over recognition, 
but have not been explicitly examined. There has been an ambiguous relationship 
between pluralism and sameness. Diversity and pluralism are often . , -cn 1 91 
lipservice by liberals, who then simultaneously announce that 'we are all the 
same'. The assumption of a labula rasa", or 'cultural neutrahtv', when investigating 
difference rrurrors uncomfortablý- the terra nullius proclamation that served to 
'justify' the expropriation, extermination and enforced assimilation of indigenous 
peoples across the world. 25 
Difficult as many conservative thinkers in the main traditions of 
constitutionalism find this, an adequate means of 'grasping' difference and 
diversity in all their entangled crossovers and distancings is an imperative, not an 
option. Despite the good intentions of Rawls and Habermas, their theoretical 
apparatuses prove hopelessly inadequate at valorising, and even recognising 
cultural diversity (and embedded power differentials). Any attempt to reach 
universal consensus on norms, principles and justice serves to filter out difference 
rather than trying to invent new forms of association. 
Antonio Negri believes that the entire Rawlsian system appeals to a practical, 
rather than metaphysical, realm of convictions, ignoring initial conflicts, 
antagonisms or differences. An adherence to pluralism is thus vanquished by the 
idea that there is one sense of justice which is grounded in the institutions of a 
democratic regime. Stability is valued rather than social difference, and difference 
is abstracted from to create a generic unity. Negri adds, "Postmodern liberal 
tolerance is thus based not on the inclusion but actually the exclusion of social 
the Caucasian but been able to discern and accept them; and did not an over\\eening sense 
of superiorItN bring about this blindness? " (quoted in Tully. 1995: 20). 
2' See Gatens (1996: 4) as she explores the notion of tabula rasa in relation to gender 
theory. 
25 Genevieve Lloýd discusses the tenuous manner in which terra nullizis %\as invoked. but 
shows how, rather than being an illusion, this notion constitutively constructed a social 
%\orld and justified barbaric practices against the -Invisible' indigenous peoples (2000: - 
31). 
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difference" (Hardt and Negri, 1994: 235). Trý-ing to balance different inputs in 
order to concoct a stable equilibrium becomes pnMary, and anything that nught 
fall into the realm of difference from this norm is a personal affair. Raxx-ls's 
account, like that of Hyland's, is deontolo ical. It does not propose aný- notion of 91 
the social good or teleological structure of the human subject. Feasibihtý- takes 
precedence over desirability. Negri believes, with Weber, that the essential 
ingredient in ensuring a stable equilibrium is the police. Weber notes that ... Every 
state is founded on force' said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk" (Weber, 1921: 78) adding 
famously that the State "claims the monopoly of the legitimate use q1' plySiCaljýrt'e 
within a given territory" (78). 
Terrorism, as a rational tool of domination and control, is a European invention 
and was initially applied to non-European peoples [ ... 
I Wherever Europeans 
and natives faced each other, terroristic practice was the colonizers' norm. It 
should be noted that neither the practice nor the theory which sanctioned and 
institutionalized it could have been sustained without the doctrine of European 
cultural and racial superiority -a doctrine implicitly or explicitly predicated on 
a view that placed Europe and the Europeans at the center of a world 
surrounded by backward, primitive cultures and peoples. 
Hisham Sharabi, lVeopatharcly. (1987: 69). 
Deleuze (1988b) remarks that processual pluralism is replaced by a dualism that 
tries to separate discourse from violence, as though violence did not rest within 
discourse. Correspondingly James Tully argues that the historical drive of 
modernity toward uniformity was paralleled by horrifying sNýstematic 
cxtern-unations of the First Nations in Canada from the nineteenth century 
onwardS. 21 Their difference and autonomy was no longer respected as it was 
when the 'Two Row Wampum Treaty' was negotiated in 1664; a treaty based on 
the image of two boats travelling down the same river, side by side, where neither 
partN, tries to steer the other. This agreement was, at least in theory, based in 
peace, friendship and respect. 
Paul Gilroy discusses the added \ IrUlence to raciological thinking once it was formalised. 
scientised, nationalised and rationalised (2000: 31 
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The conser%-ative interpretations of the traditions of nationalism, liberalism and 
communitarianism are stunningly indifferent to these traditions of pluralism, 
reciprocity and respect. Tufly notes that, 'ji]n each case, the demands [for cultural 
recognition] are seen to be a threat to the unity of a constitutional association and 
the solution is to assimilate, integrate or transcend, rather than recognise and 
affirm, cultural diversity" (1995: 44). The only remaining 'solution' left to 
dissenters would appear to be secession. 
There are more tolerant responses that seek to permit a fair accommodation of 
cultural diversity, but their advocates remain unconvinced that a true recognition 
of diversity is possible in the constitutional domain. In the case of Canada, 
modern constitutionalism is pervaded with a masculine, western, individualist 
bias. This is not an adequate basis for creating different modes of relationality in 
a "culturally diverse, post-imperial" (1994: 94) country. 
There are many critics of the dominant models of cons titutionalism. Postmodern 
writers, Tully claims, tend to stress the European, male and imperial bias of 
cons titutionalism. They seek to undermine concepts such as identity and 
recognition to show how these either exclude, or co-opt those who have 
previously been excluded, from the public sphere. By showing how identity 
always differs both from itself and from others, they provide a useful tool of 
critique. However this is also their downfall. He believes that this approach 
fragments society beyond recognition paradoxically creating a homogeneous 
culture of dissolving differences and a paralysis resembling that of conservative 
critics. 
Cultural fet-ninists also emphasise the masculine bias of constitutional language 
NTet ultimatelv, according to Tully, they do not show how Nvomen can enter into 
dialogue Nvith members of authoritarian traditions without being marginahsed. 
Finally, intercultural citizens and writers, such as bell hooks and Irl's 
Marion 
Young, criticise the homogeneous conceptions of identitýT and association of the 
n-iain traditions and are sceptical of the liberator)- possibilities of 
dcconstructive 
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post-modernism. Nonetheless, despite demonstrating the necessity for various 
levels of self-rule, and the recognition that they are not )ust t-ollsfituted 1)ý- their 
cultures but tbwarted by their constitutional associations, their claims - in Tullvs 
eyes - still fall prey to unexamined norms of uniformity such as Rawls' reasonable 
pluralism or a uniform legal and political order (1995: 55). 
Tully identifies Charles Taylor's idea of 'deep diversity' as providing a fruitful 
image that portrays the many ways of participating in and identl(ying witli 
Canada. Unsurprisingly, actualising this image would require a constitutional 
upheaval to deal With pluralism and the politics of cultural recognition in an 
adequate manner. The propensity in modern cons titutionalism is to propose a 
centralised and uniform legal and political system. This contrasts with the "legal 
pluralism and customary law of pre-modern Europe" (1994: 81). An imaginarý- 
community of the nation to which all citizens belong appeals to a homogeneous 
idea of the political community. The modernity of the constitutional nation-state 
is another requisite for modern cons titutionalism. Such modernity is proposed in 
contradistinction to the exotic 'other'. 2ý Finally, the political identity at stake is a 
bounded and distinct unity. In what Tully calls a second wave of anti-imperialism, 
all of these inherent biases are being brought to task. 
Gatens and Lloyd (1999) traverse the worlds of Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattarl, 
Negn and Tully. They do not understand Tully's work to be a quest to rehabilitate 
old concepts (of cons titutionalism) or of reforryusm. Instead they see it as close 
to Spinoza's own attempts to demonstrate the constitutive (and productive) power 
of the imagination to create better social fictions than ones prerrused upon fear, 
superstition and Potestas (Power). The aim of such a move is to transform 
institutions and collective practices of being. 
27 Sharabi distinguishes betweeri modernity (structure). modernisation (process) and 
modernism (consciousness) (1988: 20-21). -[M]odernity construed as consciousness 
is a 
model through which modern Europe recognised itself b) differentiating itself 
from the 
(nont-nodern) Other" (1988: 21). He argues that modernitý heralded an age. no longer of 
cultural interchange, but of opposition between a dominant centre and subordinate 
periphery, and believes that neopatriarchal socletý in the Arab Nvorld is a result of a marriage 
of imperialism and patriarchý (-I). 
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Rather than imposing a modern constitutionalism, Tully believes that a pre- 
modern cons titutionalism is better equipped to cope ý, N-ith these entangled 
demands and shifting intercultural relations, including the role of the women's 
movement. His work shows us that a majority is not necessarily a quantitative 
superiority, but concerns a tendency toward homogeneity and a standard measure, 
that is, a treatment of the variations of a society to create a constant. This is not 
an illusion but organises reality in particular ways. He does not engage in 
reformism by trying to work within the confines of majoritarian standards. Nor 
does he employ a quasi-transcendental ideal speech situation to harmonise the 
different voices. The difficulties he faces are augmented by the strangely 
multiplicitous nature of Canadian society. 
"When a minority creates models for itself, it's because it wants to become a 
majority, and probably has to, to survive or prosper (to have a state, be 
recognised, establish its rights, for example). But its power comes from NX-11at it's 
managed to create which to some extent goes into the model, but doesn't depend 
on it" (Deleuze, 1990b: 173). Wallerstein endorses this understanding of 
minorities by stating, "it has long been noted by analysts that minorityhood is not 
necessarily an arithmetically based concept; it refers to the degree of social 
power" (1988: 82 -83). Rather than reconciling differences through consensus, we 
need to affirm dissensus. We will continue to explore the dual nature of 
minorities, directing our discussion in later chapters toward the idea of becoming- 
n-unoritarian. 
ýs Sharabi notes, many identities have been constructed through the antagonism 
of differential power relations. Only afterwards are they endowed nostal icaflý, 91 
with the authenticity of a fictitious origin giving them greater emotive po%\, ct,. -8 
28 1 can understand why such essentialisms have emerged as strategic forms of resistance 
for 
political and historical reasons. Gilro\ (22000) discusses the process of affirmation of 
blackness but he argues that \\e must rno\c t-)c\ond racialised thinking, and criticises the 
multicultural indtistrý that has been constructed on its back. Our challenge 
is to moýe 
beýond particularisms toward other understand ing s of hurnanit\. I call this ino\ernent a 
commonahtý Of SingLI larl ties. '7 
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Within the Canadian context the further splintering of identities and solidification 
of those fragments Might well lead to an exacerbated moblhsation of identities in 
the quest and competition for scarce resources. The task is, as Chantal Mouffe 
(1995) points out, to construct a 'we. 
Tully's understanding of the hberatonT potential consonant Nxith embra i cing 
diversity resonates with Guattari's effilco-political concept of disseiisits '\ý-hich lie 
values above and against what he views as the infantilisation of thought in its 
drive toward consensus and uniformity. Guattari's writing is far more exphcltlv 
militant than that of Tully, and his understanding of subjectivity gravitates toward 
an anti-humanism that Tully might feel uncomfortable with. (His decision to map 
three ecologies - psyche, soclus, nature - is a provocative mutation of the age old 
philosophical concerns with Man, Society and Nature. ) Yet their mutual 
enthusiasm to valorise difference and diversity conjoins them in indicating a new 
way of thinking about identities and subjectivity. 
My efforts to emphasise concrete struggles and dilemmas is inspired in part by 
Sharabl's question, "What is the point of namzý. ýU the oppressed, the margInalized, 
the hurnihated, if the enterprise stops at an abstractgesture? " (1988: 123-124). 
Liv. difference, diversity and division 
The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics 
is that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological 
destiny that humans must enact or realise, because it is clear that if humans 
were or had to be this or that substance, this or that destiny, no ethical 
experience would be possible, there would be only tasks to be done. 
Communiý,. (1990: 43). Giorgio Agamben, The Comitia 
Given the nomadic nature of the thoughts that wil-I follow, I hesitate to celebrate 
'difference', 'heterogcneity', 'mobil-ity' and the myriad of related terms in 
abstraction. The enforced movcments of refugees, the capitahst 'discovery' and 
exploitation of multicultural-ism, (, something well documented by botli Paul 
Ilroy and bel-I hooks) as well as the insidious 'positivisation' of difference that is 
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emblematised by the differentialist racism discussed by Pierre Taguieff and 
Etienne Babbar, are clear indications that 'difference' is a malleable term. The 
commodification of otherness is revealed in the ,,. -aN- differencc is- often I 
"fabricated in the interests of social control as -well as commoditN- innovation" 
(Hal Foster quoted in hooks 1992: 25)29 
The following excerpt from M. Nourbese Philips' poem ODiscourse on the Logic 
of Language"" encapsulates my ambivalence and reticence to simply valonse 
difference over identity without examining power formations, dominant 
symbolics and so forth. It shows how Power can be consolidated by multiplying 
divisions and differences. 
English 
is my mother tongue. 
A mother tongue is not 
not a foreign Ian Ian lang 
language 
I/anguish 
anguish 
-a foreign anguish. 
EDICT 1 
Ereg oxner qf slares 
sball, whereverpossible, 
ensure Mal his slares 
,T to as many ethno- 
beloii 
lingmsfic, groios as 
possible. ý( //)ý), can 
not speak to each other, 
they cannot tbenfomeni 
rebellion and revolution 
N1. Nourbese Philips expresses the lack of identitý- and sense of dislocation 
induced by slaverv and colonisation, one described by Fanon so acutely with 
white-cold rage when he says that the black man has only one destiny and that is 
white; an impossible destiny. In her poem she relays the insidious pohcý- of 
'divide and rule' that tried to preclude communication by proliferating a Babelotis 
19 11 When ý'OI. Ing black people mouth 1960's black rhetoric. don Kente cloth, gold 
medallions, dread their hair and diss the white folks the\ hang out \N ith. they expose the way 
meaningless corni-nodification strips these signs of political lntegritý and meaning, den\ ing, 
the possibilit-N that thev can ser\e as a catalyst for concrete political action. As signs their 
power to ignite critical consciousness is diffused when the\ are cornmodified. Communities 
of resistance are replaced by communities of consumption" (hooks 1992: 3 3). 
A) M. NOUrbese Philips (1993). 
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multiplicity of tongues. She articulates a paradoxical state of being that, on the 
one hand, is at odds with the enforced majoritarian language and strn-cs to make 
that language stutter, and on the other hand, percewes the necessitýy to find a 
common thread or language to articulate a common condition. We need to take 
this dichotomous condition seriously and examine fruitful conceptualisations of 
relationality premised upon difference, rather than searching for all-subsunung 
universals. This poem is a refusal to allow amnesia to dissolve the comprehension 
of the power- structures and formations that delimit possibilities of expression 
and existence. M. Nourbese Philips highlights the efforts of a hegemonic power 
to disintegrate what it perceives as 'other' and a threat, in order to then 
consolidate this 'other' all the better as a tool in the capitalist processes of 
exploitation and slavery. 
It is important to recall that the consolidation and composition of identitý-, rather 
than its fragmentation, are more often than not called for. As we will see in 
chapter 2, the most radical heterogeneity can be re-appropriated in the era of 
modern capitalism. The very least that is demanded by groups who have been 
oppressed and subjugated is a recognition of the identity and value of tbez'r 
difference. But as Paul Gilroy (1993a: 2-3) and bell hooks (1991: 29) point out 
this can easily slide into claims for an ethnic absolutism or apn'On'essentiahsm. 
Cesare Poppi comments on some of these ideas in a piece called 'Wider Horizons 
with Larger Details: Subjectivity, Ethnicity and Globalization' (1997). The 
multiplication of ethmcities corresponds to the waning of that 'imagined 
community' called the nation-state. Ethnicity, he states, shares in common , vith 
nationalism a presumption of the universality of its shared subjectivity (285). A 
tendencN, to stress 'locality' and 'difference' has been concomitant , ý, -ith an 
expansive globahsation, "yet 'locality' and 'difference' presuppose the \-cry 
devclopment of worldwide dynamics of institutional communication and 
legitimation" (285). 
Hic fragmentation of the subject promulgated in contemporary social theory "is 
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celebrated to the point of becoming the new, theoretical foundation of the 
concept" (285). However, the emergence of new ethnicities and subjectivities 
cannot be understood apart from the global dynamics in which they are 
embedded. Criticisms of master narratives highlight the ways in which radical 
power relations like "race" and gender tended, in the past, to be subsumed into a 
discourse on class. Now, a Hegelian 'immanent subjectivitý-' is counterposed with 
a "celebration of subjectivity which stresses fluidity, contingency, non-identitýy, 
creativity, 'fractal' individuality (286). Yet, problematically, this 'New 
Subjectivity' posits itself as operating "relatively unfettered by economic 
determinafion, e' (287), whilst the processes of production and reproduction of 
capital are similarly free to follow their own internal logic, "free of constraints 
and impingements from the 'superstructural' " (287). So what precisely is going 
on here? 
Poppi notes that the recent trend of what he calls the New Subjectivity 
emphasises the subjective, culturally determined behaviour of the subject 'qlla 
exchanger and consumer' (288). This kind of subjectivity seems to present itself 
as free-floating, oblivious to objective deternunations. Production has faded from 
focus with the growth of the tertiary sector; it is instead an invisible dimension 
informing the construction of these subjectivities. Culture is a commodity. A 
fragmentation of societies into different movements, each claiming national, 
cultural, and ethnic autonomy, has now become the primary object of 
theorisations of the social. How does ethnicity, being as it is both lot'al andgloW, 
sit with this New Subjectivity? 
Ethnicity is a subjectively constructed phenomenon, and it is also a relational 
concept. Each group finds the reasons for its existence bý- 'Inventing' a common 
historý-. Since the instance of production has been eschewed b)- theories of the 
New Subjectivist-n, "the result is that both the productive and the cultural aspects 
of subjectiN-ity become relfied: the former as a non-negotiable, objective 
constraint, the latter as a container to be filled after a pick-and-choose fashion" 
(290-1). This account gives a positivist, de fiitm understanchng of ethnlclt\-. 
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Ethnicity is more than a subjective choice, however. 
The celebration of 'difference', as Poppi sees it, accompanies a cultural 
homogenisation and "historical obliteration of 'diversity' (291). A formalism 
or cultural codification dictates what ,. vill be accepted as the representation of the 
identity of an 'ethnic group'. He believes that "what is needed to explain ethnicity 
is a tbeog of articulation between hitherto diverse sociocultural systems turned into 
d#ferin 
,g gstems. 
Globalization, in turn, is the process by which the choice of 
'selected traits' [... ] comes to cover a wider spectrum (292). It is through their 
similarities that such groups can be perceived as different. This has turned 
cultural niches into exchange-values rather than use-values. 'Diversity' then 
mutates into 'difference. Distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable 
cultural traits has been an exhausting process for liberals. Tolerance has been 
twisted into a legitimation of the propositions of a cultural racism that claims that 
... different' peoples should indeed be allowed 'to pursue their own cultural values' 
and - for that reason - should be thrown out of the country" (296). 1 try to 
address these kinds of difficulties through my conceptualisation of an immanent 
ethics. 
In this essay, Poppi argues that it is the failure to understand that ethnic 
'schismogenesis-' has a relational, social nature precipitated from a shared and 
globalised understanding of 'the nature of difference' that has led to a 
'differentialist racism', a term I will discuss shortly. Differences are understood 
after the manner of an idealist quasi-Platonic model of difference that organises, 
gradates and compares claims to difference making them commensurable. Like 
Plato's suitorS31, many claimants are unsuccessful. Poppi's account discusses the 
implications of this comparative model, concluding that it wipes out diversitv 
replacing it with a commensurable difference, a difference that differs fi-om 
something else. It is, of course, Deleuze's contention that this tendencN- to 
understand difference in terms of an empirical (positivist) difference means that 
31 In his discussion of the sirnulacrurn, Deleuze ( 1968a) argues that Plato's real concern was 
to distinguish bemeen the true and the false copý. The image of the suitor illustrates this. 
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we fail to grasp 'difference-M-itself'. I discuss his account of difference and its 
ethico-political implications in chapter 5. In the mean ime, I ill sit ly sketch ti wi irnp , 
loosely some traits of his philosophical perspective, before I examine this idea of 
'differentialist racism' in further detail. 
I. V. racism and raciology 
Postmodern theory that is not seeking to simply appropriate the experience of 
'Otherness' to enhance the discourse or to be radically chic should not separate 
the 'politics of difference' from the 'politics of racism'. 
bell hooks, ý-Carningu: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics. (1991: 26). 
Among the advocates of 'anti-essentialist' postmodern identity politics, for 
example, one often encounters the insistence that there is no 'woman in 
general', there are only white middle-class women, black single mothers, 
lesbians, and so on. One should reject such 'insights' as banalities unworthy of 
being objects of thought. The problem of philosophical thought lies precisely in 
how the universality of 'woman'emerges out of this endless multitude. 
Slavoj Zlzek, The Ticklisb Subject. (1999: 133). 
Foucault once famously declared, "perhaps one day this century will be known as 
Deleuzian" (1970: 165). He also volunteered this observation; "a lightning storm 
was produced which will one day be given the name of Deleuze: new thought is 
possible; thought is again possible" (196). Deleuze ventured the following 
thoughts in response, "I don't know what Foucault meant, I never asked him. He 
was a terrible joker. He may perhaps have meant that I was the most naive 
philosopher of our generation [... ] I wasn't better than the others, but more naive 
producing a kind of art bnit, so to speak; not the most profound but the most 
innocent (the one who felt the least guilt about "doing philosophy") " (1990a: 88, 
89). 
This 'nalve' conviction in the notions of plurahsm or empiricism sustains 
Deletize's philosophical enterprises. He remarks, "the abstract does not explain 
but must itself be explained; and the aim is not to rediscover the eternal or the 
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universal but to find the conditions under which something new is produced 
((-reafiveness)" Peleuze and Parnet, 1977: vii). His condemnation of the Hegelian 
dismissal of pluralism as the stutterings of a naive consciousness chanting 'this, 
that, here, now' needs to be mobilised in face of Zizek's condescension. Though 
Zizek rightly condemns the injunction to 'be yourself' as one that leads to 
isolation and anornie (an extreme and horrifying individualism), in his tirade 
against the snuggling bedfellows of capitalism and postmodernism he fails to 
consider other possibilities, such as an ethics of singularities. 
What Zizek fails to understand is the profoundly Spinozistic gesture at the heart 
32 of the anti- es sentialist endeavour. He mocks, as Hegel mocked Spinoza, those 
who dare propose an etho-ontology. Deleuze and Guattari advocate an ethics of 
singularities and a new thought of commonality. Attitudes that question 
hierarchies and dominant modes of organisation can catapult those organisations 
into a qualitatively different mode of existence as we saw with Tully. 
However a number of Zizek's comments are both provocative and insightful. 
Take for instance his claim that, 
Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive 
content (the multiculturalist is not a direct racist; he or she does not oppose to 
the Other the particular values of his or her own culture); none the less he or 
she retains this position as the privileged empty point of universality from 
which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) other particular cultures 
properly - multicultural respect for the Other's specificity is the very form of 
asserting one's own superiority. 
Slavoj Zlzek, The Ticklisl) Subject. (1999: 216). 
Paul Gilroy discusses this slippery concept of multiculturalism in detail. 
N'lulticulturahsm has been used as a means of interrogating the significance of 
1 12 Like Christine Battersby (1998) 1 do not want to rernain caught in a position of anti- 
essentialism. Instead I want to rethink the question of essence. This becomes clear in chapter 
See Battersby's (1998) chapter on 'Essentialisms, Feminisms and Metaphysics' for a 
lucid and innovative re-working of the concept of essence. She maintains that it is necessarý 
-to think 'essence' in a fluid Nýay, so that it is not thought of as a fixed and static 'real" that 
is located in the body and merelý subýject to historical and cultural variation" ( 1998: 22-3). 
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nationa -ty in this time of global capitalism. He adds that it may also mark an end 
to a European hegemony on ideas. Instead of automaticaUy chsn-u'ssing this 
concept, as Zizek does, he seeks to understand how it does not just refer to the 
pressures on the nation-state but can be both an enriching concept and an ethical 
principle that helps bypass dichotirnising divisions. He admits, though, that 
corporate multiculturalism does plunder different identities. There is a great 
danger if an ossified notion of ethnic difference is mobilised "as a means to 
rationalize their own practices and Judgements in a parody of pluralism which 
perversely endorses segregation (2000: 253). An example of such an essentialist 
way of thinking about identity is 'differentialist racism'. 
In what was called the New Racism the meshing of biology and culture served to 
justify differentiation on the basis of "race". Pure difference, whether claimed bý- 
one group or attributed to another, automatically transmutes into a pure identity 
and a consequent intolerance of difference within, or outside, a group. "When 
culture is brought into contact with 'race' it is transformed into a pseudo- 
biological property of communal life" (Gilroy, 1993b: 24). Taguieff's work on the 
acculturation of the biological category of "race" shows how differentialist 
racism portrays itself as a defender of cultural identities. 
Differentialist racism is a brand of essentialism that speaks of cultural identities 
as pure, differing from other (allegedly equally valid) pure cultural identities. In 
this way, rights of expression and existence are claimed to have been respected. 
However it is precisely the understanding of identity, culture, nation, "race", and 
so forth, as homogeneous, rather than fractured, vibrant and contested territories, 
that concerns me. It posits a notion of self-identity from which one assesses 
differences in a wholly negative fashion, despite the positive, liberal spin it 
endorses. Its assimilationism imposes a hegemonic order within the group and 
expels those who do not fit. There is no understanding of the complex and 
partial identities that people operate in and through. Instead a presumption 
predominates that individuals, groups and collectivities are already fully 
individuated and in possession of a distinctive, quasi-primordial series of a scrics 
45 
DIFFERENCE 
-ýND 
DIVERSUY 
of characteristics, practices, cultural traits. Moreover, in order to retain these 
fundamental differences, distance and separation must exist between cultures. T he 
bounded and unified natures of the identities in question need to be interrogated 
When cultures are presented as homogeneous they are inevitablý T afflicted with an 
exceedingly low immune system that cannot tolerate foreign bodies. These are 
seen as parasitical (in the pejorative sense that has none of the sophistication of 
Nfichel Serres' analysis of this subject) rather than as symbiotic creating new 
relations and new possibilities. 
Etienne Balibar (Bahbar and Wallerstein, 1988) says that the universalisms of 
bourgeois ideology and humanism are not incompatible with a system of 
hierarchies and exclusions. He thinks that racism is organised around 'the 
stigmata of otherness, operating oftentimes on a micrological level, rather than in 
the more evident oppositional and disciplinary mode that is emblematic of 
colonialism. Representations, practices, affects, and discourses are all suffused 
with the New Racism. 
Bahbar emphasises the practices, the social nature of racism, and the organisation 
of affects that occurs. These organise affects by conferring a stereotype upon 
their 'objects' and their 'subjects'. "It is this combination of practices, discourses 
and representations in a network of affective stereotypes which enables us to give 
an account of the formation of a racist community" (1988: 18). Racism is a social 
relation. Furthermore, he argues nation, ethnicity and "race" are interbound 
concepts and any nationalism is premised upon a racism and the notion of fictive 
ethmcity. Stretching this to the global scale, Bahbar states that neo-colonialism is a 
reality grounded in the assertion that constant conflict and wars clearlý- indicate 
that three-quarters of humanity are incapable of self-governance. 
In a similar fashion, by calling the killing of Iraqi citizens 'collateral damage' 
General Schwartzkopf dehumanised these non-\X'cstern citizens. Increasingly, 
n-iiffitarv interventions conducted by the U. S. and its alhes are expected to have no 
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casualties (of their own solchers). Howe,, -cr, since sanctions were imposed 
thousands and thousands of Iraqi citizens have died. These are passed o,, -cr 
wordlesslý, by both the 'democratic' governments and the media (saN-c a few 
journahsts like John Pilger) of the West. The AIDS epidemic in Africa gained 
httle coverage until the recent battle with pharmaceutical companies. It has faded 
once more from the spotlight. Whether your death will be newsworthy depends 
on where you are from. 
Deleuze and Guattan claim that racism operates by positing the only face as that 
of the "average, ordinary White Man [ ... ]" (1980: 178). 11 They characterise traits 
that do not conform as degrees of deviance ftorn this norm, explanuing hoxv, 
sometimes these traits are allowed to subsist, sometimes they are erased. "Racism 
never detects the particles of the other; it propagates \xaves of sameness until 
those who resist identification have been wiped out [ ... ]" (1980: 178). Racism, 
they suggest, is never really concerned with alterity or difference, demarcating 
instead those 'who should be the same as us' and assimilating or annihilating 
them. 
White intellectuals who criticise 'essentialist' notions of identitv often do not 
question white identity and the way in which essentialism informs representations 
of whiteness. Richard Dyer notes, "[a]s long as race is something only applied to 
non-white peoples, as long as white people are not racially seen and named, 
thcv/we function as a human norm" (Dyer 1997: 1). Since white people are 
unable to see their own particularity, whiteness needs to be made strange. 
33 ' Since Deleuze and Guattari only write sporadically about racism, it would be fruitful to 
link their writing on 'race' to that on taxonomies and systems of classification. Deleuze. 
through Spinoza, dernonstrates the often prejudicial nature of the abstract fictions that 
people draw upon to classi(y and distinguish one another. As many writers have emphasised 
racism does not have an unchanging meaning. It is important to look at the various forms it 
has adopted, why certain typologies emerged, roles did the state, capitalism and 
imperialism play and how social and political structures of behaviour and classification 
sedirriented. Although this is not work that Deleuze and Guattari do. their critiques of 
lineages and hierarchical orderings and their fa\OLiring of rhizomatic alliances is useful in 
trying to think about other modes of association. This is something Paul Gilroý has picked 
up on to good effect when he discusses the rhizomorphous nature of his diasporic identit\. 
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I. A. the essence of essentialism 
Valorising difference can lead to a discourse that fetishises otherness (N%-hiIc 
retaining a sense of self-identity or 'normalcy'), and consolidates different 
practices of social control and donUnation (bell hooks, 1989: 28-34). bell hooks 
seeks to construct social realities that affirm difference by making marginahtý- a 
site of resistance. Wary of fixating on one characteristic (of women for instance), 
she focuses instead upon the concrete conditions for each reality that is 
articulated, rather than diluting those differences. She does not deny that there is 
commonality but proposes a methodology and a logic that can retain both 
difference and commonality. This calls for a complex analysis that underlines 
multitudinous variables and prOCesses of subjectification. 
Gilroy's idea of 'diaspora' resonates with hooks' strategies of resistance. Like 
Deleuze and Guattarl's rhizome, this concept does not have its roots firrjýNT fixed 
in a soil and territory but skates along or beneath the surface. This kind of 
identity formation disrupts traditional forms of belonging; it is disperse. But 
rather than gathering, regulating and ordering this dispersion, its movements are 
affirmed. Challenging traditional organisation of kinship and lineage it seeks new 
alliances. It resists the coercive identity of the nation, but remains fragile and 
temporary, born of a webbed variety of connections. It disrupts time and 
transforms space when viewed in terms of its 'ex-centric communicative 
circuitry'. Gilroy calls this hybridised diasporic identity the 'changing same' (2000: 
127-9). It is continuously modulated without being relfied. Despite this, culture is 
often "conceived along ethnically absolute lines, not as something intrinsically 
fluld, chan ing, unstable and dynamic, but as a fixed property of social groups 91 1 
rather than as a relational field in which theNr encounter one another and h,, -c out 
social, historical relationships" (Gilroy 1993b: 24). 
Moira Gatens also seeks to avoid any understanding of essentialism as a pn . 017 . 
rathcr than constructed and sedimented thrOLIgh different s-ocio- historical 
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contexts (1996: 11). She shows how cultures and identities emerge through 
contestation in a political and historical context. Her N: ý, ork with Genevieve Lloyd 
emphasises the dangers of romantically wanting to be the 'Other's Other' and 
forces the admission that one is often complicit in relations of subjugation and 
domination - something for which one needs to take responsibility (1999: 51). 
Radical pohtics has remained rooted in liberalism and cannot articulate a politics 
and ethics of difference. By fostering collective imaginings that transform social 
practices and images, minds and bodies, resistance becomes the collective name 
of freedom. Critiques of essentialism and universality are important, but so is the 
possibility of constructing and inventing other modes of being and other 
understandings of subjectivity. With Deleuze, Guattari and Spinoza, these authors 
understand that we must make use of fictions and abstractions, "but only so far 
as is necessary to get to a plane where we go from real being to real being and 
advance through the construction of concepts" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1991a: 
207). 
This entangled relation of essentialism and power is unravelled b\- bell hooks. It is 
facile, she believes, to propose an essence of 'woman', for example, on the bas's 
of common putative characteristics, ignoring other factors such as "race" and 
class. Not all women are oppressed or exploited; many take part directly and 
indirectly in structures of domination and exploitative practices. She is opposed 
to discourses such as Gilligan's (1982) 'ethics of care', or essentialist oppositions 
of male/female that presuppose a biologistic understanding of woman as 
pas siVe /nature /dominated and so forth, emphasising that many black women 
view white women as extremely violent. Whiteness is often terrorising and 
comphc1t in terror, in the way that Gilroy (1993a: 73) notes the ideals of the 
I ýInhghtenment reason are enthralled to terror. 
bell hooks argues that \Vhite Capitalist Patriarchy is hegemoluic. Rather than 
racism, she thinks that white supremacy is the most important term to 
understand. This is because it has been internahsed. F'rantz Fanon had showed 
the complicit nature of people of colour who uphold racial hierarchies. 
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Assimýlation encourages a negation of blackness and absorption of white values. 
History, memory, colour and experience are then denied. For hooks the critique 
of essentiahsm must be sustained, focusing on, for example, the "multiple 
experiences of black identity that are the hved conditions which make diverse I 
cultural productions possible" (hooks 1991: 29). 
While my work focuses on a philosophical ethico-pohtical level that is more 
n-ucro than macro, Tully and Gatens and Lloyd (as well as, of course, all peoples 
appeahng for the recognition of their practices and values) create the conclitions 
for macrological and institutional change, even by virtue of tl)lnkin ,g 
its possibility. 
It is interesting that Tully persists with the constitutional tradition, re-activating 
common law, as he seeks to reconcile principles of belonging and freedom. I 
suggest that there are other ways of composing social relations that also seek to 
avoid a 'rootless cosmopolitanism' and a 'purified nationahsm. ' Earlier we saw 
how Nhchel Serres furnished us with a philosophical series of concepts that 
sought to grasp difference, relationality and becoming. By encouraging us to 
understand processes of individuation and singularisation, Deleuze and Guattarl's 
machinic philosophy shifts our attention from those categories understood as 
already constituted - individuals and groups - in order to grasp relationality in 
terms of pre-inchvidual and transindividual dimensions that they call singular and 
transversal. 
But does their espousal of difference -in-its elf lead it to imprisonment in the 
movements of an anonymous capitalism that revels in shifting and temporary 
tapestries of diverse fragments of subjectivity? Does the subject become a 
cspiritual automaton' in a reading of realiq, as creative continuumý 
50 
Chapter Two 
Embracing Difference: 
Capitalism and Philosophy 
EMBRACING DIFFERENCE 
11. i. potentia versus Potestas 
My epilogue is: be aware of the strategy that governs what you do. 
Paul Shepheard, The Cultivated 11"ilderness. (1997: 231). 
Power has tended to be used by political theorists to describe a certain kind of 
action on others involving an element of ControJ34. It is also often described in 
zero sum terms and "conceived as something which is intimately connected , -, -lth 
authority, domination or exploitation" (Gatens, 1996: 63). This is akin to the 
concept of Potestas discussed in my introduction. Deleuze and Guattari take issue 
with the classic alternative of repression or ideology, arguing that power concerns 
processes of normalisation and modulation bearing on language, gestures, 
perception, desires, movements, and so on, proceeding bý- way of 
microassemblages (1980: 458). Power does not just constrain, but also produces 
different modes of acting and thinking. Operations of Power (Potestas) separate 
forces (Pui'ssanceslpotenfiae) from what they can do. 
In a breathtaking display of neologistic acrobatics, Deleuze and Guattari (1980) 
delineate, in their Betomiq plateau, the distinction between the plane of 
organisation and the plane of immanence. The former operates through a hidden 
principle, so that the plane only exists as a supplementary dimension. just as 
Spinoza refused to define substance as anything other than a tausa immanens or 
twtsaslli, Deleuze and Guattari are resolute when they maintain that any teleology, 
plan or principle creates an abstraction from this ontological conception of 
process, subjecting it to a transcendent power beyond it. The plane of 
organisation or development is not given but inferred from the forms it gives rise 
to. It is hidden but makes e%-erything visible. Conversely, the plane of immanence 
neither implies nor involves transcendence, hidden or overt. 
For a careful analysis of the concept of power in Deleuze's work, see Patton (2000: 49- 
67). Also see Iris Marion Young for a critique of a distributionist or substantialist paradigm 
of power especially in the context of her efforts to reconfi., ure the question of justice (1990: 
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Our first definition of Power as a hierarchical operation enables us to distinguish 
relatively easily the plane of immanence (aspotentia) and the plane of Organisation 
(as Potestas). Still, it might seem that an overtly hierarchical operation of Power 
that curtails a populace is a far cry from these undulating modulations of 
capitalism; however, the two operations are connected in at least one respect. 
Power/force understood as potentia describes an immanent mode of existence in 
which a body is defined in terms of its capacity to affect and to be affected. The 
operations of Potestas (Power) can be found wherever thought and existence are 
cut off from their powers of acting. 
Nonetheless) this second understanding of Power as the immanent modulation 
of a system cannot be conflated with this first operation. It corresponds to what 
we will call a relative deterritorialisation. Rather than cultivating their potentials, it 
permeates bodies and minds entirely, shaping them from within. The connections 
and relations that can be fostered are limited as they are normalised, and it is in 
this way that it can be called Potestas. It prevents bodies and minds from doing 
and becoming all they can. Once more forces are separated from what they can 
do, albeit through a different operation. A most pressing question in the context 
of global capl,? Esm thus involves figuring out in what sense the axiomatics of 
capitalism can be understood in terms of Potestas. Does the don-nnance of the 
capitalist mode of valorisation close off other modes of valorisation and hence 
the capacity to cultivate potentials? Or is philosophy enthralled to capitalism? 
Answering these questions requires an investigation of the operations of Power 
through both the State and capitalism. By understanding the predomiinant modes 
of organisation and thought of societies, we engender problematics that both 
critique these forms of organisation and open a space for other modes of 
existence. 
But on the new plane, it is possible that the problem now concerns the one who 
believes in the world, and not even in the existence of the world but in its 
possibilities of movements and intensities, so as once again to give birth to new 
modes of existence, closer to animals and rocks. 
G, ill cs Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, 11"hat i's Philosopý)),? (1991a: 74-5). 
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Drawing on Bovillus, Hardt and Negri claim that an enriched humanity could be 
called "Imilohomo, humanity squared" (2000: 72). This is echoed in Spinoza's 
heretical cry Dells sh)e Xatitra - an impassioned exhortation to chase a"vaý- 
superstition and fear as the organising principles of society, and to question not 
only the existence of an anthropomorphic God but to dispel a faith in any other 
form of transcendence. For Spinoza, the sage's meditation is a meditation on life 
and not on death. His ontology/ethics follows the movements and becomings of 
nature. Indeed the entire philosophical movement of the Ethh's shies away from 
mechanism and finalism to develop the singular potentials of a processual 
ontology. 
The tragic upshot of the flowering of art, science and humanity during the 
Renaissance was, according to Hardt and Negri, a collapse into war and a 
relativisation of values as a new transcendent order imposed itself i\Iodernity 
henceforth operated through command and authority. A conflict between the 
creative ii-nmanent forces of modernity and a transcendent order that tempers 
and curbs these ambitions ensued. Citing Samir Amin, " they claim that at this 
moment a Eurocentrism was born that cultivated the belief that Europeans could 
impose their civilisation across the world. Rather than fostering commonality, 
singularity and community, the decision to dominate and expropriate other 
populations became some of the cruel defining traits of European modernity. 
Born of crisis, modernitý, continued to be rocked by crises. 
"Subjective assemblages [... ] pose a vision of democracy as in an absolutely 
horizontal social plane on which social bodies are set loose to destroy the 
strictures of predetermined social forms and discover their own ends, invent their 
mx-ii constitution" (Hardt and Negn, 1994: 288). 
35 Deleuze and Guattari develop their concept of the apparatus of capture with the aid of 
Sarnir Arnin (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 436-7). See Sarnir Amin (1976). 
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II. H. the disciplinary apparatus 
In the context of the modern nation-state, capacities to innovate, create and resist 
were strictly curtailed by the operation of a 'sovereignty machine'. Rather than 
cultivating the creative prowesses of the multitude, it orders and regulates these 
bodies into an aggregate or mass. In fact, Hardt and Negri go so far as to say that 
eventually the sovereign state prodittes society. " Correspondingly, Etienne Bahbar 
claims that a necessarily complicitous triad of race, nation and culture that existed 
at that time (and continues to exist) meant that society was produced as an 
imagined community on the basis of a fictive ethnicity. " The production and 
ordering of the people gradually became a more and more important role for the 
State. With the shift from a transcendent ordering function, a transcendent 
command function emerged, according to Foucault. This social formation is 
called the 'society of discipline. 
Expanding on these insights, Patton (2000) notes some primary features of the 
State-machine. It tends to create milieux of interiority in order to rule more 
effectively. Gridding or striating social space, its operations mimic that of a 
metrical or numerical multiphcityý It creates divisions and distinctions. Moreover 
it operates as an apparatus of capture, capturing all kinds of flows such as money, 
people, commodities. Extraction from the rich flows of the socius is the modus 
operandi of all States. 
When James Tully criticised various forms of constitutional theory, he did so by 
indicating the uniformity thcý- imposed on a population which displayed their 
utter incapacity to cope with diversity. Interestingly Patton writes in similar 
fashion that, "jtjhe operation of capture always involves two things: the 
constitution of a general space of comparison and the establishment of a centre 
36 Sce Michael Hardt (1995). 
37 See also Benedict Anderson ( 1983)). 
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of appropriation" (1994: 162). This comparative method is also integral to the 
workings of capitalism which functions on the basis of quantiýring differential 
fluxes. 
The society of sovereignty encapsulated in the era of Absolutist Monarchy must 
be distinguished from the sovereignty-machine of the modern nation-state, 
according to Hardt and Negri. "The realisation of modern sovereignty is the 
birth of blopower" (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 69). The answer to the question 
'How does power function? ' hes in an examination of the forces of the social 
field. The development of Foucault's idea of a disciplinary society challenged 
theoretical approaches that emphasised repression and ideology. 
The notion of blopower is an important one. Fanon demonstrates the operation 
of blopolitics and biopower in raciological and colonial practices. Although 
different to the colonial machine, NEchel FoucaUlt'S38 explication of the workings 
of what he called a disciplinary society may prove 'illuminating'. Foucault 
invented the concept of the apparatus (dispositi 4 to show how customs, habits and 
productive practices were not only regulated but produced (Hardt and Negri, 
2000: 23). This is comprised of "a set of techniques for the exercise of power 
over bodies" (Patton, 1994: 160). 39 De Landa explains Foucault's analysis of 
power by focusing on three main elements "systematic spatial partitioning, 
ceaseless inspection, and permanent registration" (1997: 159). Individuals were 
thus assigned to categories and marked in terms of deviation from a norm. 
Societies began to be mapped systematically. However, this story does not just 
concern the formahsation of processes and policies but also the informal 
practices that spread contagiously through different institutional hosts (160). 
A society of discipline names a particular exercise of Power that cuts people off, 
38 My commentary on Foucault's work is derived primarily from Deleuze's and Hardt and 
Negri's observations. This is because it is their understanding of the relation of capitalism. 
State and the social field that is at the centre of my analysis. 
-, q in the case of sexualitý it concerns the attempt to regulate behaNiours and make bodies 
docile. 
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once more, from their capacities to act. The disciplinary diagram both traverses 
and is an effect of the social field. Power is not substantial, it is not a property to 
be possessed but is exercised; it is a strategy. And it always throws up counter- 
strategies of resistance. Deleuze notes that this kind of societý- is characterised by 
operations of allocation, classification, composition, normahsation (1986: -98). AS 
a technology it produces a particular kind of reahtyý It concerns a particular vvaý- 
of acting on bodies, on a multiplicity. "In brief, power is not homogeneous but 
can be defined only by the particular points through which it passes" (25). 
Correlating to our concept of Potestas, Foucault notes that "[d]isciphne increases 
the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same 
forces (in political terms of obedience)" (1975: 138). Instead of existing solely 
through spectacular displays of violence and domination, power began to operate 
on the body through processes of normahsation. According to De Landa, from 
the eighteenth century European nation-states began to digest their minorities 
(162). Hechter (1975) calls this 4internal colonialism. Government Acts that 
transformed the status of English into an official language can be seen as one 
instance of this process of normalisation, or to twist the concept signmificantlýT ,a 
beconling-major of a language. 
Different institutions are, in Foucault's example, traversed by a disciplinary 
diagram (what Deleuze and Guattarl call an abstract machine). This is in itself 
unqualified yet it connects these varying mechanisms for imposing discipline and 
setting up boundaries of inclusion and exclusion such as schools, asylums and 
prisons. There are nonetheless differences between these two concepts, 
specificall), in relation to their understanding of power and desire. 
Deleuze (and Guattari) felt ill at ease with a description of microsystems in terms 
of power, they prefer to talk about the assembling of desire. Rather than a 
negatwe resistance, "[s])-stems of power -\vould thus be components of 
assen-iblages. But assemblages would also comprise points (ýoilites) of 
detertitorialisation" J)eleuze, 1994). PoNN-cr would be one component or 
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dimension amongst many others in a collective assemblage. Still, Patton suggests 
that Foucault's concept of apparatus is akin in many respects to Deleuze and 
Guattari's notion of the assemblage (1994: 158). Their description of desire is, 
however, close to the concept of potentia that xNill be developed throughout this 
thesis. 
Deleuze and Guattari's theory of assemblages can be read, according to Patton, as 
a theory of power, but only if power is treated in this verN I specific sense as 
potentia. Patton tells us that this is where Deleuze and Guattan remove themselves 
from the remit of Foucault (1994: 159). 
With an approach that neither resembles structuralism (because it does not refer 
to a common structure or a series of analogies that would underlie these 
statements), nor positions one domain (the economic for instance) in a 
detern-uning relation with regard to all other domains as Marxists do, Deleuze and 
Guattari expand upon their machinic conception of society. They invoke the idea 
of an abstract machine that is not qualified, but rather indicates a new way of 
ordering or regulating a population. kbstract machines extract; theN, traverse 
different levels and give or do not give these levels an existence (Guattari 1992a: 
35). Unlike structuralism which remains rooted in an identity induced by its static 
relations, abstract machines hook up different registers. An abstract machine can 
delimit the maximum possibilities of innovation of a group and the maximum of 
deterritorialisation. Systems of power are understood, in this context, as a diffuse 
heterogeneous multiplicity of microsystems at play in the social field-411 
GraduaHy the State became the immanent reahsation of the ax1omatics of capital. 
It functions by over-coding of the surplus fluxes of money and labour rather 
than regimenting and centrahsing a cluster of groups through over-coding their 
codes. Rather than normahsing, power becomes ever more constitutive of 
different modes of subjectification. 
40 In a seminar, philosopher Nick Land once asked 'what abstract machine selected the 
hurnan"' In terms of our anti-hurnan humanism such humilitý is %\ell placed to position us 
better in qualifý ing anthropocentric assumptions. 
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11-iii. the end of ideology 
There is no universal capitalism, there is no capitalism in itself; capitalism is at 
the crossroads of all kinds of formations, it is neocapitalism by nature. It 
invents its eastern face and western face, and reshapes them both - all for the 
worst. 
Gflles Deleuze and F6Hx Guattarl, A Thousand Plateaus. (1980: 220). 
Like an eavesdropper who catches one phrase, Gayatri Spivak launches a rather 
vitriolic attack on Deleuze and Foucault on the basis of a conversation between 
them. This attack is instructive because it asks some necessary questions about 
their understanding of capitalism on the global scale. Instead she asks whether 
the subaltern can indeed speak and know their conditions as Deleuze and Foucault 
would seem to imply.. 
Spivak criticises the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari try to re-think questions 
of subjectivity. She believes they distMss the critical concept of ideology in favour 
of a libidinal theory of desire. Her paper entitled 'Can the Subaltern Speak? ' was 
initially called 'Power, Desire, Interest' (1988: 271). 
A published conversation between Deleuze and Foucault called 'Intellectuals and 
Power' (1972) constitutes her main battering ram. As I indicated in my 
introduction she argues that, "Western intellectual production is, in many ways, 
complicit With Western international econon-uc interests" (271). It is this side of 
the argument (rather than her own analysis and affihation with Derrida) that I 
want to focus on. 
Spivak contends that the West's critical discourse on the subject preserves, 
beneath the surface of subject-effects, the West's pre-eminence as subject of 
knowledge. Therefore what initially appears as a critique of the sovereign subject 
is, in fact, the birth of what she calls a 'Subject'. In the context of conversation 
these activist philosophers do not cover their ideolo ical tracks as well as they 
might othenNise do. She draws m-() main points from their conversation. Firstly, 
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the "networks of power/de sire /interest are so heterogeneous that their reduction 
to a coherent narrative is counterproductive [ ... ]" (272); instead an ongoing 
critique is necessary. Secondly, "intellectuals must attempt to disclose and know 
the discourse of society's Other" (272). Deleuze and Foucault ignore the question 
of ideology and their own implication in intellectual production. 
She criticises their homogenisation of categories such as Maoists and -\x-orkers 
while they specify the names of intellectuals, and feels that Deleuze kowtoN-, -s to 
the notion of the workers' struggle. By referring to the workers' struggle in such a 
broad manner, Spivak claims that Deleuze ignores the mechanisms of global 
capitalism and the core-periphery relationship, articulating the workers' struggle 
in terms of desire. She states that desire is a machine producing a leftover 
desiring subject (273), wilfully ignoring the Spinozistic impetus for the concept of 
desire that Deleuze and Guattari develop. They try to understand processes of 
emergence and develop a pre-personal conception of desire, rather than situating 
themselves on one side or other of a subject/object divide. Desire is not a 
determining interest. 
SI pivak accuses them of failing to consider the relationship of desire, power and 
subjectivity, the result of wl-i-ich is, in her view, an incapacity to articulate a theory 
of interests. Given the above relationship constituted one of the primary focuses 
of , 'Infi-0edipus, this appears a strange conjecture to make. Admittedly, Deleuze 
and Guattari's conclusion is a provocative one: they claim that there is no 
ideology. 
What she understands to be a romanticisation of the oppressed irritates Spivak 
tremendously, and the suggestion that the subaltern (ý(w speak and kno\', - their 
conditions strikes her not only as ludicrous but as an insichous form of neo- 
conservatism. The provocative idea that a theory is a toolbox is not read in the 
spirit of n-dlitancy with which Guattari Nx-rotc that phrase, but becomes 
emblematic of an intellectual grubbing about for tools of manual labour so as to 
ivak x ites appear more authentic. In a telling juxtaposition ot snippets, Spi % -ri 
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(allegedly citing Deleuze) "Because "the person who speaks and acts ... is ahk-ays a 
multiplicity", no "theorizing intellectual ... [or] party or [... ] union" can represciit 
"those who act and struggle" "(275). This distortion is important, not onIN- 
because it indicates a deliberate act of sabotage on the part of Spivak, but 
because it deals with the questions of the micropohtics of grassroots 
organisations that concerned Deleuze and (especially) Guattan. I want to discuss 
the Spivak cut-up and the original text in a moment; however, let us first 
contextuahse this debate through Deleuze's preface to Guattarl's book 
et transversalitý (19 7 2). 
The intermingling and interferences of a militant and a psychoanalyst in one 
person is pretty unusual; such a rarity was Guattan. Instead of concerning 
himself with debates about the unity of the self, Guattari announced 'we are an 
grolpst, ule. ý, referring both to the group and the individual. Subjugated groups are 
epiton'nsed by a hierarchical and pyramidical form of organisation which preý-cnts 
certain statements and whose identity is founded on the exclusion of others. It 
operates through stereotypes and is both cut off from the real and from 
subjectivity. Subject-groups, conversely, make transversal connections 
confounding attempts to totalise and hierarchise them. They are praxiolo ical and 91 
create their own agendas in a pragmatic way operating horizontally rather than 
vertically. Such modes of organising were publicised by the feminist movement 
and are seen as a key democratic move for many grassroots and single-issue 
groups. To respond to Spivak - the point is not whether the subaltern can speak 
and know their fate, but how can the forms of domination that preclude effective 
organisations of group-subjects be challenged. This is an ethical challenge that 
Spivak does not rise to. 
A theorising intellectual, for us, is no longer a subject, a representing or 
representative consciousness. Those who act and struggle are no longer 
represented, either by a group or a union that appropriates their right to stand 
as their conscience. Who speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even 
within the person who speaks and acts. All of us are "groupuscules". 
Gilles Deleuze, Intellectuals and Po,,,, -cr'. (1972: 206). 
The causal connections that Spivak attributes to Deleuze have vanished. In their 
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place is an ethical call to reconsider modes of social organisation and actiVis-m. In 
my reading of Dý)ýrent-e and Repetifim, I will address the question of why Dcleuze 
'conflates' the two senses of representation (rorstellen and darstelleti) by exan-uining 
his critique of a philosophy of representation. It is a deliberate ploy on his part. 
Spivak argues that running these two concepts together "especially in order to Say 
that beyond both is where oppressed subjects speak, act, and knowjýr Mepiselbes, 
leads to an essentialist utopian politics" (276). Throughout this thesis I will argue 
that is precisely by lifting the veil of false consciousness that we can think about 
new forms of collective subjectivity and practices that traverse different domains. 
This obviously involves a change in both material and incorporeal Universes. 
Surely acting under the aegis of an intellectual's 'superior' (though impractical) 
knowledge mirrors accounts of aid money being used to send Western 
technology experts to Africa in order to teach communities living in the middle 
of the Sahara desert how to be carpenters. 
If, as Spivak seems to suggest, Deleuze's (and Foucault's) conception of 'women' 
were a monolithic one, portraying women as oppressed 'with an unfractured 
subjectivity that allows them to speak for themselves against a monolithic "same 
system" (278), 1 would agree that their ideas were impoverished and ineffectual. 
However it is the spetiji(io of differences and power formations that theý- strive to 
articulate, as well as the idea that there is no hold-all ready-made solution for 
political struggles. Power and desire are not totalising (279) but evaluative 
concepts that do not clandestinely restore subjective essentialism. She maintains 
that by positioning themselves as transparent in this relaý-, intellectuals abnegate 
their responsibility to the oppressed. Furthermore, she declares that thcy solidify 
and niý-sti(y a conception of the Other as Other of Europe in a kind of 
intellectual imperialism. This strikes me as a far crý- from Deleuze's enthusiasm 
when he says that he thinks he has developed a concept of the Other - as a 
possible world (not a Third World). Indeed, Deleuze and Guattan centre some of 
their core concepts in direct critique of European ethnocentrism. 
Although Spivak, as an important post-colonial and non-Western theorist, could 
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have an important role in pointing out the bhndspots of the \Ncstern tradition, 
she goes about this in a negative fashion. It is difficult to find in her account anv 
ethico-political value in terms of an impact on social practices. Sp1Vak states 
"[t]he subaltern cannot speak. There is no virtue in global laundry lists with 
cwoman) as a pious item. Representation has not Xvithered away. The female 
intellectual as intellectual has a circumscribed task which she must not disowli 
with a flourish" (308). Deleuze and Guattari ask 'what prevents the subaltern 
from speaking and how can this be changed? ' If this is what SpiVak caUs a 
dangerous utoplanism then so be it. 
ll. iv. creeping capitalism and aspects of assemblages 
Lewis Mumford's term 'megamachine' becomes a vital concept in Deleuze and 
Guattari's conceptual apparatus. Although their machinism is often read as a 
metaphor, this 6ategon'6-aIjI is what it is not. Social machines produce subjectivitV 
through institutions such as education and health, as well as through the mass- 
media. These social machines form the different constellations called Collective 
Equipments. (Guattari, 1992c: 104). Similarly technology and information invest 
human subjectivity "not only within its memory and intelligence, but within its 
sensibihty, affects and unconscious mechanisms" (1992a: 4). 
Deleuze and Guattari (in conjunction with Foucault and others) introduced this 
concept of 'Collective Equipment' in order to discuss different kinds of social 
formations. These Collective Equipments bear a special relationship to capitalism, 
since they are non-productive, constituting the element of anti-production in the 
socius. This aspect is important to make Deleuze and Guattari's conception of 
capitalism tenable. Although capitalism can shatter traditional identities, it also 
needs to produce 'docile' subjects to ensure production is placed in the service of 
capitalism and not revolution. It only ever operates as a relative 
deterritorialisation. 
Deterritoriahsation is a word frequcntly uscd bNý Delcuze and Guattar, - It 
concerns, in this context, the destruction of old social territories, traditions, 
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identities, values and practices through the expansive movements of capitalism, 
literally 'leaving a territory'. However this process is always tempered by a 
corresponding reterritorialisation that draws up identities and traditions ane-\v in 
the most artificial of manners. 
Decoded flows that the State is unable to contain are keý- to the axiomatics of 
capitalism. The encounter of the abstract essence of wealth combined with the 
abstract essence of labour creates all axiomatic of decoded flows, i. e. capitalism. 
This is one of generalised equivalence and constitutes a deterritorialisation that 
the State cannot compete with. Concerned solely with a set of formal relations, 
"the axiomatic deals directlywith purely functional elements and relations whose 
nature is not specified, and which are realized in highly varied domains 
immediately. [ ... ] The immanent axiomatk finds in the 
domains it moves through so 
many models, termed models of realiýalion (Deleuze and Guattarl, 1980: 454). The 
term 'axiomatic' is not used here as a metaphor but is introduced to distinguish 
the movements of capitalism from operations of coding and over-coding. 
Axiomatics considers relations and elements in a purely functional manner, not as 
qualified elements. 
There is an isomorphy between States, social formations and capitalism, because 
capitalism is an axiomatic. Rather than a convergence toward a homogenisation 
of the world market, heterogeneous social formations can coexist. States cease to 
exist as the transcendent paradigms of an overcoding but become the H'=anent 
models of realisation for an axiomatic of decoded flows. "It is thus proper to 
State deterritorialization to moderate the superior deterritonialization of capital 
and to provide the latter with compensatory reterritorializations" (455). Because 
capitalism obeys its own irnmanent laws, N-,, e should not think that the only limits 
it confronts are the limits of the universe. Capitalism confronts and displaces its 
own limits by adding and subtracting axioms as appropriate. 
Guattarl argues that the State is a part of the capitahst axiornatics because it 
in threshold and become alwavs reterritonahses. Othcnvisc fluxes pass a certa 
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revolutionary. This axiomatics will take up aný, archaism and re-invent it. 
Reterritorialisation is a neo-territoriahsation, it is not just the resurrection of old 
archaisms (Deleuze, 15/2/72). 
managing the diverse; modulations of control 
In an interview with Deleuze, Negri explores his suggestion that wc exan-uine in 
detail three kinds of power; "sovereign power, disciplinary power, and the control 
of "communication" that's on the way to becoming hegemonic" (Negri 'in 
Deleuze, 1990b: 174). This ultimate proposition serves as the backbone for his 
book with Nfichael Hardt, Empire. To suggest that sovereignty has a new form, 
the form of Empire, is a contentious proposition. It is not within the scope of 
this thesis to assess the empirical validity of such an assertion; however, I want to 
investigate some of the claims they make. According to Hardt and Negri, Empire 
does not resemble imperialism. Although the United States has a privileged role, 
the movements of Empire are deterritorialising and decentralising; unlike 
imperialism, the accumulation of populations and territories is not a motivational 
force for its expansionism. Precipitated by the resistance struggles of 
decololUsation, this new form of sovereignty brings with it a New World Order. 
It designates a shift in sovereignty from the nation-state to supranational 
organisations which henceforth operate under a single 'logic of rule'. For Hardt 
and Negri, the fundamental opposition is thus between Empire and the creative 
force of the multitude. 
Instead of picking a path through the tricky claims about Empire that they are 
making, I want to concentrate on their diagnosis of global capitalism and the 
production of capitalist subjectivltý T whose mode of valorisation rotates on the 
axis of profit. Capitalism has become truly global. "Who is controlling the 
capitalist chaos todayý The stock market, multinationals, and to a lesser extclit, 
the powers of the state! For the most part decerebrated organizations! " (Guattari, 
1992d: 265). 
Deletize, Guattari, Foucault, Negri and Hardt all contend that disciplinary 
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societies reached a point of crisis some time around the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The sites of confinement that týPified societies of discipline, 
like the family and the prison, are now breaking down. What they are being 
replaced with is perhaps a more terriýving and all-consuming mode of 
organisation that no longer moulds people in a hylomorphic fashion, but 
infiltrates them through and through, taking life as its object. This is called 
modulation. The concept of modulation is taken from SiMondon's work which 
we will examine further in chapter 4. In tl-iis context it refers to an operation of 
power that is entirely diffuse pervading the interiority of the system. The arrlT%-al 
of interactive television will not only bring convenience and specialised 
prograrfirrung, but it will develop a profile of our viewing and purchasing habits 
enabling a discrete profile of each household to be created, and a corresponding 
unique marketing campaign to be waged in the living room. 
In disciplinary societies, the social space was striated; it was segmented and 
regimented. The factory is a prime example of mechanisms of enclosure. Its 
walls have now crumbled and been smoothed to a pulp. In this new society of 
control the striation and logic of the factory has spread investing the entirety of 
social space, but the regulations operate on a micro level of fissureS. 41 One of the 
ultimate disciplinary institutions, the prison, is increasingly a privatised and 
corporatised affair providing an abundant source of cheap, indeed practically 
unpaid, labour whose work is paraded as an exercise in rehabilitation. The growth 
of occupancy in U. S. prisons to over two million has surely not a solely peripheral 
relation to this phenomenon. (The young African-American man has been as 
disproportionately represented in prisons as on death-row) 
Evidently the organisation of work throughout the globe is extremely heterogeneous and I 
arn indicating one aspect of a shift in the operations of capitalism. This does not mean other 
capitalisms and forms of exploitation have been supplanted. Slave and child labour are still 
frighteninglý prevalent. In addition the enormous power of transnational corporations has 
created even more disciplined and ill-paid en-vironments throughout much of the ýNorld. 
Nonetheless the ghettoisation and marginalisation of labour is not exclusive to the so-called 
Third World but rumbles under the seams of all 'dernocratic' nations, especially when the 
presence of these non-citizens is Hunored, though exploited, by maintaining, their marginal 
and precarious status as illegal ii-nmitrants providing a huge re\enue for these economies. 
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Social relationships and management have changed tremendously with the 
introduction of new forms of technology. The worker has become a cyborg in a 
more pervasive manner than before. Organising and disciplining labour is no 
longer a main focus of capitalism. Labour is becoming self-organising. 
Rather than simply regulating life from without, power invests life from , \-Ithin. 
For Hardt and Negri this alteration of the workings of capitalism names a 
transformation in its relation to labour. Previously labour wasjbrmaýly subsumed 
under capital, now it is realjl subsumed (1994: 258). As Eric Alhez explains, rather 
than a capitalism of production there is a capitalism of circulation and 
communication. Such a change means there is no longer the same relation to an 
enclosed workspace or product. For example, work is increasingly carried out in 
the home. The practice of domination is now that of "a purely immanent social 
control by universal marketing in continuous variation and modulation (Nvith the 3 
M's ruling the supposed New International Order: 1\1oney, Media and Military)" 
(1997: 86). 
Marx's influence on Deleuze and Guattari's theory of capitalism is a sustained 
affaff; his reference to capitalism as an immanent system that constantlý- comes up 
against and overcomes its limits, only to come against them once more "because 
its fundamental limit is Capital itself" (Deleuze 1990b: 171) guides their own 
theory of capitalism. This is, they argue, a system that "produces a surplus by 
means of the axiomatic conjugation of decoded flows of labour, money, 
commodities and increasingly, information" (Patton 2000: 7). This axiomatic 
systern always manages to include another axiom. For example, the force of 
organised labour that threatened capitahsm at the beginning of the t-\x-cntieth 
century was either crushed brutaNy (as in the UfUted States) or has become a trade 
union movement that is, todaN-, part of the managerial process of sustaining 
productivity. 
F, ugene Holland (1999) explains that the social organ, saton of capitalism (and 
this is the feature distinguishing it from other modes of social production) 
does 
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not operate through coding or over-coding; in other words quahtative 
distinctions. Capitalism \, mrks through comparisons of quantitative fluxes, such 
as labour, goods and money. Axiomatic organisation is meaningless; it mereIN- 
conjoins flows that have been quantified. Capitalist subjectivity is produced on a 
grand scale. Guattari calls it a laminated, mass-mediatised and reduced sub' ectivin 
which loses its singularity (1992b: 51). 
The real subsumption of society means that the State becomes immanent to the 
capitalist process. Keith Ansell Pearson draws our attention to the generalised 
machinic enslavement that occurs when capitalism moves from "'striated' capital 
(effected by modern state apparatuses) [to] 'smooth' capital (effected by the 
multinationals and globalization)" (1999: 219). Rather than lamenting a 'take-oN, er' 
of the machines, Ansell Pearson explores some of the implications of this for a 
machinic subjectivity, remarking that within the movements of capitalist 
production machinic subjectivity is itself rhizomatic and unpredictable (220). He 
uses these insights to elucidate a 'post-human' ethics. Correctly noting that this 
does not involve a disappearance of the human, he explores the possibilities of 
the human. Importantly, Ansell Pearson argues that Deleuze's rhizomatics does 
not negate history and politics, but opens them to a 'creative evolution', 
reconfiguring these questions. " 
MassUM1 says that the capitalist relation "[.. ] consists of four dense points - 
commodity/ consumer, worker/ capitalist [ ... ]" (1992: 
132). This real subsumption 
in,, -oh-es capitalism both constantly pushing against its limits and expanding 
geographically. "This [is] a neo-colonialist movement imposing the capitalist 
relation of unequal exchange on all the nations of the world [ ... ]" (1-32). 
But 
colon1sation does not stop there, internal colonisation of private space 
becomes 
not onl)ý fair game but constitutes the intensive expansion of capitalism. 
Capitalism does not burst forth e. %- iiil)ilo. It effects incorporeal trans formation s on 
41 Ansell Pearson (1999) weds etholo, -, \ and ethics as 
he explains a way of thinking both 
before and bevond the human. His account resonates with Sirnondon's conceptions of'the 
pre-indkidual and transindkidual helping us to understand the concrete nature of 
this 
enterprise that examines the non-hurnan becornings of the human. 67 
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bodies factoring them into a relationship of generahsed eqwl%-alence. But its 
functioning is not as an absolute cause. It has a parasitical relation to the ()ther 
institutions operative in the social field and works on these pre-existing 
arrangements. Th-is relation is what Massurni calls a 'quasi-cause'. 
I expressed a concern in the last chapter that postmodernism may be just a form 
of neo-conservatism. This concern is also articulated by "Massumi and Guattari 
on different occasions. Postmodernity occurs, Nlassumii contends, once the soclus 
has reached a saturation point with capitalism (133). The problem is that human 
identity has now become effectively commodified. Subcodes or subtexts of 
subcultures are targeted by media and marketing companies. The battles for 
recognition by diverse groups are configured into categories or uniformised as 
subjects. 
Under capitalism, the "denizen of the neoconservative transnation- state" (134) 
can cut and paste identities and social codes as quickly as he or she can purchase 
the accessories. Images float through the ether plucked out by the ready and 
waiting consumer. Although there is something liberating about such a 
transformation in modes of thinking, bell hooks points out that a critical and 
political edge is annihilated at the very time when resistance to increasing 
commodification and colonisation of affects is most important. The surfaces 
ranged forth to be operated on by capitalism know no boundaries of endo- or 
exo-skeleton. What can, will. But this is not innocuous, or liberatory. 
Bateson once said that there was an ecology of bad ideas just as there was an 
ecology of weeds. This provocative image was drawn upon by Guattari in The 
T17ree Etvloaies (1989b) when he expressed the necessitý- for an ecosophý- to deal 
with the pollutions of psý-che, socius and nature. Although differences may 
proliferate under capitalism, it becomes increasingly difficult for this to occur in 
relation to ariv mode of valonsation bar economic values. 
If, as NlassurfU believes, subjecti-6ty has become isomorphic to capital, its cutting 
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edges or mutational capacities are co-opted. Like body-snatchers or rephcants, 
subliminal messaging and modification prevent not the discovery ()f 'who "ve 
really are' but the proliferation of modes of valorisation outside the axiomatics 
of capitalism. The deterritorialisations and post-human morphings of the body 
are simply recuperated into the capitalist framework. An all-pervas'Ve cYnic'sm 
accompanies this real subsumption of existence by capitalism. 
Lukics' (1922) contemplations on the relfication of second nature seem relevant 
in this context. The glaci 1 iation of the capitahst process has created a glaze that 
blinds people to the possibility of things being otherwise. His reading of Nature 
also presents a social Nature that appears immutable and ahistorical. Time and 
space are suspended, and a cyclical movement provides the prospect of the 
inevitability of more of the same. All this in spite of the ctire situation that much 
of humanity finds itself in. Bodies are sý, stematically excluded from a politics of 
experimentation. Affects are for sale. The pre-personal is a fashion item. The 
collective has been forgotten. 
A line can be drawn around a piece of territory, and all the things inside the 
line described and remembered. What happens when the territory is so big it 
covers the world? 
Paul Shepheard, The Cultivaled 11"ilderness. (1997: 27). 
Like Deleuze and Guattan, Hardt and Negri understand capitalism to be anti- 
foundational and anti-essentialist. "Circulation, mobility, diversitv, and nuxture are 
its very conditions of possibility" (2000: 64) and this proliferation of difference is 
at the heart of capitalism. The importance of the nation-state has declined as it 
has increasingly become complicit in fulfilling the demands of the global market- 
place and militar y-indus trial complexes (Guattari, 1989b: 29). 
Marketing seeks out Unique Selling Points in order to create a vast array of 
differences amongst the consumer market so that it might tar(, ct them all the 
better. The new mode of management is 'diversity manageinciit'. Capitalism then 
appears as a creative continuum caught up in an intert'rUnable quest for an etemal 
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production of the new It is in this context that a celebration of difference must 
be tempered. Difference, hvbriditv, heterogeneity are not good in and of 
themselves. Rhizomatic connections are emblematic of the new 'flat' 
organisations that are multiplying, seeking to deal more efficiently with change: 
'To go with the flow all the more'. 
Perhaps you could even say that contemporary culture is so universalized that 
we are all tourists in our own countries - in our own backyards - moving about 
our own homes, even, aspirated by prejudice and sentiment - but even so, 
tourists! Who has any sympathy for them? They don't go looking for 
experience, they go looking to have their preconceptions confirmed. They go 
unprepared, because that's the state that prejudice leaves you in. Explorers and 
adventurers know this and go prepared to be flexible. 
Paul Shepheard, The Cultirated It"ilderness. (1997: 64). 
Although in disciplinary societies life was taken as an object, power-relations shift 
in societies of control to become even more diffuse. Power is effected chrectlý- 
onto bodies and brains throughout daily life. Working in a call centre makes the 
brain-database coupling a key ingredient for a successful and smooth 
transmission of information. The movements of the body are observed, 
monitored and compared with frightening regularity. It is an assembly-line of the 
soul. Close circuit television cameras track the movement of the worker home, 
purchases by smart-card en route are noted, entrance into the house is greeted býý 
a large pile of tailor-made direct mail custornised to appeal to the nuances of her 
well documented personal tastes. The production of subjectivity becomes CN-cr 
more Mtense and affective. 
Deleuze worries about the multiplication of chch6s in mass-mediatised socien-. 
These effect sensori-motor responses that operate in a manner similar to 
tion. They deal in stereotypes and 'Spinoza's conception of the passive imagina 
abstractions rather than grasping the abstract and singular. Guattari once said 
Tas 
dc vagues-, juste des vogues' [No , -,, aN-c,,, just fashion] in 
dismay at this changiig 
face of social organisation. 
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In this mass-mediatised era where the globe is underlaid with cables, overlaid with 
satellite communication and waylaid by the crackling of messages win i ging 
through the air with Blue Chip technologies and mobile communications to,, vers, 
the notion of a pre-existent territory loses some of its pull. All territories are 
produced artificially by this capitalist machine. "From all this results the 
, gation and generafiýed tommutilt paradoxical cocktail of 
bjper-sqgre -ation" (Guattarl, 
1985b: 124). The lack of response and mobilisation to factors such as 
environmental degradation, poverty, banalisation of the media, and ongoing 
conflicts astounds Guattari. We are suffering from an ecological crisis, a pollution 
of our minds, collectivities and nature. How can we re-activate another kind of 
subjectivity in this context, a subjectivity Guattan calls 'processual' because it 
produces its own existence through a process of singularisation? What does it 
take to learn to see the world differently? What will the nature of a new political 
praxis be? 
Hardt and Negri argue that although institutions are everywhere in crisis this only 
means that the entire social terrain has been divested of any difference of inside 
and outside. This is mirrored by the affective, qualitative, immaterial nature of 
labour that impacts upon both mental and corporeal reah-ns. 
ll. vi. hybriditY and difference; a new world order? 
What we most lack is a belief in the world, we've quite lost the world, it's been 
taken from us. If you believe in the world you precipitate events, however 
inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space-times, however 
small their surface or volume. It's what you call pietas. Our ability to resist 
control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every 
move. We need both creativity and a people. 
Gilles Deleuze in inter-,, lc\-, -, %vith Antonio Negri, 'Control and 
Becoming'. (1990b: 176). 
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The struggle for subjectivity presents itself, therefore, as the right to difference, 
variation and metamorphosis. 
Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (1986: 106). 
Your nationality is an idea your ancestors had, invested and reinvested for 
generations until it seems huge and real. Do you have roots? Are you a tree or 
a human? Can you carry your nation with you when you go? 
Paul Shepheard, The Cultivated 11"ilderness. (1997: 87). 
Let us examine some of the implications of this idea that capitalism now feeds 
off, manages, and cultivates differences in the context of our previous chapter. 
This focused on the oppressive manner in which differences had been contained 
and nullified, or conversely exaggerated to the point of contradiction. Different 
theorists professed a desire to positivise difference and divcrsity and we explored 
some of their strategies for doing so. We saw how these thinkers grappled with 
the aftermath of colonial regimes. 
In Empire, Hardt and Negri also discuss the question of colonialism. Theý- agree 
with Gilroy that "the crisis of modernity has from the beginning had an intimatc 
relation to racial subordination and colonlzation" (2000: 114) and suggest that 
European identity was constructed on the negative foundation of its Other, not 
only economically but psychologically. The glamorisation and exoticisation of 
Otherness can find its sordid roots in this territory. Fanon explained \-ery clearly 
the dialectical nature of this infernal colonial machine that created racial 
difference. It creates a Manichaelstic universe. It goes so far as to dehumanise the 
colorlised. 
Although "[r]eahty always presents proliferating multiplicities" (Hardt and Negri, 
2000: 128), colonialism organises and produces a dialectical relation of reahty. In 
other words, the categories it dravvs Lip function in a negative relation to mic 
another. Thc colonial ciicounter is not an encounter of mo segments of a 
dichotomous Nvorld - the Fluropean and the Other. These are categories produced 
through the colonial machine and are not pre-existent. (I'his is one of the rcasons 
why Gilroy claims we need to move beyond raciahscd thinking rather t1i'mi 
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essentialising and positivising the category of "race". ) The segregated subject of 
the European coloniser identifies her/himself as essentially better than the others 
from whom s/he is segregated. This fixed sense of identity precludes any notion 
of diasporic and nomadic subjeCtiNqtý,. 43 
Hardt and Negri state that racisms have intensified and, far from waning, are on 
the increase. Instead of proposing a difference in kind between "races", "races" 
are distinguished by difference in degree (from a norm). Racism then appears as 
the result of mechanisms of differential inclusion. It is in reaction to this that 
various claims to essentialist identities have emerged. 
Still, they claim that despite enormous suffering and bloodshed, the increase In 
communication and intensification of movements of that era of colonialism 
carried within them the lingering traces of a utoplanism that would carry 
humanity to a higher power. They still see the birth of a globalised humanity, 
rather than one stuck in exclusionary crevices of particularism and localism, as a 
birth to be nourished. Ambiguity can be found in thinkers like Las Casas, who 
controversially believed that "humankind is one and equal' (116) (as did Toussaint 
L'Ouverture and Marx). However these thinkers failed to conceive of a 
humankind that is one and many. 
Gilroy and hooks both warned us of the con-imodification of difference in global 
capitalism. It is at this junction that Hardt and Negri's critique becomes especially 
interesting. Postmodernism and postcolonialism, they announce, have quite 
simply got the wrong enemy. By looking backwards at old forms of domination 
they have failed to notice a different organisation of Power and a shift from 
csocieties of discipline' to 'societies of control'. 
It is this shift of paradigm that concerns Hardt and Negn - how Po%x-cr mutated 
to become a rule through the "differential hierarchies of the hybrid and 
fragmentary sub*ec ivities that these theorists celebrate (138) so that the ti 11 
4 3, See Deleuze and Guattari (I 971a: 10-3-5). 
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strate ies of resistance (to old forms of domination) "unwittingly reinforce the 91 
new strate ies of rule! " (138). PositiVising diversity and revealing the racism and 91 1 
sexism inherent in supposedly neutral systems of dorrunation were N-1tal tools of 
critique. Similarly the fragmentation of identity challenged the hierarchical nature 
entailed in the imposition of a sovereignty of both subject and state. These 
critiques centre on what Hardt and Negri call the first tradition of modernity, that 
of the Enlightenment. They say "[t]he affirmation of hybridities and the free play 
of differences across boundaries, however, is liberatory onlý, in a context \-, -here 
power poses hierarchy exclusively through essential identities, binary divisions, 
and stable oppositions" (142). A pick n' mix attitude toward identity buys right 
into the new capitalism. The strategies of liberation that are proposed are 
impotent in the face of this new order of rule. 
The New Racism that we discussed in chapter 1 then becomes paradigmatic of 
this shift to what Hardt and Negri call imperial society and I call 'societies of 
control'. The mutability of difference coagulates into cultural distinctions. 
Segregation and separation are maintained, though the hierarchies dissipate. 
Racism then becomes a matter of differential inclusion. It is 'interesting to note 
that Hardt and Negri do not, as Gilroy (2000: 42-3) does, investigate the 
innovations in biotechnology and genetics as they formulate their theory of 
imperial racism. He points to the new technologies of the self that have emerged 
through various new methods of imaging. In so doing he enriches a Foucauldian 
conception of reading and inscribing the body, something Foucault never 
exan-uned in the context of "race". As Gilroy points out, modernity has displaycd 
an uncanny ability to knit together science and superstition, especially when trying 
to justify the active differentiation that is "race" (2000: 53). Yet it may also 
be 
that differential racism is no longer an adequate rendition of the complex refrains 
in population genetics that oncc again distinguish groups on the 
basis of 
biological difference. 
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ll. vii. the end of history, the demise of becomings: claustrophobic 
capital 
Capital smashes all other modes of valorisation. [ ... ] There is an ethical choice in favour of the richness of the possible, an ethics and politics of the virtual that 
decorporealises and deterritorialises contingency, linear causality and the 
pressure of circumstances and significations which besiege us. It is a choice for 
processuality, irreversibility and resingularisation. 
F6hx Guattarl, Chaosmosis. (1992a: 29). 
There's no democratic state that's not compromised to the very core by its part 
in generating human misery. What's so shameful is that we've no sure way of 
maintaining becomings, or still more of arousing them, even within ourselves. 
Gilles Deleuze in interview with Antonio Negri, 'Control and Beconling'. (I 990b: 173). 
Hardt and Negri's analysis draws heavfly upon Deleuze and Guattari's work. They 
praise them for undertaking an ontology of production and for their materialism, 
but criticise them for being "able to conceive positively only the tendencies 
toward continuous movement and absolute flows, and thus in their thought, too, 
the creative elements and radical ontology of the social remain insubstantial and 
impotent" (2000: 28). This philosophy of production remains as a consequence 
superficial and ephemeral "as a chaotic indetern-unate horizon marked by the 
ungraspable event" (28). Deleuze and Guattari have a sophisticated understanding 
of capitalism that Hardt and Negri brush past in their eagerness to contend that 
we have entered the Age of Empire. The latters' discussion of difficult concepts 
such as the virtual, singulanties and e-, -cnt is weak. In an eagerness to remain strict 
materialists, Hardt and Negri may havc burned their boats in advance of sailing. 
B\- refusing to take seriously the pre-individual nature of concepts like singularlt\-, 
they sidc with historN-, not with becomings. They are too rooted in the actual. In 
addition thcy remain anthropocentric in their anaIN-sis; their alle iance to living 91 
labour means thcý- cannot comprehend Deleuze and Guattari's unnatural and 
rhizomorphic concepts. This is not to question the importance of h,, -Ing labour; it 
is rather to approach it in a different waý, transvcrsally. 
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Traditional oppositional class divisions have collapsed. The labour market is 
traversed by all sorts of divisions and the tertiary sector has become ever more 
dominant. The fragility and insecurity that permeates the mass of society is 
especially pronounced in the case of groups like the unemployed, the satis-p7pier, ý, 
contract or temporary workers, enslaved workers and the chronically 
marginalised. Guattari agrees that we need a n-unimurn social guarantee (1985b: 
128), but he goes further. Rather than solely focusing on living labour he 
develops the concept of the machine. Machines produce heterogeneous um-, -crses 
of references, resisting the homogenesis of capitalist subjectwit\'. 
For Guattari it is precisely through this idea of a constructed, productive and 
artificial desire that is pre-personal and machinic that we can create a 'way out'. 
He says "Desire appears to me as a process q1' siqulan . sah . on, as a point of 
proliferation and creation of the possible in the heart of a constituted system. 
These processes can pass through the stages of marginality, of becon-ungs that 
are "becoMings-Minor" which disengage the nucleus of singularity" (1985b: 128). 
This event surges, imperceptible, an atmospheric mutation, changing the field of 
possibility, subjectivity, Life. Earlier I discussed the prnnacy given to the external 
relation in Deleuze's work; the relation has a reality of its own that does not 
depend on pre-existing terms. It engenders terms. This is the process that 
Guattari articulates. 
By describing the mechanisms of societies of control, Hardt and Negri inspire 
both vigilance and wariness when confronted with the plea to simply affirm 
difference. The temptation to automatically attribute a revolutionary status to 
concepts such as heterogeneity or the rhizome is thwarted by the awareness that 
this is precisely how societies of control operate. This universal transmutation or 
modulation brings together arenas, such as fan-fflN-, school, and army that werc 
previously separated. Capitalism is increasingly directed toward communication 
and lnt-()rmation technologies. "The communications industries integrate the 
imaginary and the sý, mbohc within the blopolitical fabric, not merely putting them 
at the sei-N-ice of power but actually integrating them into its N-erý- functioning" 
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(2000: 15). It invests He from Nvithin. But a constant reminder of the ed-lical 
failure of this system is that "capitalism still keeps three quarters of humanity in 
extreme poverty, too poor to have debts and too numerous to be confined: 
control will have to deal not only with vanishing frontiers, but with mushrooming 
shantytowns and ghettos" (Deleuze, 1990b: 181). There is a myth of Me market 
that is universal amongst neo-hberal theorists. In fact there are many markets 
sustained in concordance through power formations. Other modes of 
valorisation are dominated by ffie economic mode of valorisation and production 
for the sake of production. 
Hardt and Negri are inconclusive once they feel compelled to suggest how new 
modes of subjectification can be generated in the era of global capitalism. By 
depriving themselves of an Outside, they flounder in hope that Empire's crises 
will proffer more spaces of resistance, more vacuoles in a suffocating infusion of 
capitalism into the entirety of the social space. 
This disappearance of an Outside, the possible of the possible, makes it 
extremely difficult to see how Hardt and Negri's sporadic examples can offer any 
resistance to Empire, or global integrated capitalism. "The modern dialectic of 
inside and outside has been replaced by a play of degrees and intensities, of 
hybridity and artificiality" (2000: 187-8). However, the radicality of a philosophy 
of immanence is not just centred on the notion of an immanent movement but 
concerns the immanence qJ' immanence. Gathering the fuel of intensive 
discontent will not blast through the remit of capitalism in the manner they 
suggest. After all, if capitalism has the unnatural capacity to always include 
another axiom, it draws within it the point where it is challenged most. And this is 
what worries me the most about their account. It folds philosophy and capitalism 
onto one another as movements of deterritorialisation, the two becoming blurred 
and \-lrtuaU)- indistinguishable. What thq call the mysticism of Spinoza's concept 
of bealitudo is in fact the vcrý- factor that differentiates capitalism from phflosophý. 
Capitalism is a relative deterritorialisation, while philosophy is an absolute 
deterritoriahsation. 
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There is an implicit eN-olutionism and ethnocentrism in Hardt and Negri's account 
partially because thq see the progress through historý- as one of increasing 
improvements in the lot of humankind (even if these are not immediately 
evident), and partially because a residual Marxist teleology gives them an 
unwarranted faith that the contradictions of the system will resolve themseh-es 
eventually all for the best. Unlike Deleuze and Guattari they do not have a 
conception of metastability that, contrary to the notion of a realifable possible, 
develops the conception of a field of potentiality engendering a disparity in a 
system, opening up other possibilities that may be actualised. There was no 
inevitability to the path of history that led us to our present situation, and nor is a 
better future guaranteed. It must be constructed. 
Although I agree that diversity and difference are superficially celebrated bý- 
capitalism, this is no cause to abandon a positivisation of difference. I want to 
reconfigure the question in order to consider not Just human difference and 
diversity but a philosophical conception of difference that will enable us to think 
the pre-individual and transindividual; in other words, the non-human becomings 
of the human. Whilst they attempt to develop a conception of the cyborg or 
human/machine coupling, Hardt and Negri do not sufficiently explore this aspect 
of their 'anti-human humanism. Finally I want to address one more important 
criticism that can be laid at the feet of Deleuze and Guattarl. This comes from 
Alain Badiou. 
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11-viii. the changing whole of the face of capitalism 
As converter and capturer, the State does not just relativize movement, it 
reimparts absolute movement. It does not just go from the smooth to the 
striated, it reconstitutes smooth space; it reimparts smooth in the wake of the 
striated. It is true that this new nomadism accompanies a worldwide war 
machine whose organization exceeds the State apparatuses and passes into 
energy, military-industrial, and multinational complexes. We say this as a 
reminder that smooth space and the form of exteriority do not have an 
irresistible revolutionary calling but change meaning drastically depending on 
the interactions they are a part of and the concrete conditions of their exercise 
or establishment [ ... ] 
Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. (1980: 387). 
When Bachou criticises Deleuze's 'Bergsonian' philosophy his underlying concern 
is, I believe, his suspicion of a complicitous relationship between capitalism and 
philosophy. Deleuze and Guattari are aware of the risks of this ethics of 
experimentation and show in the above quote that 'smooth space' (or difference, 
rhizomes, and heterogeneity for that matter) cannot be automatically valorised. 
One has to examine the specific conditions of the functioning of different 
assemblages. The allegation of complicity is a serious one. In chapter 1 bell hooks 
and Paul Gilroy warned us of the commodification of difference. Given Deleuze 
maintains his philosophy is practical - he touts a functionalist understanding of 
philosophy asking always 'does it work? ' - are his own ideas not only captured by 
the movements of capitalism, but do they consolidate its potent reigný 
Deleuze and Badiou both try to think the event. The event, as we know, is co- 
tern-unous with a space of transformation in Deleuze's work. It marks a 
qualitative change in a system escaping from, yet paradoxically subsisting 
alongside, history. Badiou's Event derives from set theory, rather than from the 
differential calculus Deleuze is so fond of Like Das Diiia, it is the Unnameable or 
the Undecidable. It can only be made coherent in retrospect and it marks a 
. 44 The French revolution is an eN-ent. 
'A laugh' is definite rupture in a sý-stem 
certainly not. Yet, despite the apparent banality of Deleuze's conception of the 
44 See the thoughful article entitled 'Stellar Void or Cosmic Animal' bN Raý Brassier on the 
Badiou Delcuze relation and the Badioudian concept of the e\ ent as rupture- 
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event, this concept can, as we will see, be put to radical work. 
Badiou describes Deleuze as a philosopher of the virtual; a thinker of the One- 
All. The B ergs on-inspired concept of virtual multiplicity recurs in different guises 
throughout Deleuze's and Guattari's work. In Cinema 1: Tbe jA lovement-lmq e (19 83) ,g 
Deleuze develops a concept of the Whole as Relation, as the Open. The \N, 'hole 
does not attempt to unify fragments, it does not totalise, "if the Nvhole is not 
giveable it is because it is the Open, and because its nature is to change constantly, 
or to give rise to something new, in short, to endure" (1983: 9). The almost 
kaleidoscopic ever-changing continuum of Deleuze's philosophy appears, at first 
glance, to resemble the movements of capitalism. The open system of capitalism 
seems to replace the relatively closed system of the State where unity was 
imposed. But a closer examination reveals that all is not as it seems. 
In the logic of sets an element is either included or it is not. A logic of virtual 
multiplicities makes such delineation fuzzy. A virtual multiplicm, as an c\-cnt or I 
haecceity then bears a peculiar relationship to the actual; as incorporeal it is 
eternal and singular, yet irreversible. 
Badiou seems to wonder whether Deleuze's concept of the event leaves us bereft 
of any possibility of rupturing the system. No event can enter like a void slicing 
through social reality tn=*'cking a Luclo Fontana painting, providing an absolute 
end and absolute beginning all at once. Deleuze's event resembles rather Anish 
Kapoor's extraordinary blue void sculpture entrapping the eye, confounding 
space and time, seducing. In this way, Deleuze works with the concept of virtual 
multiplicity, a key inheritance from Bergson, to try to figure out the conditions for 
the production of the new Badiou, however, would argue that this is a distortion 
of Deleuze, philosopher of the One-AH. 
Brassier's reading of the Deleuze/Badiou encounter arrivcs at a damning 
conclusion. He su&gests that Deleuze's pHosophising disgwses a pohtical 
covenant with the "transcendent global sox-creignty of Capital" (2000: 2()-); an 
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allegation I made with regard to Hardt and '-,,, egn. He asks whether an ethics of 
amorjýfi, mimicking the self-affirmation of the One, can preclude resistance to the 
processes of deterritorialisation of global integrated capitahsmý Moreover, ho-\-\, - 
can a 'relative' deterritoriahsation of Capital be distinguished from the 'absolute' 
deterritorialisation of philosophyý "Does Capital merely mime the lo ic of 1 91 
nomadic distribution or does nomadic distribution in fact mime the logic of 
Capital? " (Brassier, 2000: 208-9). The ascesis of the purified automaton may in 
fact be participating in th-is generalised machinic enslavement. An apologia for the 
status quo appears embedded in this reading of Deleuze. Equivocal plurality 
appears to be sacrificed on the altar of univocitNý 
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari describe a multiplicity as rhizomatic 
and flat. It is defined by deterritorialisation or a line of flight. But what marks the 
Mý difference between multiplicity and capitalism? Is not capitalism the multiplic' , 
par excellence, cross-feeding differences, spreading its tentacles and creating 
connections throughout the globe? Why do Deleuze and Guattari continue to 
resist capitalism with such ferocity given it is the very exercise of the operations 
of deterritorialisation that they applaud? Does Deleuze and Guattari's work fall 
into the trap of fighting the wrong enemy? 
Although Hardt and Negri argue that the new form of domination, 
corresponding to 'societies of control', operates in a smooth space, they do not 
explore the different readings of smooth space suggested by Deleuze and 
Guattari. Like Hardt and Negri, Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Samir An-nin in 
order to develop their idea of an 'ecumenical organisation' spreading itself 
through a diverse set of social formations. This ecumenical organisation does not 
progressively homogenise, or totahse, but it takes on the consistenc\- of the 
diverse. However, this movement also spawns its own marginal groups, what the)- 
call 'Nvar machineS'. 
45 
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social formations is responded to by Deleuze and Guattan in the following 
manner: insofar as capitalism constitutes an axiomatic (in terms of production for 
the market) States and all other social formations tend to become "I*SOvioiph1*( in 
their capacity as models of realization (1980: 436). However, isomorphy is 
not the same as homogeneity. Capitalism always surpasses the State in terms of its 
sheer power to tolerate (and encourage) a process of deterritorialisation. States "in 
capitalism, are not cancelled out but change form and take on a new meaning: 
models of realization for a world-wide axiomatic that exceeds them" (454). The 
State moderates the deterritorialisation of capital. 
Contemporary features of power direct our attention to the micro-operations that 
modulate and normalise language, desire, movement, and so on. The birth of 
'societies of control' does not alleviate but aggravates the intensity of these 
operations of subjection and enslavement. However, because capitalism operates 
on the basis of an axiomatics, it does not occupy the kind of smooth space that 
Hardt and Negri argue it does. An axiomatics is a way of ordering and stemming 
lines of flight and mastering the flows of the soclus; this is why Deleuze and 
Guattari call capitalism a 'relative deterritorialisation'. 
"Capitalism confronts its own limits and simultaneously displaces them" (Deleuze 
and Guattarl, 1980: 463). The exertion of pressure by consumer and progressive 
movements has led to the (at least nominal) inclusion of an ethical/ environmental 
axiom in recent years. However the pressures of pollution, water scarcity and 
over-population may prove irrecuperable in the next century. 
Axioms operate by containing and centralising the living flows of the soclus, 
however these flows also escape to the periphery and present irresolvable 
problems for the axiomatic. This is why two battles must be fought - one at the 
level of the axioms as different groups look for recognition and representation, 
and one (the one that concerns us most in this thesis) which seeks to transform 
and develop qualitatively ncN-, - modes of existence that do not rest on pre-existent 
identities. The emphasis on the second should not lead the reader to conclude 
E-'\IBR. -kCl-",,, 'G DII, 1ý FRENCE 
that struggles for recognition of identities are peripheral or passý. As Deleuze and 
Guattari would say, these are concerned Nvith histon-, but the latter are concerned 
with becomings. However, we are only ever presented with mixtures. It is not a 
matter of choosing one at the expense of the other. 
"Our age is becoming the age of minorities" (Deleuze and Guattarl, 1980: 469). 
A minority is not numerically less than a majority, but reveals a disparity or gap 
with a norm. One can envisage a situation where the numerical majority of a 
population could be marginalised and disenfranchised (as occurred during the 
South African era of apartheid) and hence be a minority. Minorities have a special 
relationship With the notion of becoming, because minorities promote 
compositions that elude the grasp of both capitalist economy and State. The), 
refuse to be put in their place. Deleuze and Guattari reiterate that a struggle on 
the level of the axioms is important for women, regional economies or oppressed 
minorities, to name but a few examples. However, when minorities express 
demands that cannot be met on the level of the axioms then the disparity with a 
majoritarian standard becomes more taut and tense. It creates a metastability; a 
situation of disequilibrium. In chapter 5, we will learn how a becoming- 
n-linoritarian is bound up with a ('reated possible. Nhnorities are hVing flows that 
escape the axiomatic of capital. 
The conditions for a worldwide movement are to be found in the minorities 
everywhere. These minorities are non-denumerable; they are fuzzy multiplicities, 
always escaping the majoritarian standards. It is not sufficient to add axioms, 
although tactically this is important in terms of women's rights, rights of asylum 
seekers, rights of the unemployed and so on. The challenge consists not just in 
opposing the majority system, but in opening up a gap, a disparlt\-, and this occurs 
when people articulate and formulate their own problems (471). 
Deleuze and Guattarl contend that it is this disparity, this tension, that is 
paradoxically created by the axiornatics of capital that engender new 'nunontarian 
aggregates'. It is by destroying the "dorrunant eqwhbnum of the denumerable 
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sets" (472) that a mass becomes revolutionam This power of the non- 
denumerable is specific to the minority. In this way the minority, regardless of 
how many members it has, is always a multiplicity. The system creates its own 
outside' by multiplying the lines of flight which create transversal links bem-een 
singular problems. This is the Undecidable that forms part of every system of 
axiomatics. In What is Philosophj? Deleuze and Guattari emphasise, in a way they 
had not done before, the relation between resistance and becoming (1991a: 109- 
10). Here creation is understood as resistance. 
They argue that the notion of minority is very complex with all sorts of 
resonances such as political, musical and literary. A majority holds the standard of 
measure and assumes power and domination. Majority appears twice: once in the 
constant, and once in the variable from which it extracts the constant. Deleuze 
and Guattari view it as an abstract standard, always Nobody, while rMnonty is the 
becoming of everybody, "everyone's potential becoming to the extent that one 
deviates from the model" (1980: 105). Specifying these distinctions further they 
describe the majoritarian standard as a constant and homogeneous system (as we 
saw in Tully's work) and minorities are subsystems, whereas a becoming- 
mi*notitan'an is a "potential, creative and created, beconuing" (106). So although 
minorities may have identities and be objectively definable, "they must also be 
thought of as seeds, crystals of becoming whose value is to trigger uncontrollable 
movements and deterritorializations of the mean or majonty" (106). Because 
minorities encourage new transversal connections, they also develop a logic of 
multiplicities, of potenlia, that challenges the realm of Power and Domination. 
A logic of multiplicities concerns different multiplicities, but the gathering of 
heterogeneous components into an assemblage often involves a specific type of 
multiphcmý; the intensive or virtual multiplicim This multiplicitIT cannot be 
divided or add another element without changing in nature. The initial impetus 
for such a philosophical construct comes, I beheN-e, from Bergson. Although in 
the context of Tilll(, and 1ýree If-'ill Bergson is, strictly speaking, concerned with 
'nk about th' psychology -, N-hen mapping this concept, it is still instructive to thi ill" 
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fuzzy multiplicity as he does. Emotions cannot be divided, a heated anger cannot 
be halved into a moderate annoyance. This is , x-hat he calls a quahtative 
multiplicity. It is chfferential, consistent and irreducible. In terms of 
deterritorialisation, this marks a qualitative transformation of a given 
situation/ as semblage. On the other hand, one can cut up a square of cardboard, 
compare parts and put it back together without changing the nature of that 
multiplicity. With sheer simplicity Guattari provides the comparison of a heap of 
stones (a numerical or quantitative multiplicity) and a dry stone wall (that as it is 
organised both selects and discriminates, excludes and includes) wl-lich he would 
qualify as a heterogeneous multiplicity hooking up With A sorts of other 
components (farn-Aand, ramblers, domestic animals, weeds ). 
Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy can be synopsised as a logic of multiplicities. 
The concepts of numerical and virtual multiplicities are scattered throughout all 
the corners of their works. In A Thousatid Plateaus they distinguish between 
smooth and striated space. The gridding and division of space effected by the 
State is counterposed to the nomad war machine such as that of the Mongol 
hordes which does not divide space but distributes itself in space, cropping up as 
if from nowhere. Operations of standardisation and umforn-usation are 
unravelled by becoMings-nunor. A don-unant or official language is alwaý-s beset 
by subterranean dialects, patois and literary innovations. This distinction between 
the continuous variation of a virtual multiplicity and the relative standardisation 
of the numerical multiplicity is then instructive ethico-politically. 
Their concept of the assemblage relates to that of a virtual multiplicity since it 
concerns heterogeneous components held together in their difference, not as a 
set of elements, but through their abstract relations; their symbioses. The 
possibilities of different modes of association and alliance is an ethico-political 
question, constituting an etho-ontology. This other understanding of power as 
potentia compounds our capacities for existing and thinking in a relational manner. 
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ll. ix. mechanism or machinism? 
The implications of Deleuze's machinic philosophy are serious. For Badiou, they 
mean we can, at no time, be the source of what -, N-c think or what we do, but 
everything always comes from afar, from the infinite and inhuman reservoir of 
the One (1997: 9-13). The Deleuzean automaton is, according to Badiou, 
traversed by the power of this inorganic life and the most pure choice is 
henceforth the most automatic one, the one where we are stripped of our 
individuality and humanity when faced with this Outside. We are chosen. We do 
not choose our fate, as in philosophies of representation (11). 
This idea of the purified automaton is found, according to Bachou, in Deleuze's 
second cinema book on the The Time-Ima , ge 
(1985a), and in his vie-\x-, this reading is 
much closer to Deleuze's true perspective than the desiring machines of 1968. To 
think is thus no longer a personal capacity. (And ethics appears to constitute 
nothing other than radical passivity. ) If we read the chapter entitled 'Thought and 
Cnema' carefully we discover that this idea of the spiritual automaton (inspired 
initially by Spinoza) is primarily concerned with the contention that thinking is a 
shock. Paraphrasing Heidegger, 'we have not yet begun to think'. 
This automaton is presented by Badiou as a sIMUlacrum without any relation to 
others. Although cut off from the external world, a more profound 'outside' 
animates it (Badiou, 1997: 128). The principle animating the automaton is nothing 
other than force, this element of the outside. We are always forced to think. 
Yet contrary to Badiou's understanding of the spiritual automaton, tl-lis notion 
does not mean we are necessarily passive. It constructs a conception of the 
hurnan that is open to its non-human becomings. The human is thus re- 
conceived as relational and parv iialitrae, rather than abstracted from reality, and 
dominatorial. This is an ethics as experimentation, that invents the potentials and 
becon-nngs of humans. Foisting fuel on the fires ()f the critics, Deleuze repeats the 
notion that an ethics constitutes a kind of einiorfiiii from his earliest to his latest 
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works. 
In the 'Twenty- first series of the Event', Deleuze contemplates the -, toic concept 
of the event in detail, arguing that this is a "question of becoming a citizen of the 
world" (1969: 148). Ethics means nothing other than "not to be un,, vorthy ot 
what happens to us" (149). If we blame someone or something else for our 
misfortunes and sufferings, we slip into ressentiment. Instead we need to xvill the 
event in order to release its eternal truth. We then affirm something in that which 
occurs. We must counter-actualise or counter-effectuate the event, making it our 
46 own. 
In his final book with Guattari, Deleuze reiterates "There is no other ethic than 
the amorfi7fi of philosophy" (1991a: 159). Again ethics is equated vvith beconuing 
equal to the event, and again Joe Bousquet is quoted, "my wound existed before 
me; I was born to embody it" (159). Extracting the virtual from a state of affairs 
is to counter- effectuate the event by isolating its concept. 
.\ superficial reading of these lines would seem to deny the N-cry possibility of 
etl-iics. An unguarded cruelty appears to persist in Deleuze's words, as though 
suffering must be subrratted to and affirmed, though not challenged, however 
such a reading is simplistic. Taking our journey through Spinoza and through 
Simondon and Deleuze, we find that this ethics does not entail a radical passivity, 
but rather an openness toward the future and a practice of cons tructivism. This 
love of fate is not an acceptance of a predetermined natural and moral order, but 
is concerned with cultivating the capacity to work with the materials and 
circumstances, distasteful as they may be, in order to create other modes of 
existence. 
I agree that if we abstract the above lines from the overall pro)ect embarked upon 
bv Delcuzc (including his Nvork with Guattari) it may , vell appear that all Nve can 
46 For some thinkers the logical conclusion of this is that the conditions of thought are 
purified and sober. Personal concerns, needs and hopes can effecti%elý be put by- the 
ay side (at least this is the suggestion by Badiou and Ea,,,, Ieton amongst others). 
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do is accept our fate as pregiven and predestined. Our only hope would be to 
make contact with the impersonal Life (and impossible Death) that constitutes 
our being. But such a reading would be in bad faith. , Jmor. lýiti entails affirming 
something in that which happens to us, not affirming cverything that happens to 
us. It also involves creating the conditions for the production of the ne-\N-; a 
repetition of the different, as Deleuze argues in Dý#ýren('e and Repetition. 
"To believe, not in a different world, but in a link between man and the world, in 
love or life, to believe in this as in the impossible, the unthinkable, which none 
the less cannot but be thought: 'something possible, otherwise I will suffocate... 
(1985a: 170). The modern fact is, for Deleuze, that we no longer believe in this 
world; "it is the world which looks to us like a bad film" (171). Like Serres says, 
this link with the world has been broken and we need a faith to attach (reliaare) us 
to the world once more. 
The distinction between absolute and relative deterritorialisation then becomes a 
crucial one. It involves a conceptual difference between the 'hnuit' and the 
'threshold'. "Mhe limit designates the penultimate marking a necessary 
rebeginning, and the threshold the ultimate marking an inevitable change" 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 438). Absolute deterritorialisation expresses a 
movement that is qlialitalhely different ftom relative movement (509). Relative 
deterritoralisation is a movement that is always blocked or curtailed. Deleuze and 
Guattari repeat that absolute deterritorialisation brings about the creation of a 
new earth (1980: 510,1991a: 99), suggesting it is close to the 'utopia' of the 
Frankfurt School, and Adorno's 'negative dialectic' (1991 a: 99). 
Since capitahsm operates through an immanent axiomatic movement of 
dcterritorialisation, and since Deleuze's subject of ethics is a spiritual automaton 
affirming in everything that happens to it, the onIN ption might appear ýg 111 1-0 
to be to surrender to this inevitable movement either by adopting a stance of 
enfightened cynicism or jubilant immersion. Yet, capitahsm is always a tempered 
proccss, and it (as in Marx's theorý) inadvertently fosters the potential for 
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resistance because it needs to create minimal spaces of liberty and creativit-\' to 
prevent it from becorrung entropic. The difficulty facing us is to harness the 
forces of deterritorialisation of capitalism in fields such as science, technology 
and the media in order to develop different forms of struggle against the 
repressions and material bondage that accompany capitalism. This involves a 
revaluation of values. These resistances must be constructed - they will not spring 
forth e-x- liiklo. The qualitative transformation that accompanies passing a 
threshold is thus distinguished from the relative displacement of the limits of 
capitalism. 
Spinoza wrote during a burgeoning era of capitalism in Holland, but he could not 
be expected to foresee the mutations of finance capitalism and the prospect of 
world integrated capitalism. Does his ethics of liberation inadvertently collude in 
this movement of relative deterritorialisation or does it indeed prON-ide the 
conditions for the production of novelty and the unforeseeable? This question 
informs the rest of this thesis: can philosophy escape the clutches of capital? Or 
does it meander in a creative continuum reinforcing and affirming rather than 
rupturing the movements of capitalism? 
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IIIJ. ethics and immanence 
It may be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult 
task, or the task of a mode of existence still to be discovered on our plane of 
immanence today. This is the empiricist conversion [ ... ] 
D eleuz e and Gua ttarl, If"hat is Philosoply? (19 91a: 7 5). 
It may come as some surprise to find the word 'transcendence' used in an 
accusatory manner in the next few pages, whilst immanence is presented as 
verging on having an intrinsic value. Why should this be the case? Nietzsche said, 
"Moral judgement has this in common with religious judgement that it believes in 
realities which do not exist" (1889: §1,55). Deleuze and Guattan likewise say that 
we need to believe in this world, urging us to be aware of the forms of 
transcendence (often of theological origin) that shape our lives and thoughts. 
They go on to make an ontological claim concerning this idea of immanence, 
rather than a critical claim based upon what we can know. The 'pure ontology' 
that they delineate can also be called an ethics (Deleuze, 2/12/80). 
This ethics is described as a way of evaluating (and not judging) immanent modes 
of existence in terms of effectuating compositions of relations that 'increase 
powers of activity (and hence *oy). MorahtN-, on the other hand, is presented in 
terms of an absolutism that pays no attention to the singular essences of the 
humans it compels to obedience. 47 Spinoza's system is not based upon a model of 
obedience which finds a resonance in mind/body dualism. With an anti-Cartesian 
flourish Spinoza asserts that the mind does not subjugate the body. The mind is 
but the idea of the body. The opposition between ethics and Nlorahtý- explicitly 
and implicitly informs the next few chapters. 
Obeying requires one to imagine a body more powerful than oneself Obedience 
47 Pierre Bourdieu asks *who has an interest in the universaIT (1990: 3 1). By explaining the 
genesis or emergence of forms of the universal in different fields, the universal no longer 
appears neutral, formal and olýjective. Nietzsche's critical philosophy was dedicated to re- 
eNraluating all values. See, for example, On thc Genealogv qf . 
1foralitY (1887). 
90 
SPINOZA: THE GOD-I-NTOXICATED -MAN 
thus rests upon impotence. 411 The sovereign state is a machine to produce 
obedience. Drawing on Antonio Negri (1981), 1 Nvant to continue to use a 
working distinction between potentia and Potestaj49 to illustrate the difference 
between tl-iis conception of an absolute in-imanent movement and that of an order 
that is superposed. The assemblages that we are a part of can diminish our 
capacities for acting or enhance them. This idea is key to Spinoza's EMit's. 
The hylomorphic operation transmits a sense that matter is not active, not self- 
organising with emergent properties, and to this extent it fits in well with our 
distinction between Potestas and potenfia. The former case refers to the way in 
which a power (ýotenfia) can be separated from its capacitý- to act. Spinoza differs 
hugely from Hobbes in this regard since he does not see the political arrangement 
as one of command and obedience but one, rather, of facilitation of natural 
rights. 50 Differences between beings are then quantitative in terms of power, and 
qualitative in terms of modes of existence. 
Yet, as Lloyd and Gatens remind us, we also need to create better collective 
imaginings of forms of social organisation that do not stifle the potentl .a or power 
of people. We saw an example of this in Tully's work in chapter 1. 
natural right and power 
Rather than idealising humans, Spinoza develops a relational conception of 
humans as they are betýomin hi , g. 
He is a political realist building s philosophy from 
these flawed materials. But if, as Spinoza suggests, we do not even know what a 
body can do, how can we possibly invent (not fulfil in an Aristotelian manner) 
48 See Etienne Balibar (1985). 
49 1 find it a useful and strategic distinction in this context, although I disagree with Negri's 
argument that links the idea of Potestas NvIth an organisational role of the attributes, a role 
fie contends is dispensed of Nvhen Spinoza begins writing the second half of the Ethics. For a 
good critique of Negri's The ý(n, ageAnomaly see Pierre Macherey (1982-3). 
50 Given the critiques of theories of rights initiated by Henry Shue who calls for a correlatiý, e 
duty or responsibility. and my own criticisms of the Rawlsian theory of rights, it is 
important to stress that Spinoza's theory of right is expressly framed in terms of power as 
potentia. I Nvill describe the ramifications of this for our ideas about relationallt, % throughout 
this chapter. 
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modes of existence that increase our powers of acting, of affecting and being 
affected? With Spinoza, ethics regains an Aristotelian, Stoic and Epicurean 
resonance emphasising practices and modes of h\-ing. The principles of the good 
life cannot, however, be demarcated in ad\-ance. 
Spinoza has read Hobbes, and he constructs his idea of natural right from the 
Hobbesian proposition that things are not defined by their essence or obligations, 
but instead by their power. Hobbes says that this means we have the right to do 
all that we are able to in this dog-eat-dog world (homo homi*ni bous est). These rights 
are curtailed because life under such conditions would be solitary, poor, nastN', 
brutish and short. The purpose of the social contract is to temper our \-lolent 
propensities. 
Unlike Lee Rice, I contend that Spinoza does not fit the category of possessive 
individualist and nor is he a precursor of libertarianism, the harbinger of a radical 
individualism (1990: 274). 51 As Nietzsche rightly points out, Spinoza is non- 
egoistic; moreover he does not believe someone could want something for 
herself Without wanting it for others. 
For Spinoza, a social contract does not entail curbing natural rights but fostering 
them. The tint that Spinoza places upon the idea of power as t-onatiis paints a very 
different picture to that of Hobbes. It is entirely stripped of the will to donuinate, 
or a paranolacal compulsion to conserve power. It is an expression of openness. 
In Spinoza's view, man is a god for man (hominem homini'Deum esse) (IN'. pr. 35. 
sch. ), and nothing is more useful to man than man (homo nihil homine iltifiils) (IN". 
pr. 18. sch. ). Amazingly, he claims that if one is governed by reason, one desires 
for another what one desires for oneself However, he warns correspondingly that 
nothing is more harmful to man than man. If they are subject to passions, 
humans neither agree with themselves nor with one another. Hatred erupts in 
iI In a thoughtful discussion on this matter. Gatens and Lloyd (1999: 20-22) also challenue 
an individualist reading of Spinoza. Theý turn to Antonio Negri and Etienne Balibar to 
articulate a more dynamic account of the relation of indi\ idual and collective whereb\ unit\ 
and multiplicity are thought of as reciprocal rather than opposed viewpoints ( 126). 
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particular when they are isolated. 
According to Deleuze (3/5/77), the relationship between Ontology and political 
philosophy was key to Spinoza's work. Moreover, for Spinoza, unlike Machiavelli 
and Hobbes, ethics and politics were not altogether separated. (Politics is onlý 
needed, he says, because people are not Wise. ) Deleuze argues that philosopl-ýies 
of the One tend to be emanative, imposing a hierarchy that moves from the One 
to Being and then to beings. A pure ontology, on the other hand, repudiates 
hierarchy. It is not difficult to perceive a political motivation here. This world of 
immanence is one in which all beings have an intrinsic value, as degrees of power. 
The way Spinoza's naturalist philosophy develops this concept of power (in terms 
of potentia) introduces a very different way of understanding the individual and the 
process of individuation. I WiH show how this operates in the context of 
Spinoza's Ethks later in this chapter. 
III. iii. rights, duties and powers 
A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation of 
life and not of death. 
Homo liber de nulld re minus, qu, ým de motie tqgilat, eý- ýiiis sapentia non modis, sei viltie 
medilatio est. 
Baruch Spinoza, Elbics. (IV pr. 67). 
At this juncture, I will begin to weave together a number of different 
problematics. First of all, in response to the criticisms of Badiou, I want to sketch 
some of the reasons that Deleuze is faithful to the idea of univocal being and'\vIi)- 
this is important. Deleuze is warý- of any attempts to introduce a hierarchical 
order of Beings that would leave this world a mere degraded shadow. His 
understanding of univocity is a distmictive one, described in terms of difference. 
His concept of difference is the difference q/'difference, difference before It has 
bccn subordinated to comparative categories such as resemblance and identity. 
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Difference is affirmation, and as the difference q1- difference it is relational-, 
Deleuze calls it an intensive quantity. In the next two chapters I will explicate 
these concepts in greater detail, and show how they link with Spinoza's 
philosophy of power (poletitia) which is also described in terms of intensive 
quantities. 
Deleuze says, "With univocity, however, it is not the differences which are and 
must be: it is being which is Difference in the sense that it is said of difference" 
(1968a: 39). When Spinoza's substance is read as sirnply self-identical and 
immobile, we are blinkered to its dynamic and creative nature. I want to argue, 
through Deleuze's writings and seminars and the work of Pierre Macherq, that 
Spinoza's philosophy is one that can account for processes of individuation and 
singularisation. Through Simondon, Deleuze will radicalise this project, by 
developing a conception of immanence that rests upon the idea of metastability, a 
system of disequilibrium. In this way Spinoza's immanent cause and the 
relationship of Natura Naturans (Naturing Nature) and Natura Naturata (Natured 
Nature) pr. 29) will be revitalised and linked to the idea of a transcendental 
empiricism. 
But what has all this to do with ethics? By developing an alternative account of 
the individual, we also map another way of distin ishing good from bad. gul 
Centuries after Spinoza's death, Nietzsche would proclaim excitedly in a postcard 
to his friend Franz Overbeck, "I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted. I have a 
pir, 71r, m-, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza [... ] but in the five main 
points of his doctrine I recognise myself; this most unusual and loneliest thinker 
is closest to me precisely M these matters: he denies the freedom of the will, 
teleology, the moral world order, the unegoistic, and evil" (Letter of July 20 189 1, 
quoted in Yovel, 1989b: 105). Spinoza's conception of ethics in terms of ftec 
necessM, (libera liet, essitas) is a difficult and important idea. Fran-uing an ethics 
\x, itliout an\, conception of good or evil could seem ftankly nonsensical to many, 
but not to Nietzsche. Nonetheless, Spinoza still remains the butt of Nietzsche's 
poleirlics. Nietzsche accuses him of keeping the 'shado, \ý-s' of a transcendent God 
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ahve. 52 
Unlike Kant and Hegel, Spinoza does not feel compel-led to make his philosophý 
human centred and anti-naturahstic (Yovel, 1989b: 7). It is for this reason that his 
ethics remains anomalous. Indeed -Virimiyahu Yovel argues that anior_pti is a term 
invented by Nietzsche in "a polemical transformation of Spinoza's a)vor dei 
I. ntellectualis [ ... ]" (104). Ethical liberation is contemplated in terms of power and 
activity. 53 Power is identical to essence. It is always in action and it alwaý-s 
corresponds to an ability to be affected (potere). 
The Ethit's is a heretical and provocative text, one I want to explore over the 
course of this chapter in the context of our investigation into ethics and 
subjectivity. However Spinoza's necessitarianism has led many to believe that this 
love of fate, or love of necessity, entails nothing other than submitting passively 
to whatever befalls us. As we read Spinoza we will learn that it is an ethics of joy. 
Conscious of the incessantly changing nature of reality, it seeks to help us to 
cultivate joy and minimise sadness (which is correlative with passivity). His 
account of sadness, together with a Hobbesian understanding of the human in 
terms of power (potenfia), is repeated throughout Marx's theory of alienation as an 
account of secular redemption (Yovel 1989b: 97). 54 
When Deleuze and Guattari controversially said that human rights were just I 
52 - Against Spinoza's eminently rational, law-governed nature-God Nietzsche thus opposes 
a world in everlasting flux - never self-identical, never at logical rest, never attaining 
equilibrium (by which it would be captured and defined) or a fixed final state, a world 
which is neither pure being nor pure becoming but always wavering between both" (Yovel, 
1989b: 123). This static reading of Spinoza fails to examine the dynamism of concepts such 
Natul-a Natin-ans, conatus and potentia. I will respond to this kind of reading in 111y own 
presentation of Spinoza especially through Macherey's and Deleuze's interpretations. 
53 Andr6 Tosel thinks that recently far more credence has been set by the idea that Spinoza is 
concerned with processes of liberation. 
-5-1 , Fhe impact of Spinoza on Marx's thought is more pervasive than he admits. Borges wrote 
a storN about a real book Don QuiXote that he considers to be imaginary, reproduced b" an 
imaginary author. Pierre Menard, \\, ho Borges considers to be real. He says the texts are 
identical but Menard's is infinitely richer (Deleuze. 1968a: xxii). In a similar fashion. Marx 
entitled a manuscript 'Spinoza's Theo log 1co-Po I itical Freatise' bý Karl Heinrich Marx. 
Berlin 184 1. This was. as Yo\-el (I 989b: 78) emphasises, a perfect act of plagiarism since 
Marx had sirnph, copied frorn that text and rearranged it. adding no thoughts of his own. 
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another axiom added to the market, they echoed a sentiment that Spinoza 
expresses when he tells us that formal democracy is a constitutional illusion if 
powerless people possess rights they cannot exercise. The right of the farmer in 
Malawi to demand a fair price for his/her products constitutes nothing other than 
baying into the wind if international finance markets set the prices for cash crops 
and supermarkets can head off to a cheaper supplier. 
By articulating this discourse in terms of power, and immanent rather than ideal 
modes of existence, not only can a critical stance be taken on such questions, but 
a constructivist one premised upon the singularity of cases can be adopted. I do 
not want to introduce a debate about rights and duties, but simply N,, -ant to draw 
attention to the way that (rightly or wrongly) Deleuze and Guattan place a 
premium on real, situated modes of existence and the capacity for action, thought 
and expression correlative with these instances, rather than speaking about the 
abstract (and often flawed) ideals of human rights. 
Spinoza does not provide an account of ideology; ideology is necessarily 
comparative, measuring something that exists against something that does not 
exist. 55 just like Bergson, Spinoza has little time for a retrospective (and 
(: fisempowering) illusion of the possible. He is turned toward the future. 
As a diagnostician, Spinoza indicates the ways that we can engage in a cntical and 
clinical evaluation of our modes of existence. New modes of existence must be 
constructed and invented, and hke Deleuze and Guattari's plane of immanence 
the), do not pre-exist their creation. Tbrough their combined theories of 
affectivity, humans are opened up to their non-human becomings. Such is 
Spinoza's ethics: immanent, situated, embodied, and capable of affirn-ung 
chsparitý- and dissensus. His ethics of liberation is a constructivist one. It is no 
accident that Deleuze and Guattari call a plane of immanence alternatWely a plane 
of consistency or composition. 
i: l See Arnelia Oskenber, -, Rorty (1990). 
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But before examining this kind of ethics in further detail, I N-ý-ant to discuss some 
of the themes I have introduced by returning to an important critic of Deleuze - 
Alain Badiou. The issues I will address prIn-larfly concern the notion of unIvoc1tY 
so they refer equally to Spinoza. Through this debate, I seek to indicate some of 
the ways in which Deleuze reconciles his status as philosopher of difference and 
thinker of univocity. We have already come across the idea that a degree of power 
is an intensive quantitý-; this is something we will look at in detail in the next few 
chapters. However I also want to demonstrate that these abstract concepts, such 
as univocity, must be explained concretely. 
IlLiv. 'bolshevik' versus 'fascist': the Badiou/Deleuze encounter 
In short we end up with Deleuze as the joyous thinker of the world's confusion. 
Alain Badiou, Deleuýe: the Clamour qf Beitiu (1997: 9). 
Alain Badiou did not enamour himself to readers of Deleuze when he circulated a 
little pamphlet entitled 'Onze notes sur le petit deleuzien', a leaflet that accused 
'deleuzians' of evangelism, discipledom and a profound misunderstanding of the 
words of their Master. 51 He presents himself as the only person thus far to treat 
Deleuze's work in a philosophical rather than evangelical manner. 
In contrast with many commentators, Badiou asserts that, like Spinoza, Deleuze is 
an ascetiC57 thinker of the One-AH. The questions of ontology and ethics are 
56 See Futui- 4nt&ieur (no. 43,1998, Ed. Syllepse) for the "deleuzians' - (Jos6 Gil and 
Arnaud Villani) defence of Deleuze in the wake of the publication of Badiou's Delelize: The 
Clamout- of Being Badiou will respond to this article at a number of intervals including in 
his 'Onze notes sur le petit deleuzien' and 'Un, multiple, multiplicit6s' in . 1fultitildes (no. 1 
Mars 2000). 
57 This strikes me as peculiar given the importance of Nietzsche for Deleuze. Deleuze 
rernarks, "What does the man of the ascetic ideal want? The one who repudiates life is also 
the one Nvho wants a diminished life, the conservation of his type and moreover its power 
and triumph, the triumph and contagion of reactive forces ( 1962: 96). These sentiments are 
expressed throughout ! Vicl: 7. yche und Philosopky. He adds, "We have had no other ideal but 
the ascetic ideal. We have opposed knowledge to life in order to judge life, in order to make 
it something blameworthy, responsible or erroneous" ('15). Similarly Spinoza is understood 
nd affiri-nation, not an ascetic philosopher. as a philosopher of a 
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inextricably linked in this contention. Rather than a philosopher of difference, 
Deleuze is presented as a Platonist of the virtual; a thinker for \-, -hom the actual is 
a mere effect, by implication denigrated and peripheral to the overall movement 
of the virtual. Can this philosopher of proliferating differences and singularities 
be reconciled with the advocacy of a philosophy of One-All that Badiou argues is 
key to the Deleuzian enterpriseý 
Badiou be is his short text on Deleuze in polemical vein. A degree of intimacy is gin I 
established as he describes the personal and political antagonisms, and even a 
peculiar closeness he felt at times, between himself and Deleuze. Despite this, no 
real commonality was founded; even their point of convergence, Spinoza, 
constitutes a bone of contention. Badiou muses over his utter lack of 
comprehension of the Deleuzian creation. Stringing together anecdotes, Badiou 
(stating his maoist and bolshevik credentials) accuses Deleuze of fascism and of 
glorifying the philosoph ýT of Life and the One-All (1997: 2). These accusations 
must not be dismissed as those of a bitter protagonist. They direct us, for 
instance, to the dangers of an effusive, quasi-spiritualistic notion of primordial 
Nature. 
The points scattered through the first pages of the introduction are not 
unimportant. -\s much as the philosophical critique that follows they provide a 
veiled, but incisive, commentary on the ethico-pohtical implications of Deleuze's 
philosophy. Although Badiou distin ishes the political event from philosophical I 
9W 
eternity, it is not clear that the two are as separated as he intimates. . ýfter the 
publication of Deleuze's The Fold there is a rapprochement, at least from Badiou's 
perspective. This is a paradoxical entente along the lines of Deleuze's philosopliy 
of series and divergence. A series of letters passes between them for a 'while; 
however due to a sequence of unforeseeable events, Deleuze firmIN- closes the 
discourse. 
The philosophy of the multiple that informs Bachou's ontology is written vis-A-vis 
gm of Deletize. The distinction is, as he sees it, bet-ween the vital (arumal) paradi, ý 
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MLIltipliCIties that one discovers in the trajectory from Bergson, and a theory of 
sets. Though both are concerned with the question of ontology, virtual Totalin- or 
chaosmosis are anathema to Badiou. These words lav bare the fundamental 
proposition of the ontology of the One-All inforrmng Deleuze's philosophy. 
Deleuze is a metaphysician of a renovated Onc and it is precisely his fidehtý- to 
this particular understanding of univocity that Badiou grapples with, and 
challenges. 
Far from being an egalitarian, Badiou claims that Deleuze is a profoundl) 
aristocratic thinker. Thought only exists in a hierarchalised space where the 
individual is seized by its pre-individual determination (11- 12). Although Being is 
neutral and equal, one must always find out whether a thing can go to the limit of 
its power and things are consequently considered from the point of view of their 
power, again according to a hierarchy (32-3). The only anarchy Deleuze wants is a 
crowned anarchy (anarchie (wlronýe). 
All that matters, on Badiou's reading, is that a fundamental asceticism is imposed 
whereby all of the intellectual, social and sentimental factors associated with the 
adualio of 'states of things' and the 'lived' are renounced in favour of this power 
to exceed one's limit, in favour of bifbn*s. Badiou adjudges this to be a philosophý, 
of death, a dissipation of all that I am, of my actuality, into a purified automaton. 
This assessment seems bolstered by Deleuze's fondness for Maunice Blanchot's 
writings on death. 
it is perhaps the proliferation of dualisms, combined with the inevitable 
qualitative privileging of one term over another, that most irks Badiou when 
reading Deleuze's philosophy. Constantly two terms are introduced, only for one J 
to be made foundational and superior. For instance, difference is privileged above 
identity, affirmation over negation, movement over immobility (Badiou 2000: 
197). Similarly, the virtual is Real while the actual (states of affairs and lived 
experience) is merely an effect, a simulacrum. It is tl-ý,, propensitý- to attribute an 
antetiority to the virtual, lo ically, chronolo icallN and most especially 191 191 Y 
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ontolo ically, that leads him to call Deleuze a 'Platonist of the virtual'. 91 
Badiou therefore asks why Being needs two names if it is said in one and the 
same sense of all beings. These names are said of the unity of the power of 
production and the actualisation of the multiplicity of divergent simulacra. Such a 
move, according to Badiou, re-introduces transcendence into this system. 
Moreover, it demonstrates Deleuze's Bergsonism as he compulsively multiplies 
dualisms at every turn. (Deleuze will respond that it is what happens between the 
two that matters. ) The virtual is the principal name of Being in Bachou's N-lew. 
Ray Brassier (2000) elaborates these ideas further. He claims that, for Deleuze, 
Being is an inclusive disjunction that constitutes a unilateral asý-Mmetrý,. Being i's 
said of virtual and actual, so the naming of Being becomes equivocal. It is 
therefore transcendent. The inclusive disjunction is an excess over virtual and 
actual, marking a political covenant with the global sovereignty of capitalism. 
According to Brassier, Badiou effectively asks whether the nomadic distribution 
mimes the logic of capital creating an indiscernibility of capital and philosophy. 
Resistance to the sovereignty of capital requires a rupture, not an ontology 
premised upon a creative continuum. Consequently, rather than process, Badiou 
stresses subtraction. The excess of the system is the Vold. An emphasis on 
production, constructivism and process throughout this chapter must be offset 
against the question of whether this is another instance of philosophy bolstering 
the movements of capitalism. This allegation will be implicitly addressed through 
the dyad of Potestas and potenfia. 
Ba(: hou has a further ethico-political point to raise. The impersonal One re\-cals 
Deleuze's Stoicism by invoking what Badiou calls a purified automaton in the 
place of the subject. The affirmation of necessity of all that occurs treads near to 
an apolo ia for the status quo, and appears, moreover to sacrifice novelty and 91 
plurality on the altar of univocity (Brassier, 2000: -206-9). 
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According to Badiou, Deleuze proposes a rene, ýved concept of the One. While the 
confusion of the world resists taming by a stable classification or a direction of 
history, the multiplicity of the world is nonetheless subject to a qualitative 
subsumption by the One. Badiou argues that this manoeuvre is consistent with 
Deleuze's overall project whereby a static opposition is resolved as one term 
effects a qualitative takeover. To consolidate his contention that Deleuze is in fact 
a thinker of the One, he draws our attention to statements i Dýl in 
. 
Prence and 
Repetition and The Lgic of Sense where Deleuze appeals to an idea of one clamour 
of Being for all beings. His conclusion is that Deleuze has no interest in freeing 
the multiple but is concerned with folding it back onto this renewed concept of 
the One. 
There is no doubt that univocity is an important concept for Deleuze, but we 
must examine the way he reworks this concept, especially in relation to Spinoza 
and the concept of potentia as a iv's e-%-istendi. Univocity is described in terms of the 
differences of differences in Dý§ýrence and Repetition and is invoked in order to rally 
against philosophies of emanationism and eminence with the express aim of 
constructing a philosophy of radical immanentism. 
Badiou knows that univocal Being is neither numerically one nor even unified. He 
tells us that the power (Puissante) of the One is that its beings are multiple and 
divergent produced by a disjunctive synthesis. In the same way, substance is, for 
Spinoza, immediately expressed by an infinity of attributes, although there is no 
ontological division of Being. Individuating differences are intensities or 
inflexions of power and are mobile and singular. 
This 'virtual totality' has different names such as inorganic Life and the One-All 
I (, Spinozist substance), according to Badiou. Being is thought as po,, ver (ýIII'Slfam-e) 
or as Life. Although there is no ontological distinction between Naturing Nature 
and Natured Nature, there is a binarv distribution \N-hich either accentuates its 
As xe will discm r this immediate 'inatter' or its actuahsation (1997: -')-) 
distinction, according to Macherey, relates to whether a particular or a global view 
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of things is taken. Deleuze explains this notion further in his seminars, which we 
will turn to later in this chapter 
The difference of beings is thus only formal; their ontological identity is Being. 
Conversely, Badiou argues that what is required is a thought of the actuality of 
Being in terms of its 'pure dispersion-multiple'; an immanence excluding the all. 
Countering a logic of multiplicities, this logit, of the multiple dominates Badiou's 
philosophical enterprise. This is because a logic of multiplicities is anachronistic 
and pre-Cantor (Badiou, 2000: 199). By drawing upon set theory Badiou proposes 
a univocal determination of the multiple -Without- one (199). 
In a (pre-emptive) backlash, Deleuze and Guattan themselves accuse Badiou of 
transcendence. They contend that his conception of the emptý- set or the vold 
implies that philosophý' floats in an empty transcendence, as the unconditioned 
concept (1991a: 152). In their view, this is why at least two multiplicities are 
needed because multiplicity is what happens bet)Peeen the two. These are back to 
back (and not hierarchically superposed) as in the relation of states of affairs and 
events. 
Firmly convinced of the value of the multiple of set theory, in contradistinction 
to Deleuze's logic of multiplicities, Badiou does not investigate thoroughly 
enough the concept of the plane of immanence and the idea of the inclusl\, e 
disjunction. In my view, Deleuze's work with Guattari is set to one side in what, 
for Badiou, is an uncustomarily weakly argued fashion. For Deleuze, univocal 
Being is the differences of differences communicating through their differences, 
and the One-All is distributive, not unifying. It is open and disparate. These 
themes recur in \-arious guises in the -\vork with Guattari. Badiou's decision to 
ignore this sets Deleuze's multiplicitous oeuvre on a trajectory very different to 
the one it would be on if the work with Guattari xas included. 
I'hcre are some points of agreement, however. Badiou understands that a 
contemporarN, metaphysics must be a theon, of mul iphci ies and grasp w 
ti Iti 
I () -', 
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singularitics. Of necessity this initiates a critique of insidious forms of 
transcendence \,, -hether they be overtly reh ious or cloistered. In addition, the 1 91 
lingering traces of religion mean that univocal Being must be posited (2()()(): 196). 
He concurs with Deleuze that every true thought is a thought of singularity, but 
argues that, for Deleuze, actual multiplicities are purely formal modalities. It is 
this necessity to appeal analogically to the intuition of the virtual that re- 
introduces transcendence. 
In sum, for Badiou, Deleuze ends up with a virtual, 'horizontal' transcendence (as 
opposed to a 'vertical' transcendence of the One) that misrecognises the intrinsic 
resources of the multiple by presupposing a chaotic power of the One, and bý- 
making analogies of the modes of actualisation rather than grasping them in their 
singularity. Deleuze is a natural mystic (2000: 211). 
It would be facile to deny that Deleuze makes the statements that Badiou quotes, 
or to claim they were anomalies, at odds with his overall philosophy of difference. 
Instead we need to understand in what way Deleuze is a thinker of the One-All 
and indeed what motivates him to take such a trajectory. In contradistinction to a 
'democracy of desire' (1997: 10) Badiou believes Deleuze's machini'sm leads to an 
abnegation of choice and of will because of the emphasis placed upon the 
impersonal concept of A Life, of the One. Our challenge, as Fric Alliez points 
out, is to try to grasp the complexity of the "ontological proposition of the thesis 
of univocal Being and the pragmatic affirmation of multiplicities" (Alhez, 2000: 
192). 
It is therefore acutely important to understand both the nature of the ontology of 
becon-ung that Deleuze is proposing, and how it relates to his philosophy of 
difference. We need to figure out why Deleuze takes issue NX-1th an image of 
thought that does not reflect upon its ifficit pre-philosophical presuppositions. 
GIN-cli the discomfort felt by different philosophers with notions of an 
impersonal Life or Spinoz.,, i's Naturing Nature, Nve must ask whether in fact the 
allegiance to a phi-losophy of force and becoming abnegates any responsibility to 
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actuality and to ethics. Is it as though the individual is dissolved into the 
inchvisible substance in v. -hich all inchviduality lacks reahty? 
This kind of ob)ection is also effectively made by Tern- Eagleton in a revie-W 
(2000: 9) where he argues that philosophy is still enamoured with religious 
fervour. He claims that the invocation of an impersonal, vitalistic Life traversing 
the universe is found in concepts like 'difference' and 'desire'. A privileging of an 
inhuman, impersonal force dissolves the reality of the actual human. A similar 
kind of allegation is made by Antonio Negri in reference to Part V of Spinoza's 
Etbics which, in Negri's view, slips into a d-iinly veiled mysticism through the 
introduction of the third kind of knowledge amor dei'which Spinoza calls beatitildo. 
Moreover, for different reasons that we will discover shortly, Laruelle will call 
Deleuze's (and Nietzsche's) philosophy an idealistit, one premised upon a 
particular conception of force. 
Perhaps, on the other hand, we will be able to draw upon these attempts to think 
process and movement to rethink the questions of difference and relationality, 
and reconsider the question of ediics. 
Him. univocity, eminence, analogy 
We need an ethic or a faith, which makes fools laugh: it is not a need to believe 
in something else, but a need to believe in this world, of which fools are a part. 
Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-lmqe. (1 985a: 173). 
In a seminar on 'Scholasticism and Spinoza' (14/l/74)51, Deleuze situates the 
difficult)- of the question of the nature of being and distinguishes bet-, -, -ccn 
cquivocity, analogy and univocity. Equivocity, he saý-s, is a problem of utterances-, 
we need to know whether a table is said in the same sense as an animal, or a man 
in the same sense of as God. Equivocal Being59 means that there are several 
i'N All quotations are taken from the seminar in discussion unless otherwise noted. These 
serninars are not published and are only found online, hence the lack of page numbers. 
59 In order to distinguish 'ýtrc' and '6tant' I \N III retain a (Heidegger nuanced) distinction of 
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senses of being and that these different senses of the word Being are without 
common measure. Curiously, this could lead to heresv since some would prefer to 
say that 'God is not, rather than say 'God is' in the same \vay that a chair is. At 
least the former could be interpreted as meaning that God is superior to Being. 
Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly declare an allegiance to a philosophy of 
immanence. This is distinguished from the stepped universe ('unh, ers en est'alier) 
that is emblematic of platonic, neo-platofflc and mediaeval traditions (Deleuze, 
1985b: 79). This universe was suspended from the One which operated as a 
transcendent principle, proceeding through "a series of emanations and 
hierarchical conversions" (79). 
"Plotinus reproached Plato for having seen participation ftorn its lesser side" 
(Deleuze, 1968b: 170). "What is participated remains in itself [and does not enter 
into what participates in it]; it is participated insofar as it produces, and produces 
insofar as it gives, but has no need to leave itself to give or produce" (170). If the 
One is above its products (and its gifts), this is emanation. 
The effect produced does not remain in the cause, it exists by coming out from 
the cause, and it is this movement from an (empty) cause that determines this as 
an emanative movement. The One is superior, not only to its effect, but to what 
gives the effect. It is beyond Being and beyond substance (172). Beings are 
ranked hierarchically in terms of their distance from this first cause and have 
more or less reality, more or less being. "' 
On the other hand, univocal Being means that "Beiti bas onjl one sense and is said in 'g 
oile and the same sellse qfevetytbiq ql-ivbl*(. I) it is said" (Deleuze, 14/01/74). Deleuze's 
famous example of this is that God is said in the same sense as a tick. "There is 
Being and being. This distinction should not be read as proposing any relation between these 
ideas and those of Heidegger. 
60 Remarkably enough Spinoza's substance is often read in an emanationist fashion in which 
the modes follow from the attributes which follow from substance; this partlNr corresponds to 
Hegel's reading. For another such reading see Paul Eisenberu ( 1990). 
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no longer a remote cause: the rock, the lilv, the animal, and the human cquall) I 
sing the glory of God in a kind of crowned an-archy" (1985b: 79). Like Hardt and 
Negri, Deleuze argues that these waves of immanence surged forth against 
transcendence throughout the Renaissance era (79). 
Immanence is then no longer 'irnmanence to' and participation can no longer be 
thought of in terms of 'participation in'. Like an emanative cause, the immanent 
cause does not leave itself, however, its effects remain in the cause. There is no 
degradation. Pure m-imanence means that beings are not ranked hierarchically in 
distance from their cause but immediately participate in Being. 
Finally, the analogical conception of Being was mapped out by St Thomas 
through Aristotelian philosophy. Being is said in several senses of that of wl-lich it 
is said. However, in this case, these are governed by analogy. Deleuze remarks 
that the categories, which are concepts denoting every possible object of 
experience, operate in an analogical fashion. Philosophies of representation work 
through analogical principles of mediation, something we will discover more 
about in chapter 5. 
But are these not just pedantic, obscurantist arguments emblematic of mediaeval 
times, irrelevant to the present day? People were tortured and burned for saying 
that Being is univocal. The fear of condemnation as a heretic and pantheist meant 
that Duns Scotus only managed to think univocal Being and not to affirm it. The 
univocity of Being is a dangerous idea, expelling transcendence from the world. 
Not only is God said in the same sense as a tick, but in a strange way the tick is 
God. But in this case how can there be differences of beings, if we no longer have 
Aristotelian categories or differences of formý There are differences between 
beings because difference is thought solelý- on the level of degrees of power, not 
bý- form or genus or species. 
gests that although these kinds of debates appear f Ahmed Alarni sLiq ar from ,q 
concrete concerns they have huge ethical and political implications (1997: 80). 
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Citing Guattari's celebrated aphorism 'Before Being there is Politics', he claims 
that by battling against an equivocal conception of Being, Deleuze, Duns Scotus 
and Spinoza demonstrate that that notion implies "a political hierarchy and an 
impen*ahpati . um which operates through transcendence and verticality as it appeals 
to a celestial bureaucracy" (80). Univocal Being, however, implies a "polifical 
extensi'on that advances and progresses through the immanent extension of forces 
of life, and through the creation of spaces of liberty immanent to singularities that 
are real and effective" (80). 
Interpreting this in ethico-political terms, Alarm argues that the Anstotelian 
method proceeding through mediation mirrors the political mediation that 
subjugates the powers of the masses. Conversely, "[t]he univocity of being is 
direajl and immediately said of the singularities of multiple and different essences, 
that is of the effective and real forces of the masses" (80). 
Unlike Badiou's selective reading of univocity", Being is affirmation and not 
neutrality. It is becoming and not identity, difference and not resemblance. In 
turn, singularities are only neutral insofar as they are the potential of ever), 
possible individuation (80). By developing this understanding of univocity we 
shall continue to challenge the idea that philosophy has made a political covenant 
with global Capital. 
HIM. a degree of power 
There is nothing to life that has value, except the degree of power - assuming 
that life itself is the will to power. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power. (1901: §55,37). 62 
I "So between a table, a little bov, a little 1, a locomotive, a cmv, a god, the gIr 
chfference is solely one of degree of power in the realisation of one and the same 
61 Citing The Logic of Sciisc Badiou claims that Being is neutral (1997: 53). Alaml explains 
how univocal Being is affirmation and becoming. 
62 Because these notes have been rearranged a number of times, I cite the date \N-hen the first 
volurne is published b\ Nietzsche's sister in her edition of his collectke works. 
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being" (Deleuze, 14/1/74). Beings are understood in terms of assemblages - the 
ways theýý are capable of affecting and being affected. For d-iis reason, Deleuze 
will argue that a draft horse is closer to an ox than to a race horse, because it can 
enter into similar assemblages. This is Spinoza's great innovation; he sees 
everything in terms of differences of degrees of power and to each degree of 
power there corresponds a capacity of being affected. Spinoza invents a new 
taxonomy, closer to that of ethologists than traditional classifications. Hence the 
ethical challenge: of what affects are you capableý 
Degrees of power are called intensities and unlike the Aristotelian idea of 
potential, they are not separated from activity and are necessarily fulfilled. "[t]be 
affea i's the manner in wbi(h a de:, oree ofpower is necessari# attualised as ajuntfion oy'tbe 
assembla :g , ges into wbkb the individual or the tbiý eillerý' 
(Deleuze, 14/1/74). Spinoza's 
world is a world of continuous variation. Our affects depend on the affections 
that we have, and if we are sad, this is because our power of acting is dimiMshed. 
An example of this might be the factory worker forced to work extremely long 
hours in poor conditions. When multinational companies become virtual 
enterprises concentrating on branding, and sub-contract their manufacturing line 
to other firms who themselves sub-contract, workers (especially young women) 
find themselves drawn into an exceedingly brutal capitalist subjectivity that does CI. / 
not pay them enough to live, and works them to the point of exhaustion. 
Something that systematically curtails our power of acting we will continue, for 
present purposes, to call Potestas. Guattan also critiques the infantihsation and 
mass-mediatisation of society, giving us a different insight into the workings of 
Poteslas. He argues that television is hypnotic inducing passivity in the viewer, and 
more importantly, the cultivation of a capitalist subjectivity means that other 
modes of valonsation are erased. 
"The powers-that-be are fundamentally institutions built to affect you with 
sadlic"', [thev] only keep hold on us by affecting us, which is to sav bv 
fulfilling our p(), \vcr of being affected 'with sad affects, and undoubtedly 
thousands of ways of doing this cxl, -, t" (14/01/74). In order to exercisc Power 
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these powers-that-be must inspire sad passions, and take away the capacity for 
acting. 
This is Spinoza's ethical and political problem. In the last chapter we came across 
the idea of Collective Equipments which, according to Deleuze and Guattarl, 
were effectively machines for producing affects. In order to have Power over us, 
they need to diminish our capacities of acting (and this includes thinking, since 
thinking is, for Spinoza, an activity). Deleuze (15/2/77) argues that once there is 
an apparatus of power, there is an abstract machine and vice versa. 
In his little book on Spinoza, Deleuze writes that Spinoza, the atheist, devalued 
sad passions in favour of )oy (1981a: 25). His tripartite scheme describes the man 
saddened by the human condition (the priest), the man who exploits sad passions 
to establish power (the tyrant) and the man with sad passions (the slave). 
Denouncing transcendent values he assesses that through the imposition of an 
external norm, the singularity of the thing is annihilated as it is forced to submit 
to a comparative model that rids it of its difference. 
S inoza resembles Nietzsche greatly in his analysis of this situation since he says p 
that there are two scourges; hatred and remorse. This sentiment echoes the 
Nietzschean idea of ressentiment and bad tvnstzentv. Deleuze calls the Powers that 
stunt our powers of activity the 'powers-that-be', and like Negri distinguishes 
between Power (Pouvoir) and power (puissance). 
No doubt inspired by Hobbes, Spinoza defines the individual in terms of power 
(potentia), but unlike Hobbes his idea of power is one of constitutive openness 
rather than self-regulation. It does not seek to dominate others to preserve its 
being, but is concerned with inventing new modes of association and existence. 
In chapter 5, we Nvill see how the Image of Thought operates to diminish our 
capacities of thinking. This runs counter to our essence as a degree of poN-, -cr 
(polewi(i) not insofar as it is any less perfect given the affections it has, but because 
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it operates near its minimal threshold of activity. Someone striving to feed herself 
evcry day will find it near impossible to cultivate other aspects of being. Simone 
Weil's year working in a factory is a tale of ho,, -, - long hours and exhaustion 
prevent the ability to think or to be. Her conclusion, like Deleuze's, is that 
sadness makes no one intelligent. We will now turn to Deleuze's and 'Macherey's 
readings of Spinoza's philosophy to further our understanding of some of these 
ideas concerning univocal being. 
Ill. vii. Benedictus, Maledictus 
Spinoza 
The Jew's translucent hands 
Shape the crystals in the twilight 
And the dying evening is all fear and chill 
(In the evenings, evenings are the same). 
His hands and the hyacinth's space 
Paling at the purview of the ghetto 
Are almost inexistent for the quiet man 
Dreaming a clear labyrinth 
Fame does not perturb him, that reflection 
Of dreams in another kind of dream, 
Nor the girls'fearful love. 
Free of metaphor, free of myth 
He shapes a rigid crystal: the infinite 
Map of the One that is All Its stars. 
Jorge Luis Borges, translated by YIrimiyahu Yovel (1989b). 
Ontology- Ethics: a profound coupling that resounds with the radical nature of 
Spinoza's philosophy of immanence. Spinoza's unspoken pledge to purge the 
world of transcendence saw him ridiculed, hated and feared. Calling him the 
prince of philosophers, Deleuze contends that no one has gone so far in thinking 
immanence, no one remains as misunderstood, and we have hardly begun to 
comprehend his bewildering philosophý-- In a seminar Deleuze tells us a story 
about Goethe. Goethe read and re-read the E. Mics until finally he exclaimed that 
each time the wliole escaped him. It is this paradoxicaflý- constitutive openness of 
Spinoza's philosophy that Will be our concern as Nve seek to understand how 
Spinoza can propose an ethics without aný- conception of Good and FIvil. and v, -hy 
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SI pinoza's ethics is inseparable ftom his ontology. 
111-viii. Spinoza's heresy 
One of the primary objections to philosophies like that of Spinoza's is that they 
dissolve individuahtý, into the Whole: a kind of night -\xhere all cows are black. 
When Hegel remarked with a certain glee that "Spinoza died on the 21st of 
February, 1677, in the forty-fourth year of his age. The cause of his death was 
consumption, from which he had long been a sufferer; this was in harmony with 
his system of philosophy, according to which all particularitý- and individuality 
pass away in the one substance" (Hegel quoted in Negri, 1981: 141), he bolstered 
the beliefs of many who saw Spinoza's system as immobile (das Starre), an 
unmoved Un1ty. 63 
From Hegel's perspective, Spinoza constituted an important moment in thinking 
the immanent totality of the Absolute but it was up to Hegel himself to make this 
Substance Subject; to make it move. For Hegel, Spinoza's substance was abstract 
and undifferenciated, echoing the Orient, and he could see no necessity for this 
plenitudinous affirmative Being to produce its effects. Still, according to poet 
Heinrich Heine, "All our contemporary philosophers, perhaps without knowing 
it, are looking through the eyeglasses that Baruch Spinoza polished" (quoted in 
Yovel, 1989b: 52). Because Hegel takes Spinoza's conception of tvusa 1711 asa 
defiMtion concerning an absolute beginning, he (understandably) cannot 
understand this initial moment. Why would substance begin to produce the 
modes? Are the attributes a supplementary dimension tacked onto substance? 64 
63 Yirimiyahu Yovel says, in the context of a discussion of conatus as self-preservation and 
Spinoza's relation to Nietzsche, that -Spinoza's insistence on self-preservation is in 
accordance with his metaphysics of self-identity and permanence [ ... ]" (1989b: 113). 1 take 
issue with both this conception of substance and understanding of conatus. 
6' The role of the attributes in Spinoza have been the subject of much heated debate and 
disagreement. In his expressionist reading, Deleuze (1968b) (strangely given his overall 
therne of expression) likens them to different names (like Jacob and Israel) of the same 
referent. Wolfson (1934) ar-ues for a strongi-, subjectivist account. MachereN emphasises 
that the use of percipere (rather than cmicipere: to conceive) means that we perceive the 
attributes passivek. hence theý are no construction of the intellect. On the other hand, 
Gueroult (1968a) interprets Spinoza as sayinu each attribute is a substance. Finalb, Negri 
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Indeed ,,, -hat would shake substance from such immediate ecstasy of Beingý 
Not onlý- does Hegel think that Spinoza's philosophy is immobile, he thinks that 
it has no relation to an Other. Consequently that \x-hich lays claim to absolute 
reality is entirely devoid of reality and is, in fact, entirely abstract. Since he 
understands substance to be self-identical, he believes it lacks the movement of 
negation that could make it determinate. Hegel fl-tinks the relationship betkveen 
substance, the attributes and the modes is a hierarchical and serial one. 
Consequently, for him, the movement from the unitv of substance to diN-ersity 
could only be false and abstract. But, as we wiU learn Spinoza's system is a sN, stem 
far from equilibrium. 
From the Marrano tradition, Sephardic Jews who had been initially forced to 
convert to Christianity and then fled Spain and Portugal escaping the tyrannous 
purgings that began with Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492, Spinoza was used to an 
atmosphere that deployed ambiguity and dissimulation in order to communicate 
forbidden thoughts. Undoubtedly an atheist, Spinoza masks this heresy by using 
the name God. " But Spinoza's God in no way resembles the God of the 
monotheistic faiths. If we take a close look at de Deo, part 1 of the Etbit's we find a 
(1981) just obliterates them, saying they were a symptom of Spinoza's idealistic phase 
before he became a full blown materialist. He justifies such a reading by telling us how the 
Ethics was written over two periods, and the attributes are no longer mentioned once the 
second period of writing has commenced. This topic is a thesis in itself and a minefield I 
want to avoid prolonging my contact with for the present. 
However, I want to briefly refer to Etienne Balibar's very interesting reading of the role of 
the attributes in order to situate my own problematic. He maintains that the attribute makes 
the 'passage' of substance to the modes intelligible, while still retaining the idea that 
substance can be comprehended in an infinity of ways. They do not appear as a mediation of 
substance and the modes, but as a unity of contraries that is immediately given (1990: 67). 
Spinoza states that there is an infinity of attributes of which we know two, Thought and 
Extension. He also says that the attributes are the essence of substance. A rather simple way 
of grasping this would be to begin, not at the speculative level of God, but with the example 
of a human whose body and mind can be understood as different expressions or aspects of a 
single individual, rather than a composite or a union of two substances. Spinoza negotiates 
the camps of idealism and materialism, slotting into neither. I understand this idea of the 
individual in terms of a qualitative multiplicity in which aný change results in a qualitative 
transformation of the whole. 
0 ý' I will refer to God as 'he' because this is how the Latin has been translated. I realise that 
on the one hand this is ironic. given the criticism of anthropomorphic images of God that 
follow. but it also serves to show Spinoza's capacities to mask and dissimulate. 
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complex and dynamic conception of substance, a substance that is a far cry from 
a container or even from the unmoved unity of Being. 
Throughout the Ethics, there is a sustained, though veiled, critique of 
anthropomorphic conceptions of God that rests on a vulgar conception of 
monarchy as Potestas (11. pr. 3. sch. ). When God is presented as a free and fickle 
ruler that can will anything into existence and obeys no law, Spinoza retorts that 
God cannot produce tl-iings in any other way or order to the way they have been 
produced. A free thing exists through the necessity of its own nature j. d. 7). God 
is tausa sui ., hence he is not constrained or determined to exist by any external 
thing (ab alio). He is rather in himself (ifl se). Nature has no fixed goal and all final 
causes are figments of the human imagination, since were God to act with an end 
in Niew, he would necessarily lack something J. app. ) 
Elaborating on this insight, Macherey argues that we must make a distinction 
gere and operan* (1992: 72). God acts, exercising an infinite power between a 
(potentia), but God is nothing other than the nature of things. He certainly does 
not have the power to constrain, in the manner of an autocrat that operates 
(operan) or works on a reality that is exterior to him. Such a model would involve 
a supplementary dimension of reality. And such a God would be nothing other 
than a caricatured image of the human; God made in the image of Man. 
SI pinoza)s conception of God rests on a conception of potentia, what he can do 
pr. 34) and potestas, the infinity of ways he is able to be affected. 66The essence of 
God is activc in that he develops his nature by producing effects in it. The logic 
of the t-allsa sill' (cause of itselo means that this process of production escapes all 
66 Potestas frorn potere also rneans -to be able to' and Deleuze emphasises this capacity to 
be affected that potestas communicates. As I have done throughout this thesis, I capitallse 
poicstas when using it, as Negri does (and Spinoza does occasionally) to illustrate an 
operation of Poýver that diminishes others' capacity to affect and be affected. Spinoza, 
though he uses potestas in this way when he says that understanding God's power in this 
NNaý is likening it to vulgar monarchy. does not keep to this distinction. Deleuze's use of the 
pair pia . ss(mcv p0111,01 .r communicates the sense of this potentia , Potestas coupling. English 
does not communicate this nuance so I will continue to draw upon the distinction of *power' 
(and sometimes 'force') and Po\\er. 
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external determination. God is absolutely infinite, absolute affirmation and 
without negativity or lack (I. pr. 15. sch. ), existing through the sole necessitý- of his 
nature. This nature implies (invoh)ere) e-istence J. d. 1), moreover his essence xi is 
existence. Ibis conception of essence means that it is neither a possible nor does 
it pre-exist. It is an aduosa essentia (11. pr. 3. sch. ) and God exists and acts 
necessarily. Liberty and necessity are not opposed. Freedom consists of existing 
and acting by virtue of one's own nature. Only God is ftee J. d. 7 and pr. 17) 
because, unlike the finite modes, he is not a constrained thing. 
Spinoza flattens God onto the Real in the first pages of the Ethzi'f. God is 
revealed as the immanent movement of the Real, a dynamic and tendencial 
movement without teleology or design. Any external determination injects the 
possible, and hence a lack, or an overde termination, into this absolute 
immanence. This implies God is somehow lacking and limited; however, for this 
to occur, there would have be an external cause J. pr. 11. proof 2. ). God exists 
necessarily because He is infinitely infinite. To be unable to exist is impotence, 
and to be able to exist is power (potentia). 
In proposition 18 of De Deo Spinoza distinguishes between the Milmanent cause 
(,, allsa i'mmanens) and the transitive cause (6, ausa tranfiens). Gabriel Albiac suggests 
that this use of Spinoza's adoption of this distinction stemmed from the Suirzian 
tradition, through the manual of Adrian Heerebord (1997: 127). According to 
Macherey this is a direct refutation of creationism, because it shows how God is 
immediately at one with the action that manifests his power (PUISSan6-e) (1992: 82). 
There is one reality, not a hierarchical gradation of realities comprised of greater 
and lesser being. Free necessitý- (fibera neteffitas) is opposed to acting in terms of 
free decree or external ends. " 
In other words, if Nx-c imagine that there is a model (a formal cause) and a goal (a 
final cause), wc posit an cxternal reahty independent of diVine nature. Such a 
67 See Spinoza's letters 57 and 58 to Tschirnhaus and Schuller respectlýel,,,, on free 
necessity. 
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hylomorphic conception of God's power would resemble that of kings and 
queens that impose their power on the populace-" By attributing an arbitrary free 
will to God, the response of the people could only be obedience. This kind of 
power would be irrational. 
Pierre Macherey observes that it is because we are accustomed to reasoning from 
the part to the whole (under the aegis of the imagination) that we find it difficult 
to install ourselves in this totality that the modes depend upon. The nature of 
Being is nothing other than the reality or nature of the things gathered to this 
substantial principle. The relation of substance to the modes is donuinated by 
productivity and power (potenfia). God does not come out of himself to produce 
and to act. God does not want but he acts. Naturing Nature is simultaneously 
Natured Nature and these two are perfectly adequate. To separate them would 
introduce a hierarchical causality flouting Spinoza's innovation of the immanent 
cause. 
Macherey explains how to comprehend the relation of NaturMg Nature and 
Natured Nature. He says in the former case we look at things in terms of infim, 
seizing them globally. In the latter case, we examine how things determine one 
another reciprocally in their particularity. In this way we can understand that this 
is one and the same Nature conceived from different points of view (1998: 164). 
The only distinction between Naturing Nature and Natured Nature arises from 
our lack of knowledge (Macherey, 1992: 105). We are not free through an 
impossible ideal but through the constitutive and positive capacity to act that is 
our effective power. In his exposition of the rules of practical living, De Senitllte 
I llilll(wa, Spinoza explains that to be ignorant of the causes of things is sen-itude 
The essence of humans is nothing other than their varied powcrs of 
68 In rn% view it \vill be Badiou's inability to grasp the notion of the immanent cause that 
leads him to allege that actual and multiple lives are flooded and submerged in the 
impersonal flows of Life, rather than perceiving how Life is the name for the immanent. 
processual and inventk e movement of Nature that is inseparable from its productions. I will 
return to this theme shortlý . 
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activity and capacities for association. Even impotence indicates an affirmatiN-e 
affective movement that is a power of being. 
Nonetheless, external forces can alienate this power from its capacity to act 
a#ir1nath)ej1. This is the natural state of humans according to Spinoza, since theý 
find themselves sub'ected to forces whose effects they passively undergo. To be 
passive is a necessary part of our finitude, but to be human means that one can 
behave in such a way as to be the adequate cause of one's actions JV. pr-2. 
prooý. By understanding the conditions of our servitude and not detaching 
ourselves from Nature, we can understand the means to our liberation. 
Marx tells us in his early Writings that an ethical problematic arises when humans 
are systematically curtailed and constrained from acting and thinking, when theý 
cannot foster and invent new potentials of existing. Gatens and Lloyd argue that 
we need to invent better collective imaginings that can cultivate, rather than over- 
determine, diversitýý and difference. 
Consequently, the notion of the individual cannot be thought of in an ato=stic 
fashion. It is the result of a combination of bodies JI. pr. 13. and pr. 14) As we 
will learn, ethics does not involve accumulating Power over others (Potestas) but is 
concerned with composing relations, finding out what agrees with us, 
constructing new modes of association and organisation that increase our 
capacities to affect and be affected (potentia). This is a dynarmc and concrete 
process that is not premised upon abstractions such as 'human nature' but on the 
agreement of bodies and minds. This insight is the core of Spinoza's ethics, 
something we will explore in further detail throughout this chapter. 
116 
, SPI-', MZA: THE GOD-INTOXICATEDMA\ 
IlLix. the active essence 
'[E]ssence' does not refer to a general idea of humanity, an abstract concept 
under which all individuals are subsumed and their differences neutralised. On 
the contrary it refers to the power that singularises each individual, conferring 
upon him a unique destiny. 
Etienne Bahbar, Spinoýa wid Politics. (1985: 107) 
Deleuze remarks (15/2/77) that he does not see that life is possible without 
molar wholes, that is without individuated, though complex, bodies like 
organisms. In no way can we postulate a world of abstract intensities (15/2/77). 
An intensive quantity is never abstracted from the extensive quantity it correlates 
to. "The question is to know if an intensity agrees with someone and he can 
tolerate it. An intensity is bad, really bad, if it exceeds the power of someone that 
undergoes it, even if it is the most beautiful of things. An intensity is always in 
relation With other intensities" (15/2/77). 
An essence is not an abstract view on a thing; indeed Spinoza tries strenuously to 
avoid speaking of a human essence (or nature) (11. ax. 1). An essence is the acting 
principle of the thing, that without which the thing cannot be or be conceived. 
Conversely, an essence cannot be conceived outside of the thing of which it is the 
essence JI. pr. 10. sch. ). There is no hierarchy of essence over existence, and an 
essence does not have the status of being a possible before it is the essence of an 
actually existing thing JI. d. 2). It is an affirmation, not something to be subsumed 
under an abstract universal JI. ax. 1). 
Modes are not inherently passive. Once they exist they have a power of acting 
and a capacity to be affected. This is their tonatus, their attualis essentia (actual 
essence) and it is an expression of God's power (potentia) to exist. Insofar as theý- 
are hn-ýted and finite beings they are caused to exist by other modes and are 
necessarilN- constrained and hmi'ted, part of a complex network of relations. They 
exploit this power of existing operating on reality (operan) but their power of 
-er of God as Naturing Nature. acting (iolwtlls) means theý- participate in the poNx 
This idea draws close to what Guattari calls processual emergent subjectivin-, and 
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what Sch6rer names 'subjectivity without a subject'. 
The idea of t-onatils opens up ways of thinking about how things invest themselves 
both mentally and corporeally, and to what extent theý7 are acting at the minimum 
or maximum level of their thresholds of intensM-, the former relating to a pole of 
extreme passivity and the latter, a pole of extreme activin, (Macherey, 1995: 24, 
and 111. pr. 6,7 and 8). All things are equal in that they are identically inhabited bý- 
the same force to persevere in their being. This refers to the way that a thing is 
always in action and in movement, rather than being propelled into movement by 
something exterior to it (Macherey, 1995: 85) and "[flrom this perspective, 'nature 
(natura) and 'power' (potentia) are one and the same thing" (87). God's power is a 
power that is nature (potentia bot, est natura) ýH- pr. 7) whose essence it is to exist 
and act. 
If we recall the distinction between a gere and operan* we can affirm that a particular 
thing acts in a detern-unate way since it is limited by other things. It does not act 
in this way because it is limited but instead because a positive thing 'acts' in it, it 
4operates' in a determinate way in coexistence and reciprocal linuitation with other 
things (Macherey 1992: 87). Again this emphasises the necessity to grasp the two 
points of view from which we can conceive of the thing, in order to grasp that 
the operation is a part of the action of the thing, and not an autonomous 
procedure. Things are both 'in God' (Ili Deo) and 'of God' (a Deo) (I. pr. 26). Theýý 
are at once constrained and free, depending on whether we look at them from a 
global perspective or a particular, situated perspective. 
Part IV of the F. /bl't's is entitled De Serfivitute Humand. It examines the idea of the 
virtue in terms of ethical principles (especially d-8). Vittus is closely tied, even 
interchangeable with the idea of potentia. Virtue is power, and vice versa. 
Macherey is tempted to call virtue the sense of the possible that projects each 
individual toward existence, and coincides with its effort to realise its nature 
(199,1b: 45). Hc tells us that "virtue, which is the ethical principle par excellence, 
is far from a subn-ussion to a transcendent rule that establishes the connection 
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between absolute values that would impose themselves regardless of the nature of 
the individual toward which they orient their activities; it consists on the contrary 
in doing all that one can to be and act in conformity with one's nature, and doing 
this to the maximum, finding an immanent clý-narnic whose orientations are 
fundamentally positive and affirmative" (45). To desire to be autonomous would 
be contrary to one's nature and would be impotence. Given the affections we 
have, we are as perfect as we can be JI. d. 6). But if we lack nothing at any i given 
instant how can we speak of ethics? 
11U. confrontation and sacrilege; contesting Morality 
A man as he ought to be: that sounds to us as insipid as a "tree as it ought to 
be". 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Tbe 11"ill to Power (1901: §332,181). 
Let us finally consider how naive it is altogether to say: Man ought to be such 
and such! Reality shows us an enchanting wealth of types, the abundance of a 
lavish play and change of forms [ ... ]. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, TmilýTljt of Me Idols. (1889: §6,46). 
Spinoza's ethics is an ethology. 19 It is concerned with modes of Being, whereas 
morality implies that there is 'something' superior to Being. Morality, according to 
Deleuze, Judges Being (2/12/80) since it appeals to essences and values. This idea 
of essence implies something that is to be realised, that has not yet been realised. 
Morality is a systern of Judgement comparing beings with an abstract essence that 
they are supposed to reahse. One does not behave ethically through a conception 
of duty or universal principles, but things are judged good because we desire 
them. 
By opposing ethics and Nforahty, Deleuze argues that ethics asks 'what tmi we 
do? ', while Nforahtv asks 'what sbould we do? ' Ethics asks 'to what extent arc \vc 
separated from our powers of actlngý' A tý-pology of immanent modes of 
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existence operating through principles of natural right is opposed to duty-based 
morality that refers to transcendent values which demands adherence to them. 
The moral Law is an imperative that makes nothing knm, ý-n and at worst prevents 
knowledge (Deleuze, 1981 a: 24). Any norm is an abstract and empty figure which 
presents itself as absolute JV. ax. ). By taking a transcendent vie, \X-point, 
movement is arrested (Deleuze, 1990a: 146). "Processes are becomings, and 
aren)t to be judged by some final result but by the way they proceed and their 
power to continue, as With animal becomings, or nonsubjective individuations 
There are no universals, only singularities" (146). 
The immoralist beyond good and evil, Spinoza does not disavow good and bad. 
He adopts a perspectival approach. What is good is when the relations of one's 
body are composed with the relations of another body in such a , -,, a)- that our 
power of acting increases. What is bad is when the bodý-'s relation is decomposed 
since the relation of the other body combines with (but does not agree with) our 
essence. Ethics is a practice of organising encounters in such a waýT that one's 
capacities for affecting and being affected are compounded, "while preserving or 
respecting the other's own relations and world [ ... ]" (Deleuze, 1981a: 126). This is 
a dynamic idea pren-used upon the notion of the composition of power. However 
Spinoza does not adopt an egoistic or individualistic stance, for reasons I have 
explained. One has to figure out how to live well With others. 
In his seminars on Spinoza, Deleuze develops his idea of the individual. He does 
so by paralleling the three kinds of knowledge found in the EtIV, 's (imagination, 
reason and the intellectual love of God) with three kinds of ideas (affection-ideas, 
notion-ideas and essence-ideas). 
\N, 'c are born into ignorance and operate through the mechanisms of the 
imagination. Macherey says that Spinoza defines the mind "as a machine to 
imagine and nothing else" (1997a: 248). The imagination is understood in terms 
of the traces of images imprinted on a body, M other N-vords the v, -ay that 
69 See Deleuze (1981 a) especialk chapter six "Spinoza and Us". 
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a body is affected by another body. The imagination conditions our relation with 
the world and others. Hence the problem is how to adapt ourselves to reality in 
such a waý, that we can maximise our powers of acting. How can vvc lessen the 
pressure put on us by external causes which enslave us in situations and alienate 
usý (212). 
Every individual is complex, made of an infinity of parts. These have different 
relations of speeds and slownesses. By using the term 111ditidullm, Spinoza 
demonstrates this complexity since this is said of that which is indivisible 
Nacherey, 1997a: 36-7). What Spinoza appears to be saying is that singular things 
result from a dynamic assemblage of other bodies, therefore, were they to be 
divided this could not occur without them changing in nature. The conclusion 
Spinoza draws from this is that if the relations that constitute our body change in 
such a way that our characteristic relation is destroyed, we die. 
It is in the interest of humans to multiply the relations they have with their milieu 
of life, maximising their powers, thresholds and capabilities. To be human is not 
be isolated but to multiply relations. Deleuze elaborates a conception of an 
intensive multiplicity that seeks to explore the thresholds of this 'ufflity in plurality' 
by cultivating transversal relations with all kinds of things. These kinds of 
operations are called 'becoMings' since they open spaces of transmutation while 
retaining a consistency of their own. 
The 'self as multiplicity is an emergent and complex self, constituted through 
relations with all kinds of other bodies and ideas, with defmed thresholds of 
existence. "Urnty is precisely what is missing from multiplicity, just as the 
subject's what's n-ussing from cvents ("it's raining")" (1990a: 146). Transcendence 
is an operation that relies upon abstraction, so the 'unity in plurahty' is 
understood in the same sense as the machinic assemblage, as a grasping together 
of heterogeneous components in such a way that they maintain their 
independence. The individual is emergent, not primary. 
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Affections are the effects of the image of a thing on me. This makes no claim 
about the nature of the object. Increasing the affections of -\ý-hich "ý-e are capable 
increases power. Prejudging the limitations of affections decreases power, in that 
part of my power becomes inactive. . ýffections (afttio) are the dimension of 
instantaneity. 
Each affection envelops a passage or transition that is called an affect (q&dlls). 
This is similar to Bergson's idea of duration. It refers to a passage that is 
irreducible. It is an idea of an affection of the body corresponding to an increase 
or decrease in its power of acting. The relations which are composed or 
decomposed relate to affects. We either become more or less active. If we are 
passive this means we are cut off from our powers of acting. 
Edwin Curley criticises Spinoza for a lack of normative content in his philosophy. 
Like Blyenbergh he asks - how can we condemn a tyrannical government or an 
evil actý How can we distinguish vice from virtue? The letters exchanged between 
Blyenbergh and Spinoza touch upon these themes. Willem van Blyenbergh first 
wrote to Spinoza in 1665. He was a grain merchant who presents himself as a 
seeker of the truth. Spinoza is of course delighted to correspond with him, saying 
"For I believe that such a loving friendship affords us a serenity surpassing aný, 
other boon in the whole wide world" (Ep. 19: 132) and so begin the letters on 
Evil (Ep. 18-24, Ep. 27). I only want to touch on a few points in these letters as 
they relate to the themes in this chapter. 
In the first letter, Spinoza takes issue with an anthropomorphic conception of 
God. He explains that the Holy Scripture tries to present things to humans in a 
way that they can understand. However, the command given to Adam not to eat 
the apple was a revelation by God that the apple was poisonous. God did not 
depl()ý- a moral prohibition but revealed the natural consequences of eating the 
apple (Flp. 19: 1' )5). There is no eN-11 in itself but only that which is bad for me. 
HaN-Ing received Blyenbergh's lengthý-, detailed and furious response Spinoza 
realises thc\, - haN-e little in common, but he continues to write. 
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He admits that he does not understand the Holy Scripture and believes that God 
communicates, not through the Holy Scripture, but through the natural 
understanding given to us. He states that God's nature is not the same as the 
nature of man (Ep. 21). Spinoza also chastises Blyenbergh for not understanding 
the nature of the dependence of things on God, saying "If you had apprehended 
by pure intellect the meaning of dependence on God, you would certainly not 
think that things, in so far as they depend on God, are dead, corporeal and 
imperfect. (Who has ever dared to speak so basely of the supremely perfect 
Being? )" (Ep. 21: 156). 
Spinoza confesses that he is astonished at Blyenbergh's suggestion that if God did 
not punish wrongdoing nothing could stop us all from leaping into a life of crime. 
If it is only the fear of punishment that stops us from doing such things, we do 
not act from love or virtue. He himself does not commit these acts because it is 
opposed to his particular nature, and would lead him astray from the love and 
knowledge of God (Ep. 21: 156). Blyenbergh writes back, hurt at Spinoza's 
reproofs bringing up a number of questions that might also be directed to 
Spinoza by critics today. They are summarised by Spinoza as follows: 
1. Is murder as pleasing to God as almsgiving? 
2. Is stealing, in relation to God, as good as righteousness? 
3. If there were a mind to whose particular nature the pursuit of pleasure 
and villainy was not repugnant, but agreeable, could it have any 
virtuous motive that must move it to do good and avoid evil? (Ep. 23: 
167) 
In response to the first question, Spinoza points out that God is not a perfect 
man so he is not pleased by one thing or another. Neither the righteous man nor 
the t1ilef can cause God pleasure or displeasure. Nonetheless men are not equally 
good and perfect if one murders and one gives alms. The question is wliether 
these actions are equally perfect (though they may be in their execution). 
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To elucidate this point, let us take the response to question I This question 
presupposes a contradiction, says Spinoza, since you might as well ask him 
"whether, if it accorded better with a man's nature that he should hang himself, 
there would be any reason why he should not hang himself However, suppose it 
possible that there could be such a nature. Then I saý- (whether I grant free will or 
not) that if anyone sees that he can live better on the gallows than at his own 
table, he would be very foolish not to go and hang himself' (Ep. 23: 168). 
Likewise if a more perfect life and better essence could be attained through 
villainy, a person would be foolish not to take that route. In effect, such ideas go 
against everything Spinoza has written about the essence of the human as tonattls, 
as we will see. 
God is the cause of cverything that has essence. However c6l, error and villainy 
do not consist in anything that expresses essence. The difference between Nero's 
and Orestes's matricide is that Nero was 'ungrateful, devoid of compassion and 
obedience', while Orestes committed an act of sacred revenge because his mother 
killed his father Agamemnon. Both acts were the same, both intentions were the 
same, however the association of the image of the action with the image of the 
thing was not the same. 
Orestes associated his act not with the murder of his mother, Clytemnestra, but 
with his murdered father. There was a direct composition of relations, and an 
1. ndirea decomposition of relations. Obviously abiding by the laws of sacred 
revenge is not appropriate in our day but in essence, what he is saying is that no 
action considered in itself alone is good or bad (Deleuze, 1981a: 36). Deleuze 
(13/1/81) sun-imarises this saying that every action must be considered ftom two 
perspectives: the image of the act as a power of the bodý7, what a bo& can do, 
and the image of the associated thing upon -\N-hich the act bears. The relation of 
association is between these t, \N-o. 
What is bad is NN-lien an act is associated , vith the image of a thing whose relation 
124 
SPINOZA: THE GOD- INTOXI CATED MAN 
is decomposed bý the act. If I raise my arm and move downwards tli force 
this expresses the power of my body. If I am hitting another person, I decompose 
a relation and this is bad, if 1 am harrunering a protruding nafl, I compound a 
relation and this is good. Good and bad is not a question of -\x-hat suits me, but 
what agrees with me (Deleuze, 1981 a: 35). 
This correspondence is cut off by Spinoza, most likely because he feels it would 
be dangerous to communicate with Blyenbergh any further, rather than due to an 
inabihty to respond to Blyenbergh's questionS. 70 
111. xi. the art of immersion 
Composing relations is like swimming, says Deleuze (14/5/73). It is a kind of 
savoirfiýire. If we think of it in terms of rhythms, this becomes more clear. If 
swimming is an art of composing relations, I need to ensure that my body enters 
a relation with the wave, without the wave submerging me or knocking me down 
and drowning me. I need to modify the movements of my body in accordance 
with the rhythms of the wave. This requires improvisation, experimentation and 
cunning and objective or theoretical knowledge is useless. It is a pbronesi's. 
Similarly, common notions are not subject to the imagination since they deal with 
objects that are non-existent in nature; relations JI. pr. 38). These are not just an 
effect of the affections of the body. The common notions are adequate ideas. 
They are not just opinions or the sensori-motor images that are cliches. They 
have no universal claim but are good in function of the usage to which they are 
put, concerning the relations of singular things. 
Macherey (1997a: 360-1) explains that adequate knowledge involves a gradual 
70 Blyenbergh's response was to write a short booklet on Spinoza ý\Ith an extremely long 
title The knowlecige ol'God and his service affirmed against the outrages of athel . sts, in 
which it is demonstrat ed with clear and natural reasons that God has created and rei-caled 
a religloi7, that God also wishes to be served in accordance with this religion, and that thc 
Christian religion corresponds not onli, to the religion revealed bY God, but also to our 
I. 1117(IIL' I'LUS017. Clearl, 'r Spinoza was correct to be cautious. 
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transition, rather than a rupture, from the regime of the imagination. It is like a 
fish in water since adequate knowledge of the infinite and eternal essence of God 
exists as a condition making possible movements and modes of being. Imagining C) C) 
is inadequate because it is a privation, cut off from reaht\-. We develop our 
potentialities by incorporating more and more things, but this requires a specific 
mental attitude which involves understanding our relation with other things. It is 
in our interests that we find better ways of living together (405-6) 
Having adequate ideas does not mean that the mind affirms a greater power of 
control over the body. It is to comprehend more things and increase a power of 
thinking, while also developing "a body capable of the greatest number of things" 
(quicorpus ad aptumplun"Ma habet) (V. pr. 39). 
When I act, I do not decide everything in advance and set down a series of rules 
in relation to which I gauge a situation. For instance, rather than condemning Le 
Pen's supporters as reactionary, xenophobic and fascist, Guattari asks why are 
large portions of the French population, especially workers, embracing this 
ideology. If we do not engage in a pragmatic response we lose all hope of 
'rhizomatising' that component. Guattarl calls this dissensus. 
The individual is a singular essence, that is, a degree of power, and a characteristic 
relation (of the differential relations of movement and rest constituting its body) 
corresponds both to this essence and to a capacity for being affected. We are 
active if we are the source of our affections, but we are passive if we submit and 
react to whatever happens to us. In the former case our powers of acting are 
increased, and in the latter we operate at our lowest ebb. What pertains to an 
essence is a state or an affection insofar as it expresses an absolute quantity of 
reality (Deleuze, 1981a: 39). 
An essence is an intensive quantity. It is inseparable from a threshold. Spinoza 
calls it a parf potentiae. This involves a quantitative conception of individuation, but 
this quantity is an intensity. It is not the same as an extensive part, but is a special 
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part. /' In a letter to iMeyer (Ep. 12: 105), Spinoza describes a peculiar conception 
of infinity. He draws two non-concentric circles, one within the other. The sum 
of the inequalities of the space between these circles exceed any number, likeNvise 
the variation in the speed of matter moving in that area. This '\-, -ould be the case 
regardless of the size of the portion we took. It is infinite and limited. 
There is a maximum and a minimum. There is a limit and a threshold. Similarlv, a 
degree of power is the difference between this maximum and minimum. It is 
therefore, Deleuze (20/01/81) tells us, a difference in itself As a degree of power 
it has a latitude. In chapter 5,1 want to draw upon this idea of the unequal in 
order to show how the disparate is a key moment in thinking difference-in-Its elf. 
Deleuze makes a link here between the idea of intensiVe quantities and that of 
differential calculus (as he does in Differen(v and Repetitim). 
Things are powers for Spinoza. They do not bave power but they are power, and 
power is a quantity of force. ýn intensive quantitý- replaces the idea of an 
essence. The intensive quantity defines the thing. An essence is no longer 
described qualitatively (Man is a rational animal', 'NIan is a featherless biped') but 
is understood in terms of the capacities to affect and be affected of singular 
things. 
John Rawls does not look at these capacities when he formulates his effectively 
distributive model of justice. A formal definition of powers and rights can have 
no effects since it remains abstract. Like the Malawian farmer, formal rights must 
be backed up by an effective power to act, otherwise these concepts are simply hp 
service. We need to concentrate on this concrete aspect of this definition of 
power. 
We find a remarkable extension of this reading of Spinoza in //I Thousalid Plateaus. 
ýg IN/ 'T Inserted in the 1750: Becomnigo-bilense, Becomuý -An' al, Becomm -Imperceptible... 
71 1 xvill explain this distinction between intensive quantit,,,,. and extensity and quality in 
chapter 5. b\ showing how Deleuze develops his philosophy of difference. 
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plateau, Memories of a Spinozist, 1. discusses the idea of longitude: the 
differential relations of movement and rest, speeds and slownesses that constitute 
the characteristic relation of the individual. The simple bodies that constitute a 
limit point are only distin 'shed in terms of movement and rest, slowness and I gul 
speed. They have no form or function. These always come in greater or Icsser 
infinities. In this way we can understand that every individual is an infinite 
multiplicity. Things are distinguished from one another in terms of these 
differential relations of speed and slowness. They call this the Ion itude of the 91 
individual. "It is a question not of organization but of composition (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1980: 255). 
Memories of a Spinozist, H. informs us that to each relation of movement and 
rest, speed and slowness grouped in an infinity, there corresponds a degree of 
power or potential. The latitude of an individual is the degree of power that 
correlates to these differential relations. It is an intensive part and concerns the 
capacity to be affected of the individual. Deleuze and Guattari give Von Uexkuu's 
example of the tick. The tick has three affects; it is attracted by light so it 
manoeuvres onto a branch; it is sensitive to the smell of mammals and drops on a 
mammal that passes; it burrows into the most hairy bit of skin it can find. Until a 
mammal passes, the tick waits and fasts; this is its 'pessimal' threshold. When a 
mammal comes by, it feasts and then dies; this is its 'optimal' threshold. Its degree 
of power is a quantum that operates within limits. These limits are not contours, 
but the intensities or affects of which something is capable (257). Deleuze and 
Guattari. say that you are an haecceity "You are longitude and latitude, a set of 
speeds and slownesses between unformed particles, a set of nonsubjectified 
affects" (262). 
Etienne Bahbar argues that the object of Spinozist ontoloPT is individuation, "or 
Me ýi#ýrelliv qfadi'Piý, ftom But this difference, which is nothing but the 
movement of its own production, is also an originaty umty. It is immediately 
'practical"' (Bahbar, 1990: 58). The individual is conceived as both t, s, ý-elltv and 
effect. 
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The individual is thought synthetically in Spinoza. Consequentl\-, mechanistic 
accounts fall to communicate his subtle account of processes of 1ndiv1duation. 
Indeed my argument with Negri, that I alluded to in the last chapter, is that Negri 
fails to think the process of individuation, settling for a description of the 
interactions of actualised and individuated beings in terms of tendencial action 
(Negri, 1981: 146). His 'real' concept of potentia as a tension internal to being is 
not fleshed out thoroughly (44). 
111. xii. decentering the human 
What we find here is still the hyperbolic naivete of man: positing himself as the 
meaning and measure of the value of things. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, TI)e lf"'ill to Pomer (190 1: §1 2B, 14). 
Finalism is an illusion for Spinoza. Nature has no ends set beyond it, as though its 
only purpose was to arrive at a goal. Centuries later Darwinism put paid to a 
human centred conception of Nature, but its legacy remains. The Appendix that 
the first part of the Etbics ends with is a baffle-cry against such illusions. 
Heretical, vibrant, scathing-, this Appendix is an extraordinary read, especially 
when compared with the cool, systematic preceding passages. Deleuze claims that 
there are three Etbics; the first moves through the moregeomeftito, but the second is 
magical, full of whirlwinds and surprises (the last is part V when Spinoza's 
develops his idea of beafitudo). Spinoza's rousing attack on the anthropomorphic 
conception of God and the vanity of humans would appear heretical even today. 
Humanitýy is ripped from its pedestal and put in its place as a part of nature. Many 
of the arguments he draws upon are used today by environmentalists and 
progressivist activists in the face of unabated claims of the rights of humans to 
exploit and dominate nature (as well as one another) with abandon. 
Mere are three illusions of consciousness accorchng to Deleuzeý- the illusion of 
finahtv, the iflusion of freedom and the theological illusion (1981a: 20). Such a 
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typical human prejudice is the attribution of final causes to things. Humans 
assume that since they act in terms of an end, so too do all natural things- Spinoza 
notes that they even think that God rules with a given end in mind, and imagine 
that God made humans to honour him. His response to the claim that humans 
have free will is well known - and so the stone rolling down the hill believes it 
rolls of its free accord. 
People are born ignorant of the causes of things, but theY all look for what is 
useful to them. Since they are conscious of their \, ohtions and appetites, they 
believe themselves free. However they ignore the causes disposing them to such 
appetites. They act in terms of utility and are simply obsessed with attributing 
final causes to things. All around there are plenty of things that are useful to 
them; eyes to see, teeth to chew, plants and animals to eat..., so they think that 
these things have been put there for them. Things are means to their ends. -And 
who put these things there for them? God. Responding in this manner ignores 
the embedded and situated relational reality that humans are a part of, as a part of 
nature themselves, imposing instead a grand design on Nature (and humanity). 
Nature has no final end prescribed to it, because it lacks nothing. 
Falling prey to fear and superstition, constructs of the imagination, people search 
for meanings and signs of God's will in the world. Spinoza gives an example of 
the person who is hit and killed by a stone falling off a roof. By instigating a 
potentially infinitely regressive series of asking 'why? ' (why did the wind blow at 
that moment? why did this person happen to be passing the house just thený) 
people arrive at the fallacious conclusion that this was God's will. This is the 
asý, Ium of ignorance, and demonstrates how ignorance and stupidity can be used 
to argue for and maintain authority. By not understanding the li(itllre of things, 
humans imagine things, and affirm nothing in things. Theý- behc\-e there is a 
created order without understanding the nature of things. This just reflects a 
human disposition and preference for order. 
Humans have madc themselves abstractions, bhnkered to the complex nature of 
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their bodies and minds and the ways they are affected. This practical attitude of 
seeking out what is useful to, and hence %,, -hat is good for, us has led to an 
instrumental attitude toward real-ity. This tendency to isolate things from their 
context as though things were predisposed to play a role as ends for hurnans, 
compounds a conception of final causes in which there is an objecti\-e reahty, or 
teleology. Because humans are conscious of their actions, theýý believe themselves 
free and set themselves above the laws of Nature. His immanent phi-losophy 
chaflenges the invocation of any transcendent principles with the remarkable 
phrase 'God, that is, Nature' (Deus sive Natura). 
"Our understanding of responsibility is restrained by thinking individuals as 
bordered territories, firmly separated from others in such a way that the issue of 
where responsibility hes is always in principle determinable. Spinoza's treatment 
of individuality - especially that aspect of it which Bahbar terms 
'transindividuahty'- gives insight into the nexus between individual and collective 
identity" (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 74). All acts are inscribed within a network of 
pre-estabhshed relations (Machere y, 1992: 137). Responsibility, then, must be 
thought in terms of our embedded relationships in a collective that may be 
presently enjoying the comforts that derive from historically reprehensible acts. 
Spinoza's ethics is an ethics of liberation that frees us relativelý- from the bondage 
and ignorance we are born into. It is a search for commonality that does not rest 
upon abstract fictions and ossified essences. It is a philosophy of dynamical 
equilibrium that moves us toward greater powers of acting, thinking and being 
without abstracting ourselves from Nature. It is a philosophy that impels us to 
accept finitude and believes eternity is not the same as immortality. To act is 
perilous, putting our lives in danger, but we can do no other. His analytic is one 
that serN, es to displaý, the mechanisms for realising ethical transition. Such an 
ethics does not rest on abstraction, but on trying to learn what you are capable of, 
wliat your In-nits are. It is life lived on the edge. Rather than overcoming affects, it 
is, a rationaht), of the affects. 
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"Spinoza always thinks of the individual sý-nthetically, as the result of a movement 
of totalisation which began before it and continues beyond its own timit'S" 
(Niacherey, 1992: 121). The individual is a part of nature. This is not to say that it 
cannot be decomposed, that it exists tanqiiam i. mpen . I/M I. /11 . mpen . o. Such a definition 
would be an analytic definition. Instead, it finds its principle of existence in the 
whole(s) to which it belongs and from which it can only be separated in a relatl\-e 
manner. Nature is not made of parts isolable one from the other. The conception 
of a simple body is but an abstraction, it is a limit point. Rather bodies must be 
thought of in terms of their differential relations, their speeds and slownesses, 
movements and rest. 
Humans need to learn to see themselves as a part of nature (pars naturae) subject, 
like God, to the laws of Nature. The use of the term God is not just a practice of 
subterfuge and camouflage for Spinoza but concerns the difficult process of re- 
situating crucial philosophical problems. By thinking Spinoza as a dynamical 
philosopher of process we can perhaps avoid the temptation to prioritise one 
term (substance) above the other (the modes) and understand that Naturing 
Nature is a causality that invests the whole field of reality. Such a move does not 
close off the possibility of human liberty, but sImph T shows how liberation is an 
ongoing activity that accepts and embraces our existence as finite, complex and 
relational beings. It is in this way that Spinoza's philosophy can be called an anti- 
human humanism. 
By no longer seeing ourselves apart from nature, we can begin to understand 
freedom. We no longer fetishise ourselves and other things. Necessity is an 
essential dimension of freedom. But this does not run contran, to our nature by 
operating as a hniitatl'\T C force. It means understanding that the individual is not 
isolated, but embedded in a complex network of relations. 
III. Xiii. transitions 
In the astonishing last part of the LthiCs, Spinoza says that Nve feel and experience 
that we are eternal. This phrase has led some to say he has reneged on his 
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immanent philosophy accusing him of talking about the immortality of the soul, 
others see it as a lapse into mysticism. But what is this beatitudo that is the third 
kind of knowledge (V. pr. 32. corr. ) that he says is a knowledge sub jpe6-ie aetertlitalas 
(\ T. pr-29)ý It is not an abstract thought of a never-ending duration, a long linear 
time but something more similar to Bergson's concept of duration. It is a very 
concrete experience, based in the present, that comes from a practice that strives 
to see things globally. The imagination always grasps things as past and 
contingent, but this affirmation of necessity is a love of the present, an amor_pfi- 
We are both finite and a part of nature. Spinoza is saying that we cannot 
understand without loving and this moment is a synthesis of the rational and the 
affective. 
In my next chapters, I want to explore how Deleuze takes and transforms 
Spinoza's philosophy of immanence. At times especially in the seminars, Deleuze 
drops tasty morsels into his narrative that seem to align Spinoza with the 
philosophy of difference he himself articulates. For example, he (20/1/81) says 
that a degree of power is always an intensive quantity, a difference of difference. 
Unfortunately at this point the transcript indicates that the tape ends, so I do not 
know how he might have expanded on this theme. 
Although Spinoza's is undoubtedly a philosophy of force, power, becoming and 
transformation, these ideas can be developed further in the direction of a 
transcendental empiricism. Through SiMondon's concept of metastability, the 
virtual is no longer a non-realised possible but real. This idea is intimated through 
the idea that potenti .a is a power in act; however, the reality of a tense and 
metastable system would have been difficult to conceive in Spinoza's day. I draw 
upon a useful short piece bý, Etienne Bahbar in which he brings together Spinoza 
and Simondon to exan-une some potential links of these thinkers. 
Any system or individual, for Simondon, is more than identitv and more than 
unity. I situate this proposition in the context of what Deleuze calls the Image of 
I-Iought. Deleuze argues here that difference has not been thought in itself and 
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endeavours to develop a series of concepts to do so. I argue that his concept ()f 
chfference-in-itself as disparate enables us to retain a philosophy of immanence 
while developing a more expansive account of processes of inchviduation and 
singularisation through the notion of the pre-individual field or the problematic. 
This propels the notion of continuous variation into an arena where divergence 
can be affirmed. 
Ill. xiv. the disparate and the possible - toward the pre-individual 
In my next chapter I want to follow up on some of the many ideas and concepts 
that surround the 'image of thought' chapter in DOereme and Repelifion, a theme I 
will return to in chapter 5. Through these two chapters I shall explicate the 
concepts of difference -in-its elf, intensity, individuation, the disparate, and pre- 
individual singularity. Using these concepts I will show how the idea of nomos 
relates to the concept of becoming, and will demonstrate, utdising the work of 
Etienne Bahbar, the role of the pre-individual and transindividual in Spinoza's 
work. 
There is a link between thought and individuation. Individuation does not 
proceed through a determination of species. "It involves fields of fluid intensive 
factors which no more take the form of an I than of a Self [ ... ] It is inseparable 
from a pure ground that it brings to the surface and trails with it" (1968a: 152). 
This field coexists with the individual though the individual is unilaterally 
distinguished from it 'like lightning across a dark sky'. What relation does the 
Untimely have to the actual? Through the concept of a pre-individual field, I will 
counter Laruelle's claim that Deleuze is a philosophical idealist, showing how his 
concept of difference does not betray a fidelity to immanence. Finally, I will 
exan-une further ethico-political implications of this approach. 
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IV. i. paradox 
The same terms are used to describe ice deserts as sand deserts: there is no line 
separating earth and sky; there is no intermediate distance, no perspective or 
contour; visibility is limited; and yet there is an extraordinarily fine topology 
that relies not on points or objects, but rather on haecceities, on sets of 
relations (winds, undulations of snow or sand, the song of the sand or the 
creaking of ice, the tactile qualities of both). It is a tactile space, or rather 
"haptic", a sonorous much more than a visible space. 
Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus. (1980: 382). 
In an English collection of her work entitled Power and Inrention: Sihlafiý: g S(, i'ence, 
Isabelle Stengers examines the question of relevance, and the notion of a 
problem, in the concrete domain of science. In a piece originally written with 11ya 
Prigogine, she explores 'The Reenchantment of the World'. They argue that while 
science is the art of manipulating nature, it also tries to understand it. It is for this 
reason that it occupied a territory between episteme and tec'bne in Aristotle's 
writings. "Like ýristotle's gods, the simple machines of dynamics are only 
concerned with themselves. They have nothing to learn; rather they have 
everything to lose from any contact with the outside. They simulate an ideal that 
72 the ývnamlt, ýystem will actualize" (1979: 35). 1 
"The foedera fali are replaced by the foedera naturae, which, as Serres emphasizes, 
designate both the "laws" of nature - local, singular, historical relations between 
things - and an "alliance", a contract with nature" (49). A perennial 
battle for law 
and masten, is subverted bv a turbulent science that can embrace singulantv. 
FIxtending this logic, we can surrMse that Deleuze's philosophy cannot be called a 
critical philosophy, in the Kantian sense of the term, but constitutes a kind of 
critical ontology which is the art of posing problems. As he says, "I make, remake 
and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an alwavs decentered 
centre, from an alwa)-s displaced peripherý- which repeats and differenciates them 
72 These simple machines are those like the cannonball in a \acuum and the ideal pendulum 
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(1968a: xxi). The subject is no longer an active subject "endow-ed with projects, 
intentions, and Nvill [ ... ]" (Pngogine and Stengers, 1979: 56), but a Ian-al self. 
In the next chapter, I will suggest that Deleuze's philosophy can be understood in 
terms of a radicalisation of pbronesi's. Michel Serres, according to Prigogine and 
Stengers, also evoked the intelligence of peasants and seafarers in order to 
describe an intelligence premised upon respect for the world in which they live. 
As humans, we incessantly modify the world. By cultivating a 'respect' for nature, 
we also ceaseJud , giq other 
knowledges and practices, opting instead to interbreed 
with them, creating novel communications and unnatural nuptials. This approach 
epitonlises what Guattarl calls a 'meta-modehsation' or a 'schizo-modehsation', 
which refuses the judgements of a 'definitive' model of thinking. 
"This world that seems to have renounced the security of stable, permanent 
norms is clearly a dangerous and uncertain world" (58). This is the time for the 
new alliances. Paradox, not doxology. Our relation with the world is not, and 
cannot be, a pacified and harmonious one. It remains fraught with, and 
dependent upon, dissonance and disparity. What would reason be capable of if 
"liberated from the disciplinary models that normalize it (Stengers, 1989: 
130)? For William James this IS pragmatism; philosophy pursuing its adventures 
(1907: 101). Like NEchel Serres, James focuses on conjunctive relations, 
prepositions like 'With' and 'through', to explain this radical empiricism which he 
describes as a 'mosaic philosophy'. 
In Gilbert Simondon's work we find a processual philosophy that takes issue with 
the propensity to abstract and isolate the individual. As a critique of a model of 
being, premised upon the notion of the individual, it is superb; as an exposition 
of another model of being as metastable, it opens up the possibibty for us of 
showing the more- than- inchvidual dimensions of aný- individual (a term \vC \611 
continue to use only for the sake of convenience). Drawing out the non-human 
beconUngs of the human is part of the process of reinventing the human. Tracing 
a subjectiviq that is not the property of the individuated subject tli\varts a 
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subJect-object opposition, grasping subjectivity as a process, or a hetero 's, that , geiiesi 
transverses different domains. The ethico-pohtical implications of tl-ýs will be 
made clear in the final chapter. We are no longer ourselves. Beconuings are not 
solely esoteric conceptual inventions, but help us to understand our non-human 
and pre-human dimensions. It is the individual human that is an abstraction. For 
this reason, Sirnondon continues with Spinoza's enterprise of understanding the 
human as a part of nature. 
IV. ii. thinking with the grain 
Everything is obscure in the idea of creation if we think of things which are 
created and a thing which creates, as we habitually do. 
Henri Bergson, Crealive Evolution. (1911: 26 1). 
Gilbert Simondon is a little known French philosopher of science. In fact, much 
of the interest in him has been sparked off through Deleuze's references to his 
work. His writing on technology has been the cause of renewed debate and 
discussion; however, it is his account of individuation I want to concentrate on. 
Interestingly, SiMondon dedicated Lindividu et sa enýse physit'o-b' Iq ique to e ,g 10 T th 
memory of Maurice Nlerleau-Ponty. Toward the end of his life Nlerleau-Ponty 
had begun to interrogate the idea of 'pre-objective being. Perhaps Simondon 
here felt he had found a kindred spirit in his effort to move beyond both 
phenomenology and positivism. 
In the posthumously published The Visible and the Invisible (Follom)ed by 11'orkiq 
Notes), Merleau-Ponty saN, s that we need to revise our ontology in order to talk 
about conditionings that escape us or remain hidden (1964: 21). We interrogate 
our experience in order to learn how it opens us to that , x-hich is not ourselves 
(159). Seeking to aN-oid invoking transcendent principles, -\N-hile being umvilling to 
remain at the level of the individuated empirical, 'Flesh' "N-as Nlerleau-Pontý`s waý- 
of articulating a conception of an anonymous, pre-individual being,, \x-hile refusing 
to admit a pre-constituted \x-()rld. He calls it a "pregnancý- of possibles" (250). 
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This common knot, beyond the point of N-leN-, - of the subject and the object, is the 
modulation of being in the world. 
For Nlerleau-Ponty too, the possible is not a simple pre-formed reservoir 
accompanied by a principle of choice. He argues that actualism must be 
eliminated (since it is not true that everything is actual), proposing in its place a 
being of be6'omzq actual - that is, an actuality of the possible. As Henri Nfichaux 
has lyrically observed, by breaking the skin of things we learn how things become 
things, and the world becomes world. 
Originally written as a doctoral thesis, Simondon's two books, LIndiridu et sa 
venýse pbýysico-b *A Tique and LIndh)iduafion p tbique et tolle(-five, cons i zoo ýy titute part of the 
same project. They endeavour to grasp the process of individuation in its vety 
becoming, rather than re-constituting it from already individuated elements. In a 
footnote to The LoTh, qf Sense, Deleuze expresses his belief that LIndividu et Sagenese 
pbysit'o-bioloTique has a special importance because it presents the "first thought-out 
theory of impersonal and pre-individual singularities" (1969: 344, n. 3) providing a 
new conception of the transcendental field. 73 
Simondon proposes an overall critique of the tools and models that we have used 
to approach concepts. In agreement with Bergson, he thinks the concepts we 
have developed onlý7 present us with snapshots of the world; we stumble before 
Zeno's paradox, unsure of how to take another step. Individuals are not so many 
potential immobilities. Becoming is, for Simondon, infinitely varied; the 
dimension of being that opens up the possibilities of the world. Our banal and 
static way of viewing the world is thrown into movement. Not onlý- is the 
individual grasped as part of a wider reality, a part of nature, but its own reaht, \- 
becomes partial, relative and brims Nxith potentials. For these reasons, the process 
73, This idea of the transcendental field is a very important one, one ýýhich I cannot do justice 
to within the confines of this thesis. I haNe tried to show that although Deleuze develops a 
philosophN he calls transcendental empiricism. this does not involve transcendence. A fuller 
engagernent directed solelý toward this theme would also examine Kant and Kantian 
philosophy in great detail. 
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of individuation rather than the state of the individual is the focal point of our 
enquiries. 
Simondon asks two fundamental questions in relation to individuation: why do 
we assume that individuated being is the most interesting or e\-en the most 
essential reality to be explained? Why do we also imagine that indi\-lduation has a 
principle that is both prior to the process of individuation and which could 
explain the formation of the singular indi\-idual? 
IV. iii. snapshots 
But things and states are only views, taken by our mind, of becoming. There are 
no things, there are only actions. 
Henri Bergson, Creafire Evolution. (1911: 26 1). 
Atomism and hylomorphism make the same mistake. Theý- think being in 
accordance with the model of the one, and they presuppose the existence of the 
individual. According to Simondon, these have been the two primary ways of 
approaching the reality of an individual being., 4Were we to pohticise these 
points, we could suggest that liberal individualism effectively atormises societý-, 
since it portrays it as a conglomeration of egoistic, possessive individuals that pre- 
exist the relations they enter into. Moreover, the pressures of a communitarian 
position bears down upon the singularities of a populace. The individual is made 
to fit the group. SiMondon implores us to distinguish being as beiq' from being as 
I. 11(lim'(111al. Individuation for philosophical, but also for ethico-political reasons as 
the second volume of his thesis testifies, needs to be thought as a process. Like 
Spinoza, he tries to navigate between the traditions of idealism and materialism, 
but he also dc\-clops a unique conception of the individual that disrupts the 
discourses of both communitarianism and liberal individualism. While not 
II do not continue with the Heideggerian distinction of Being and being here because the 
ord Sirriondon uses throughout is 'ýtre'. I think this is a deliberate move because it focuses 
on being in terms of singular processes rather than a catch-all term Being. Fie %ý ill argue that 
Sub - ject 
and obýject cmerge frorn pre-indi\ idual being. 
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wanting to lose the specificity or the singularity of the individual, he also wants to 
underscore that it is necessarily a relational being, and to develop a conception of 
its essence as becoming. What he calls the pre-individual and the transindividual 
relate to that which Deleuze and Guattari christen the non-human beconlings of 
the human. 
Substantialist atomism provides us with a classic monism. It posits being as that 
which consists in its unity, resisting that which it is not. Impermeable, impassive, 
indifferent, it is both grounded in itself and unengendered. Resonances of this 
approach remain within the discourse of rights-based theory; the integrity of the 
individual is often assumed and her relations With others are supplementat), 
rather than constitutive. For example, John Rawls' distributive paradigm of justice 
both presupposes and obscures these relations as it focuses on the individual 
(I. M. Young, 1990: 20). For these kinds of reasons, Henry Shue (1980) criticises 
this approach, appealing for a theory of rights and duties that accepts and affirms 
responsibility to and for the other. Hylomorphism, on the other hand, paints a 
slightly more dynamic encounter through which the individual emerges as the 
product of the meeting of form and matter. However, James TullýT has shown us 
how the scored specificity of the individual, the venl different'e of the individual, 
can be planed and smoothed over with top-down theories that seek to assimilate 
differences. In addition, the dogmatic image of thought that Deleuze identifies 
has resonances with a hylomorphic operation, resting on a will to identity. 
Differences are denied in both communitarianism and possessive individualism, 
because of the resolute focus on the unity and identity of the individual, or of the 
group. Such a unity provides no real space for heterogeneity and multiplicity. 
By complacently assurmng that the individuated, given, and constituted being is 
not on1v the most interesting reahtý, around, but also the one that needs to 
be 
explained (Simondon, 1964- 21), we set ourselves off on a particular trajectorý. 
Hylomorphism and atomism both imagine that there is a pn'ntiple of individuation 
anterior to the individuation itself, and this principle can be found in a reality 
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prior to e process of individuation. -5 For this reason, theNI begin '\vith the 
constituted individual, and try to detect from its presence the conditions of its 
existence. Yet if the constituted individual is given an ontological (and 
explanatory) privilege, then the individual is torn and abstracted from the 
processes of individuation and the system of reality that it is a part of We need to 
develop a thought without image, a thought that can trace movements in their 
singular becorMngs without assimilating them to an identitarian model. A thought 
that can grasp difference. 
Sffnondon says that if "Individuation does not only produce the individual, xe 
would not seek to move so quickly through the stage of individuation to arrive at 
the final reality that is the individual ... ]" (22). Instead, we would try "to know the 
I. ndividual throiý in in in , gh 
* dii)iduation rather than * ditidiiation through the * dipidilaP (22). This 
is the challenge he sets before us. The implications of this approach are radical. 
It is no longer a question of imposing a form upon a matter but of elaborating 
an increasingly rich and consistent material, the better to tap increasingly 
intense forces. What makes a material increasingly rich is the same as what 
holds heterogeneities together without their ceasing to be heterogeneous. 
Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattarl, --I 
Thousand Plateaus. (1980: 329). 
A technological approach to individuation envisages the sculptor chiselling stone, 
or the carpenter carving wood. The activity of these artisans is viewed as the 
skilled imposition of a form upon the passive matter of the materials. Yet this 
abstract form and matter is a far cry from the reality of artisanal fabrication. Aný' 
material is brimi-ningwith potentials and singularities; often it must be prepared in 
advance. If ý'()Ll cut a piece of expensive wood against the grain it may split and 
ýýou will ruln it. Deleuze and Guattari argue that royal science is inseparable from 
this hylomorph-ic model, saying that it derives less from technology and life than 
from a society of governing and governed (1980: 369). "It is the idea of the law 
7ýI believe this presumption that individuated realitý is the most important realit,, 
precipitates Badiou's contention that Deleuze denigrates the actual. HoNNever, Deleuze (like 
Sirnondon) is more concerned with processes (of indi\ iduation and singularisation). 
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that assures the model's coherence, since laws are what submit matter to this or 
that form, and, conversely, reahze in matter a given property deduced from the 
form" (408). 
Stmondon explains that the technological operation involves an encounter of two 
realities of heterogeneous domains) an encounter that institutes a mediation. 
Matter is actively plastic, harbouring potentials, and is not in the least passive. 
Take the example of moulding clay. A whole chain of factors5 relations and 
operations come into play in this process. These include the workplace, the 
worker, and the microphysical chemical reactions that occur in the claý- at a 
molecular level. (Deleuze and Guattaris term 'assemblage' communicates the 
complex operations at play that far surpass a simple form-matter dichotomy. ) The 
Jýrm of the mould has no role but to Hn-dt and stabilise. 
IV. iv. multiplicitous beings 
We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, 
inspired, multiplied. 
Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattari, A ThousandPlateaus. (1980: 3). 
Traditional models of being have, according to SIMondon, rested upon the 
conception of an ideal state of stable equilibrium. Becoming is thus presented as 
the becoming of an already individuated being. Being is portrayed as substance. 76 
All its potentials extinguished, such a being lays exhausted at its lowest ebb, 
incapable of further transformations. For this reason, individuation has not been 
adequately thought. A reliance upon this conception of being was understandable 
since only relatively recently has a conception of metastable equilibrium been 
developed. The mcapacitý- to think of a system that could be more than unitý- and 
more than identitý-, that could be both itself and other than itself, prohibited 
intuitions such as those of the Ancients, from being taken further. The entire 
tradition of Occidental philosophy has been, in Simondon's N-lew, a substantiahst 
Un I ike Spinoza's substance which xN as, as Nve saw. a dýnam I cal and act ke being. 
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one since it has never seized the real individual in its genesis. It has accepted it 
gratefully as a given reality (90). Deleuze's conception of a o-eated possible that 
precipitates a disparity or problematic develops some of the intuitions of a 
transformational pragmatics. But -\-v-hat ontology accompanies these intuitions-r 
What if, however, being was no longer itself_ý What if being and becoming were 
no longer opposed, but dimensions of one system? Simondon's name for this 
state of affairs is metastable being. This is a thought of being as more than unitý- 
and more than identity. Since it is both one and not-one, Simondon calls it pre- 
individual being. We no longer need to flail about in search of a pfintiple of 
individuation, since the individuated term is neither presupposed nor privileged. 
In this system, becoming is a dimension of being and it corresponds to the 
capacity of being to be out of phase with itself and to resolve itself bý- moving 
through phases. Becoming is the dimension of being that constitutes "the mode 
of resolution of an initial incompatibility that is rich in potentials" (1989: 13), 
rather than a framework through which a being moves. Individuation is the 
movement through phases of being. Being is a field that is rich in potentials; these 
result from the incompatibility of heterogeneous dimensions. Being is only as it 
bet, omes. 
We can only understand individuation if we grasp being as a supersaturated 
system. Such a being cannot be accessed through the principle of the excluded 
middle and the principle of identity, since these principles applýl onlý- to 
individuated being (13-14). Consequentl), we discover that what is commonlý- 
called being is nothing other than an impoverished abstraction; it is the Midividual 
separated from its milieu. No longer will the individual be a stranger to a world 
confronting it (1964: 28). 
The individual knowii through individuation reveals itself to be a relative reality, 
part of a \vider re ie or system. "The individual is thus relative in two senses, 191M 
because it is not A being, and because it results from a state of being in which it 
did not exist either as individual or as principle of in&-viduation" For this 
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reason, the term 'individual' does not adequately convey the complex relation of 
'indi-,, -idual-milieu' that emerges. A milieu is associated with the individual through 
the process of individuation. This term 'miheu' replaces the old sense ()f matter, 
as it gestures toward a matter that is metastable like a supersaturated solution 
awaiting its crystalline germ. Such a system is the synthetic grouping of differing 
scales of reality which do not communicate prior to individuation (1989: 66). 
What is this pre-individual being? Is it simply a domain relative to the individual, 
or does it consist in its own reality? And why is individuation understood to be "a 
partial and relative resolution which manifests itself in a system harbouring 
potentials and containing a certain incompatibility in relation to itself, an 
incompatibility produced by forces or tensions as well as bý- the impossibility of 
any interaction between the extreme terms of its dimensions" (12)? '\, Vhat kinds of 
ethics and politics will be adequate to this concept of pre-individual being, and 
the additional concept of the transindividual? A new thought of relationality is 
required. 
IV. v. revolutionary states 
Pre-1ndividual being is described by Simondon as homogeneous, concrete and 
without phase. This description is n-usleading given the emphasis he places on 
disparateness (disparafion). Disparateness designates a tension or incompatibility 
between two elements of a situation which results in the invention of a new 
individuation. Pre-individual being can be better understood through Deleuze's 
distinction of differentiation and differenciation. The former refers to a non- 
actuahsed though absolutely real virtuality -a field of potenfials or pre-individual 
singularities - and the latter to the processes of actualisation through individLiatioti 
and differenciation of this reality. The former cannot be posited without the 
latter. SiMondon joins Deleuze and Bergson in seeking to avoid a conception of a 
rt, ellisal)k possible. ', He is reluctant to import anN- concept that nuight inject a 
77 fie is \\ary of the concept of the vIrtual for this reason as 
he thinks it in\ol\'Cs an 
enteh, clicia and designates a possible that has yet to be realised. 
His use of the idea of 
potential is. ho\\ever, \erý close to Deleuze's understanding of the \irtual as a 
dimension 
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teleological direction. For this reason he develops the idea of potential enerp- 
Potential energy is related to the capacity for transformation of a system. I)Cleuzc 
calls it the energy of the pure event (1969: 103). SImondon argues that the idea of 
potential energy allows us to understand a system that could not be grasped 
through formalism or through quantification, in other words a metastable wstem. 
Through it we can trace real transformations in that system. There is a critical 
moment where potential energy is at its maximum; however, it is not something 
that exists independently. It is a part of a system and expresses the dissymmetrý 
of that system. 
In my introduction, I discussed P6guy's conception of the event. The c\-ent 
involved a dissymmetry, indicating a state of affairs was 'out of joint'. S111gularities 
or critical points described irreversible states that sparkled and hissed. Deleuze 
remarks that "Singularities are turning points and points of inflection, 
bottlenecks, knots, foyers and centres; points of fusion, condensation and boiling. 
points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, 'sensitive' points" 
(1969: 52). This singular or critical point is remarkable; it is a point of 
transformation. This point is pre-individual as it is anterior to anN, individuation, 
and it is singular, because it cannot be captured through a general law. It is 'not- 
yet' and 'always -already'. P6guy believed that both history and event are 
inseparable from these singular points (53). They delineate a problematic that is 
irreducible to a subjective perspective indicating, rather, an objective or real state 
of being. It is this tension that is described at length by StMondon. These ideas of 
potential energy, metastability and singular points can be understood readily if we 
cxamine a supersaturated system. 
A suinple example of a supersaturated system is a glass of , vater dosed with 
spoonfuls ()f sugar. The water becomes supersaturated , vith sugar. F, x-cntually it 
immanent to a sN stern. "As a corollary. the energetic theory of the operation of taking form. 
which we present, does not use the notion of virtualitý [ ... ], potential, understood as 
potential ener, -, ý, is ival. 
because it expresses the reahtý of a metastable state and its 
energetic situation" (Simondon, 1989: 68). 
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wiU take only the tirdest addition of sugar to trigger a process of cp-stallisation 
which engenders a crystal. This genesis of the crystal occurs at its exterior lirrut 
and the crystal is permanently ex-centric and peripheral to itself. 
Another example of a kind of metastable state might be a stand-off between not 
police and protesters. A minor incident, or the n-usinterpretation of a movement, 
may lead to a transformation of that situation into a pitched battle. '\ [etas tability 
entails conflict and uncertainty. Simondon notes that a pre-revolutionary state is a 
state of supersaturation (1989: 63). 
SiMondon does not propose a difference in kind between physical beings and 
organic beings. He thinks the latter are more complex because a phase shift has 
enabled them to become a theatre of individuation themselves. In fact, he 
surmises that reality is primitively )ust like this supersaturated solution, and this is 
why it manifests itself in different ways as wave or particle, as matter or energy 
(24). 
N. A. mediators 
There is no love which does not begin with the revelation of a possible world as 
such, enwound in the other which expresses it. 
Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. (1 968a: 26 1). 
DcN-eloping this idea further, SiMondon argues that we need to grasp 
individuation as a mediation of (at least) two disparate orders of magnitude. 
Individuation resolves a tension that surges in a metastable system rich in 
potentials. Initiafly, however, there is no communication between these orders of 
magnitude. In Deleuze's language, this is a virtual prior to the proccss of 
actu,, ihsation. A flower is the resolution of a disparity between an infrai-nolecular 
order of magnitude and a cosn-uc order of magnitude that correspond to nutrients- 
in the soil and the process of photosynthesis. As a living thing, a flo'\k-cr is neN-cr 
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fully individuated or it would be dead. It is not simply the result of a process of 
individuation but agent and theatre of individuation: "in it exists a more complete 
regime of internal resonance that requires permanent communication, and maintains 
a metastability that is the condition of life" (1964: 25). It continues to modiý- its 
relation with its milieu, but as it does so it modifies itself In other words, it 
carries with it a certain level of potential that can be the source of future 
transformations and new individuations. This is the pre-individual nature of the 
individual. It is an inventive resolution. The living being is a problematic being, 
superior and inferior to unity (1989: 20). 
For Deleuze, "Mediators are fundamental. Creation's all about mediators. 
Without them nod-iing happens. [ ... ]I need my mediators to express myself, and 
they'd never express themselves without me: you're always working in a group, 
even when you seem to be on your own. And still more when it's apparent: F6hx 
Guattari and I are one another's mediators" (1990a: 125). INIediators connect 
heterogeneous domains, they make worlds collide and they open us up to our 
non-human becorrUngs by creating a zone of indetermination. We call this a pre- 
individual field. Incommunicability, a lack of mediators to create transversal 
communications, is a sure sign of a state of ahenation and isolation. Intelhgence is 
not the art of solving problems but of inventing them, creating a possible. 
A pre-individual field is both pre-subject and pre-object. When Deleuze 
discovered a small piece by Sartre called The Transtendent-e of the Ego, he was 
thrilled. In this text Sartre endeavoured to provide an account of an impersonal 
and pre-individual transcendental field that bore no resemblance to empirical 
fields, and which could not be determined as that of a consciousness. "It does not 
suffice to say of the foundation that it is another matter - it is also another 
geographý,, without being another world" (Deleuze, 1969: 
99). This 
transcendental field excludes both the form of the general and the form ()f the 
indn-idual, developing in their place the idea of pre-individual singularities. 
Deleu/e used Ferlinghetti's image of the 'fourth person singtilar' to commumicatc 
this idea of a pre-individual singularity (102). Deleuze maintains that 
"Onlý- when 
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the world, teeming with anonymous and nomadiC, impersonal and pre-individual 
singularities, opens up, do we tread at last on the field of the transcendental" 
(103). This is the opening forced by Sirnondon. 
IV. vii. difference affirmed 
As a general rule, two things are simultaneously affirmed only to the extent that 
their difference is denied, suppressed from within [ ... ] To be sure, the identity here is not that of indifference, but it is generally through identity that 
opposites are affirmed at the same time [ ... ] We speak, on the contrary, of an 
operation according to which two things or two determinations are affirmed 
through their difference, that is to say, that they are the objects of simultaneous 
affirmation only insofar as their difference is itself affirmed and is itself 
affirmative. 
Gilles Deleuze, The 4ýgic of Sense. (1969: 172). 
Since classical logic cannot grasp pre-individual being, Simondon introduces die 
idea of transduction. Transduction is an operation through wl-ýich an acti6ty 
modulates a domain, extending in multiple directions from a centre. Think of the 
supersaturated water solution that reaches a bifurcation point and effectuates a 
crystallisation of the liquid sugar-water. This resulted from a primitive tension and 
incompatibility. SiMondon, echoing Bergson, calls transduction 'intuition': a 
capacity to follow the movements of being as becoming. 
Through transduction, Simondon wants to map out another way of thinking. 
Infinitesimal dissection and the search for an ultimate commonality, are equally 
shunned by the transductive method. This method tries to comprehend the 
different and heterogeneous realities constituting the individual. Transduction is, 
in this regard, quite similar to Serres' idea that thinking must occur vectorially or 
transversalIv, hooking up heterogeneous domains of being. It is a phronesis, 
improvisational and experimentational. An image of thought tcHs us hox %ve 
should orient ourseh-cs in thought, in what directions \vc should march. It is not 
only a method, but a whole system of coordinates upon \vInch we position 
ourselves. Fundamentafly, it guides the creation of concepts ýDclcu/c, 1990a: 
148). 
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Like Bergson, Simondon remarks that humans havc a need to individuate objects 
to recognise and find themselves in things. Bergson had postulated that humans 
feel more at home amongst inanimate objects (especially solids) although he also 
remarked, "In vain, we force the living into this or that one of our moulds. All 
the moulds crack. They are too narrow, too rigid, for what N-, -e try to put into 
them" (1911: x). These two thinkers both question the privilege of natural 
perception and the subordination of movement to static shots of reality. "Bergson 
himself, who made a remarkable effort to think the individual without falling into 
the traps of mental habits imported from psychology by a spirit accustomed to 
treating other problems, remained too close to pragmatism" (Simondon, 1989: 
148). Bergson concentrated too much, in Simondon's view, on intra-individual 
dynamism to the detriment of intra-individual structural realities. 
We cannot know individuation. "We can only individuate, individuate ourselves 
and be individuated" (1964: 34). It is not just being but thought too that proceeds 
by individuations. To grasp the individuation of the real exterior to the subject we 
need an individuation of the knowledge of the subject (34). Another manner of 
thinking is required. The concepts we have may be perfectly adequate for an 
individuated world, but not for a pre-individual one. concept is neither apnon 
nor a posten'on' but a praesenti, because it is an informative and interactlN-e 
communication between that which is greater and that which is lesser than the 
individual" (Simondon, 1989: 66). If we classify things in an arbitrary and abstract 
way through species and genera, we take absolutely no account of the specificity 
of their genesis. We need to understand them from the perspective of a pre- 
individual reality that is a field of potentials. It is never a matter of studying 
individuation in general, but rather of examining singular individuations. Such an 
acentered lo * you make VOUr own connections invent your own gic means 
communications and nothing pre-exists. Simondon is deternuined not to permit 
any transcendence as he maps out his idea of transduction: a thought that can 
cope with singularities. An example of this is offercd by Deleuze. I-, xplainiiig 
groupuscule, Deleuze shows ho-\v it descn I tion Guattarni's idea of aa Unifica i 
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that operates transversaHv, across a multiphcin-, in such a way that it does not 
crush that multiphcity (1972: vii). 
Deduction tries to impose a principle on a domain of being. Transduction, 
however, does not seek a principle from elsewhere in order to resolve the 
problems of a domain. Induction, while analysing the character of terms of 
reality, only conserves what is common between terms, eliminating whatever is 
singular (Sitnondon, 1964: 32). Transduction discovers the dimension of the 
system which make terms communicate. It does not search for terms that are 
identical to one another, but it looks for that which makes them disparate. 
A little piece of knowledge can make an entire system metastable, and call the old 
way of thinking into question. When Stephen Lawrence was murdered, his 
parents set up a campaign appealing against racism in the Metropolitan Police 
force. The evidence put forward about the case called into question the 
machinations of that police force, identifying an institutional racism embedded in 
it. It created a metastable situation that had to be resolved. A gradual resolution 
and dissipation of tension occurred, though not necessarily one that fully 
addressed the implications of that initial disparity. Those are the moments when 
things can never be the 'same' again. 
"R]ransduction is characterised by the fact that the result of this operation is a 
concrete web that contains all the initial terms (32). It applies to operations 
that are physical, biological, mental and social (30). An operation is the 
conversion of one structure to another structure (28). Muriel Combes gives us a 
nice example of such conversions. It comes from Marx. Marx's formula of the 
nature of the capitalist relation of money and goods initially delineated a market 
operation premised upon buying in order to sell: C-M-C (commochties-moncý-- 
commodities). Two acts of purchasing and selling are bound together in this 
chain. Its corresponding form of selling in order to buy (moneý-- 
commodities-money). This second formulation constitutes the beconuing-capital 
of iiioncý- (1998: 29). Simondon calls this interest in changes of statcs from 
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structure to operation, or conversely from operation to structure, 'allagmatics'. 
We are accustomed to thinking in terms of common genera and specific 
differences, and they seem to be natural classifications for us (Simondon, 1964: 
87). 1 will discuss this proposition in the context of Deleuze's critique of the 
identitarian 'n-nage of thought' in the next chapter. Meanwhile, Simondon also 
wants to introduce another way of thinking. Returning to the example of the 
crystal, he shows how it involves an operation through which it structures itself, 
being both cause and consequence of the polarisation of the matter N-6thout 
which it would not exist. The singularity, or the germ, is the sugar crystal that 
makes the different orders of magnitude communicate. Hence its structure is 
ret, eh)ed but this germ is not distinct from the crystal. The properties of the crystal 
are relational rather than substantial. This elementary discontinuity (in the growth 
of the crystal) means, SI-Mondon contends, that the discontinuous is prirnarý, in 
relation to the continuous (94). Ibis is close to what Laruelle called the relation of 
the non-relation and Deleuze named the 'inclusive disjunction'. 
Relations have a real claim to being in Simondon. A relation is not just the 
consequence of the juxtaposition of two terms. "ýIt is an aspect of the internal 
resonant, e oJ'a ýystem oj'indizýduafion; it is a part of the state of a system" (27). This 
participation involves being part of an individuation that is greater than one's 
own being through the charge of pre-mdividual reality, the potentials harboured 
by the individual. A relation is a modality of being. The essence of a reality cannot 
(as Bergson and James told us over and over) be re-composed by extrapolating a 
relation between pre-existent terms. All relations have a class of being and are 
simultaneous with regard to the terms whose existence the ýT ensure. 
Rather than adhering to the model of substance, metastable being eiqiiders that 
%,,, -hich Nve call substance - individuated being. By declaring a "var on the 
substantiahst tradition, Simondon highlights the tendency to treat relations as a 
rapport of pre-existing terms. These terms are thought of as already sLibstances. 
By 
understanding the individual as "a relation in being, a relation of 
being, land] a 
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way of being [ ... ]" (30), being is itself understood as that which becomes through 
creating connections. S=iilarh-, knowledge is not a simple relation of t-\X-o I 
substances, but it needs to be conceived as "a relatioli betiveeli two relationr, one in 
the domain of the object and the other in the domain of the subject" (81). 
Like Spinoza, SiMondon thinks that something is an object only insofar as it is 
capable of affecting and being affected by other objects in a s\-stem. He says that 
there is "a virtual reciprocity of actions between the terms of a system" (66). A 
relation does not link pre-existent terms, but is born by constituting terms 
themselves as relations (Combes, 1998: 34). Twisting Hegel's formula Combes 
says, "What is real is relational, and what is relational is real" (35). A relation does 
not express being, but it constitutes it (SiMondon, 1964: 126). This idea of 
relation introduces to us the notion that being is a disjunctive diversity. 
IV. viii. crystalline visions 
Mine is no callous shell, 
I have instant conductors all over me whether I pass or, 
stop, 
They seize every object and lead it harmlessly through me. 
Walt W'hitman, 'Song of Myself', Leaves of Grass. (1855: 90). 
SIMondon's theory of knowledge does not extrapolate from sensation but is 
propelled by the problematic of metastable being. In a seminar on music, Deleuze 
describes the crystalline lines of an assemblage, lines that do not simply designate 
a set of states, but trace glittering movements. Deleuze and Guattan' call a refrain 
a prism, a "crystal of space-time" (1980: 348). It acts on that which surrounds it, 
extracting light and vibrations. But it also catalyses, hooking up elements without 
a natural affmity, creating a transversal relation 
between them. These crystalline 
lines have their own hiStor)T and open up new becomings. 
We need to understand the subject in a real and concrete situation, not as a 
un-ified and fully individuated being, but as a 
heterogeneous reatity with a 
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multitude of desires, passions and interests. The perceiving subject is part of a 
dynamic system that is over-determined and super-saturated and perception 
modifies both the subject and object. The individual is a transductive reality that 
is neither an element, nor a pure relation (rappod). It is the reahtý- of a metastable 
relation. "[A]n intensiVe diversity [ ... ] exists Nx-l-iich makes the subJect-world system 
comparable to a supersaturated solution" (Simondon, 1989: 91). 
There are many different kinds of individuations; subject-type individuations 
(that's me ... that's you ... ), event-type individuations that do not rely on a subject (a 
battle, a wind ... ) Peleuze, 1990a: 115). But the subject does not ha-,, -c any identitY. 
Subjectification constitutes both a personal or collective individuation (115), so 
we need to ask in what ways can we constitute ourselves as selves? Someone 
walks into a room and the atmosphere changes imperceptibly. This is because the 
person is, as Spinoza told us, a set of intensities. Individuations do not have to be 
personal. Deleuze observes, "Hlix and 1, and manN- others like us, don't feel Nve 
are persons exactly. Our individuahty is rather that of events (14 1). 
Mix. an ethics of the pre-individual 
The individual is an activity, condensing information, transporting it, and 
modulating it in a new milieu which it is instrumental in inventing. The process of 
individuation is an operation of communication. (Simondon, 1964: 229). For a 
being to be a living being, there must be a polarisation and an asymmetrical 
qualification through which an orientation or tendency emerges. This idea of 
asym. metry is explored by cosmologists seeking to explain the birth of the 
universe after the Big Bang, and by geneticists who have drawn our attention to 
the asymmetry of the DNA strand. We came across it in our example of the 
flower that mediates different orders of magnitude. Deleuze calls this the Unequal 
and, like Simondon, names it a 'problematic'. To live is to be agent, milieu and 
element of individuation (Simondon, 1989: Y, ). 
Simondon quotes Nfalebranche who noted once that e-, -cr\- being, has "the 
movement to always go further" (144). This activity is \x-cU documented by 
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Spinoza. When he chronicled his story of the individual as t-oliatu, ý-, a potelitia 
perpetually engaged in activities whereby it was both affected and affecting, he 
effectively described that pre-individual zone of beings which is the part of 11ature 
associated with individuals. From this zone, emerges the new. We called this an 
asymmetrical system, comprised in part of a pre-individual charge that 
accompanies individuals. The future bears upon the present, informing it. Let us 
see why this is important for an ethics. 
Ethics occurs in a network of acts, acts that resonate with each another, 
modulating and transforn-ung one another. Any act is always becoming in the 
middle of its becoming (242). It is centred but infinite, and its value is its capacity 
for transductive shifts liberating new potentials and effectuating transformations. 
No act that is isolated, consisting only in itself, or operating'With an end in view, 
is ethical in this sense. Cutting oneself off from or dominating others breaks off 
this communication. An ethical act is radiant, radiating, more than unity and more 
than identity, creating new relations and connections. Rather than trying to deny 
its becoming, it embraces it. "Ed-iics is that by which the subject remains a 
subject, refusing to become an absolute individual, a closed domain of reahtN,, a 
detached singularity; it is that by which the subject remains in a perpetually tense 
problematic, internally and externally [ ... ]" (245-46). 
In an essay entitled 'Spinoza: From individuality to transindividuality', Etienne 
Bahbar explores the eccentric nature of SpMoza's theory of individuation. 
According to Gatens and Lloyd, "Bahbar has offered a reading of Spinoza's 
theory of individuation as a relational ontology that is opposed to both classical 
individualism and organicism" (1999: 121). Spinoza's antipathy to formalism leads 
him, as we have seen, to counter a philosophy of attribution with one concerned 
with process and networks; one in which concepts and definitions cannot 
be 
employed indifferently to context and the real definition of the essence of the 
human is not encapsulated in any single proposition. The individual cannot 
be 
thought other than in relation and constant communication with others. 
Bahbar 
takes issue , vith m-o common objections to 
Spinoza's \x-ork; the first alleges that 
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he has no theory of subjectivity; and the second claims that the individual's 
autonomy is denied, immersed in the impersonal and undifferenciated entity that 
is God. The conception of inclividuality developed bý T Spinoza is one that 
emphasises the individual's necessary relationahty with others since singularities 
are interconnected in a 'network' or a 'system' (1997: 9). The ontology proposed 
is therefore a relational one and Balibar calls it a general theory of Communication. 
It is with obvious dehght that Bahbar tells us of his chscovery of SiMondon who, 
despite his pedestrian and conventional criticisms of Spinoza, is himself a true 
Spinozist. Bahbar argues that metastable equihbna require an elevation of 
potential energy in the form of a polarity of individual and environment. 
Adaptation to changing environments is not reactive but involves the invention 
of new structures and modes of existence. Neither reductioMst nor vitalist, a 
natural philosophy prevails (11). Individuahty in Spinoza operates as a 
transindividuality, or rather a transIndividual process of individuation, that is 
neither individualistic nor hohstic. Individuals want to avoid being decomposed 
so they engage in an active process of exchange with the environment and 
cultivate a multitude of relationships which increase their power. Freedom is the 
expression of the active dimension of the individual. 
With regard to Simondon, Bahbar asserts that, "His key idea is that -tný- 
individuation remains dependent, in a metastable equilibrium, on the pre-indiz4diial 
potential from which the individual emerged through successive "structurings" or 
"distanciations from the environment". Therefore the existence of an individual 
is always "problematic" or tense" (22, n. 25). By creating a collectivity, a new 
metastable entity that is neither internal or external to individuals emerges. The 
prc-individual charge that is a non-individuated reality of the individual impels 
this movement toward others. "Spinoza's concept of relation as immanence is 
best described by the term "transindividuality" (33). 
Spinoza's conception of the individual as the relative and changing reality of a set 
of differential relations is not dissimilar to SIMondon's ()-\x-n understanding ()f the 
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individual. Simondon agrees that the individual must be grasped as "Me R*ný, giilar 
poi*nI q1- an open hýfiniýy q1'relationZ' (1989: 254), adding, "the individual is not a 
substantial being like an element, nor is it a pure relation, but it is the reahtý- of ,t 
metastable relation" (79-80). And like Spinoza's individual who dies slowly and 
gradually as it can no longer sustain so many affects, SiMondon's individual "loses 
its plasticity bit by bit, along with its capacity to create metastable situations and 
to make of them problems With multiple solutions" (80). For each of these 
thinkers, individuation is a voyage that takes place in relation to thresholds of 
intensity. 
Muriel Combes notes that Spinoza, like Simondon, comprehends the subject of 
ethics as the place of a perpetual variation in its power of acting that is its capacitV 
to affect other subjects, and be affected, transforming itself. Ethical difference 
concerns a liberatory movement from servitude. Consciousness varies in relation 
to affective life and the forces surrounding the subject. Modifications in these 
result in modifications of the individual. As a result the subject is nc\-er fully 
constituted (1998: 54). It is both individual and other than individual. 
We call this being that traverses the individual the transindividual. The excess of 
being that is the pre-individual nature of an individuated being is lived as a 
tension. The presence of a 'more- than-individual' dimension makes itself felt as a 
sign. A sign stems from a disparity, it reveals that which is more than individual. 
This sign results in a de-individuation of the individual, liberating its non- 
individuated potential. The transindividual emerges from that in us that is not us. 
It is the limit of exteriority and interiority; a fold of an outside that constitutes an 
inside that is not an interiority (71). Subjectivity is not contained -\x-ithin the limits 
()f the individual. A collective emerges when individuals engage in a new 
individuation. just as a relation is not just a rapport of pre-existent terms, the 
transindividual does not constitute the entnT of the individual into a oup that is gr 
an ag ri anguished bct-\N-een a subject- 
. 
gregate of other individuals. When Guatta i dis i 
group (a groupuscule) and a sub'ugated group, he explored the idea of a oup 1ý 
gr 
that was not simply a conglomeration or meeting of individuals. Instead, lie 
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sought to express the possibility of a non- hierarchical group that could express 
and develop itself through singular ideas, actions and relations. This would be an 
ongoing process of invention. 
If the individual enters an already constituted group, the leeway for change and 
innovation is limited. The culture of these groups can become ossified and ngid, 
unable to adapt to change, closed to the world. Ireland's Roman Catholic 
community is an example of a doctrinaire group that has seen its members 
dwindle rapidly in recent years, partially because of its own intransigence. 
Through the transindividual, humans are opened to their non-human becomings 
and potentials. "To the extent that the transindividual takes root in this zone of us 
that is exterior to the individual, it swells in us like an outside" (71). 
SlMondon begins thus to reconceive the relation of individual and society, 
stressing the reality of the social as a system of relations (1989: 179). The human 
is not an exceptional being endowed with an abstract essence and generahsable 
nature. Individuals enter a collective through the potentials of a real t-reated 
possible. "The subjective transindividual names, therefore, the effects in a subject 
of the discovery of her more -than-individuality, of a zone in herself which is 
revealed as pre-personal and common" (Combes, 1998: 82). For this reason, 
Combes extracts a phrase meant for Leopardi and written bý T Negri which calls 
for "a humanism after the death of man [ ... ]" (85). 
A human is an essentiak 
incomplete being. What potentials can she have for going beyond herselfý 
Deleuze and Guattari call these aparal-lel communications 'transversal'. \Ve form 
rhizomes by deterritotialisitý creating connections ith others in such a \x-ay that g, Wi 1 
the territorialitý- of the self is disrupted and opens itself to new modifications. 
These transformations can only be understood on the level of intensity. 
Appeating to this idea of transduction, d-icy elaborate on their rhizomatic thought 
which the)- oppose to an arborescent and hierarchical image of thought. 
In 
contrast to the latter's centred system, they 
develop an acentcred system, - 
individuals are only "defined only by their state at a given moment 
(1980.17). 
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This operation is the transduction of intensive states (17). Anything that nught 
uniýy it from on high is subtracted, hence the formula 'n- F. 
The relation of being to itself is much richer than identity. Substantial being is 
one because it is stable consisting in itself and for itself. However, the original 
state of being is pre-individual, surpassing its coherence with itself It is 
metastable and potentialised. Any structure rests at a stable equilibrium only 
within certain magnitudes and limits. It is defined within thresholds. A new 
interaction can Berate masked potentials leading to an abrupt change. 
Ontogenesis is no longer directed toward the individuated individual but 
designates instead the character of becoming of being, a character that is neither 
mechanistic nor teleological. 
What is striking in this account is SlMondon's conviction that the world is not 
already there, structured and existing as a system of reference that is ulltt, -Irýý and 
objective; in fact, it is precisely this conviction that leads him to criticise both 
Lamarck and Darwin. The closest philosophical account to this is Bergson in his 
late work Creafiie Ei)olufion. Being is understood as a problematic that contains a 
number of virtual tendencies. These split and are differenciated into different 
paths through an inventive process of unforeseeable novel týT . The actuahsations 
of this 'simple virtual' constitute resolutions that are novel inventions of a 
problematic that did not pre-exist their invention as realisable possibles. Similarly, 
Spinoza's condemnation of a teleological conception of Nature mocked the 
notion that we have eyes in order to see. We see bet-ause we have eyes and in 
Bergson's view, sight is the resolution of a problematic. 
If all the potentials in a s), stem are already actual-ised it is difficult to see how 
transformational strategies can be cobbled together. It was for thýis reason that I 
criticised Hardt and Negri's limited use of the virtual and their dedication to a 
rather rigid materialism that placed false hope in the contradictions of the system 
throwing up a new mode of reality. Deleuze and Guattarl"s constructiVism 
challenged this approach by always emphasising that the plane of immanence 
1 
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does not pre-exist. Simondon does not exphcldy align himself with a (Deleuzean) 
'created possible' but this is implicit in his texts. It shines through in his novel 
thought of pre-individual and problematic being. 
IV. x. flashing intensities 
Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by Ný-hich the 
given is given, that by which the given is given as diverse. 
Gilles Deleuze, Dffference and Repetition. (I 968a: 
It seems to us that Gilbert Simondon's conception can be compared to a theon, 
of intensive quantities; because in itself each intensive quantity is difference. 
Gilles Deleuze, Review of L'ilidii4dil el, ý-ti,, aenýsepý)ysit-o-hi'oloaiqlle. (1966b). 
Yet all is not guaranteed. We came across Deleuze's 'Postscript on Control 
Societies' in chapter 2. In this piece, Deleuze argues that controls operate through 
modulation, a transmutation that changes from one moment to the next. 
Businesses try to create even greater competitions within the workplace. \N'e are 
each in competition with ourselves. In this societ\-, N, ()u no longer continuouslN, 
start over as you move from school to factory "business, training and military 
service being coexisting metastable states of a single modulation, a sort of 
universal transmutation [dormatim]" (1990b: 179). A pretence of openness and 
disparity is quickly co-opted in the service of business. It is a feigned and limited 
disparateness. The real problem, as we saw in the last chapter, is how to invent a 
problematic. 
Alberto Gualandi thinks that Sffnondon's theon, of individuation played a N-cn 
important role in Deleuze's philosophy (1998: 64). In the context of the cr1tiquC 
of conceptual difference offered by Deleuze in the 
last chapter, \X-c will no"v 
develop his positive account of difference in conjunction witli 
Simondon's theory 
of individuation. 
In dramatic fashion, Deleuze tells us that God made the world by calculating, 
but 
I ý, ) 
SIMONDON'S CRYSTALLINE BECOMINGS 
his calculations are never exact Vuste). This leads to an irreducible inequality that 
forms the conditions of the world. Even- phenomenon is conditioned bN- an 
inequahty and 'je]verý- phenomenon flashes in a signal-sign system" (1968a: 2-22). 
Paraphrasing SiMondon, Deleuze notes that insofar as a system is constituted bl- 
at least two heterogeneous series or disparate orders capable of entering into 
communication, we call it a signal and "[t]he phenomenon that flashes across this 
system, bringing about the communication between disparate series, is a sign" 
(222). Every intensity is already difference in itself It is already a coupling. 
Intensities comprehend the unequal or different and open onto divergent series. 
"We call this state of infinitely doubled difference which resonates to infinity 
di. prio. Disparity - in other words, difference or intensity (Chfference of intensm-) 
- is the sufficient reason of all phenomena, the condition of that which appears" 
(222). Deleuze concludes his first paragraph of chapter V 'The Asymmetric 
Synthesis of the Sensible' by claiming that, "The reason of the sensible, the 
condition of that which appears, is not space and time but the Unequal in itself, 
disparateness as it is determined and comprised in difference of intensity, in 
intensity as difference" (222-23). 
These are difficult thoughts but we should already be familiar with a number of 
them through SiMondon. If we recall Simondon's own approach to individuation, 
it emphasised first and foremost that being is not substantial. It is at odds with 
itself, incompatible, more than unity and more than identity. It is this intuition 
that Deleuze picks up on to amplify his theme of disparate and heterogeneous 
orders of magnitude. Through this he develops a real and genetic account of a 
difference that is not subordinated to an identitanan image of thought. 
In notable distinction to his earlier 1956 essay on difference, Deleuze no longer 
begins with a Bergsonian distinction between differences in kind or nature 
(quality), and differences in degree (extensity). Though this distinction remains, it 
is secondary. "Intensity is difference, but this difference tends to deny or to 
cancel itself out in extensity and underneath quality" (223). 0ý#ýi-ente and Repetilion 
constitutes a veritable attempt to throw off the shackles of those approaches 
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which remained limited to a consideration of empirical difference. Throughout 
this thesis, I have tried to show , x, -hN, this is an important endeavour, indeed) 
Simondon's critique of the constituted individual provides, perhaps, the greatest 
impetus for this renewed theory of individuation. 
If we only know difference "as already developed within an extensity, and as 
covered over by qualities [ ... ]" (223) then we will strive in vain to understand the 
conditions or genesis of reality. The postulates that structured the image of 
thought are Implicit and complicit In the development of a series of philosophical 
concepts. The old adage is transformed as we are asked to think with the grain, 
with the singularities of the matter. 
Good sense distributes, and in this distribution it tries to banish difference, 
cancelling it out (224). The explication of difference is a process of identification 
of difference. Good sense tries to bring things back to a calm sense of stable 
equilibrium. Deleuze, in a moment of penmanship worthy of Nfarx says, "Good 
sense is the ideology of the middle classes who recognise themselves in equality 
with an abstract product. It dreams less of acting than of constituting a natural 
milieu [ ... ]" (225). Instead of negating difference, it recognises it just enough to 
dissipate tension and ensure that difference negates itself However, this system is 
created by difference of intensity as it explicates itself We learned how this 
occurred in Simondon's account of crystallisation. Still "difference has nc\-er 
ceased to be in itself, to be implicated in itself even while it is explicated outside 
itself' (228). 
CI ommon sense is defined, on the other hand, by facing a supposedlý- identical 
Self With a supposedly identical object. This static approach has nothing of the 
dynamism of Simondon who, according to Deleuze, maintains that 'JolbJects arc 
divided up in and by fields of individuation, as are Selves" (1968a: 226). Thought 
has not gone so far as to dare think that bý- which the given is (,,, lN-cn. 
Intensity has three characteristics, Deleuze tells us. It includes the unequal in 
161 
SENIONDON'S CRYSTALLINE BECONIINGS 
itself, representing a difference in quantity that cannot be cancelled in quantitý-. In 
this Nxaý- it is the quality belonging to quantity. Because it is alreadý- difference in 
itself, it affirms difference. As difference, intensity already refers to a series of 
other differences that it affirms by affirnung itself This becomes clear if , N-e 
remember Simondon's explanation of the incompatibility or difference of orders 
of magi-Atude that creates a state of metastabihtý-. Difference is not, hoxvever, 
negation. Again drawing on Simondon, Deleuze elucidates this contention. A 
field of forces refers to a potential energy, and opposition refers to a 'deeper' 
disparateness. These oppositions are resolved only insofar as disparate orders of 
magnitude have invented an order of communication. 
Intensity can be distin 'shed in the following way: as a really implicated and gui 
enveloping diffirence, and as an implicated and enveloped distante (236). -\s a 
consequence, Deleuze claims that intensity is neither indivisible like quality, and 
nor is it divisible like quantity. Flourishing a formula that will be repeated at 
length throughout A Tl)ollsalid Plateaus he states, "An intensive quantity may be 
divided, but not without changing its nature. In a sense, it is therefore indivisible, 
but only because no part exists prior to its division and no part retains the same 
nature after division" (237). This is, of course, his classic definition of a N-irtual 
multiplicity. SiMondon and Spinoza are therefore reN-ealed to haN-e constructed 
theories of virtual multiplicities as intensive quantities, and this is due in part to 
their antipathy for abstraction and formalisation, and in part to their love of the 
singular and concrete. 
The idea of the unequal or the disparate is at the heart of Deleuze's 
understanding of differences. This primacy of the unequal should not be 
understood as a justification of hierarchy. It is more akin to an opening of the 
possible, a world without identiq, brimming with potentials, albeit one that needs 
to be constructed. "The ethics of intensive quantities has onlýý t, \N-() principles: 
affirm even the lowest, do not explicate oneself (too much)" (244). 
I- Stmonclon's metastable state is a fine cleschption of xvhat Deleuze means 
by a 
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problematic. Deleuze sometimes calls this non-being, in the , -, -aN- that SiMondon 
stresses it is pre-individual: both involve a conception of being that is more than 
unity and more than identitý-. The disparateness of tl-iis being is, resolved by a 
germ, or 'dark precursor', that integrates "the elements of the disparateness into a 
state of coupling which ensures its internal resonance" (246). The pre-individual 
half of the individual is the reservoir of singularities from xvluch new 
transformations can emerge. Deleuze believes that individuation is essentially 
intensive and that "the pre-individual field is a virtual-ideal field made up of 
differential relations" (246). Bergson told us that the most difficult thing is to 
invent good problems. Inventing or constructing a problematic forces a si-stem 
into a state of disparateness. 
Metastable being requires a distinction between singularity and individuality; the 
pre-individual field is not individuated, although "it is filled with singularities 
which correspond to the existence and distribution of potentials" (Deleuze, 
1966b: 116). Deleuze underlines this idea that the state of the pre-individual field 
is singular without being individual. And what encourages him in Simondon is 
that this state is one of "difference, disparity, disparateness" (116). Disparitýy is the 
first moment of being, and all the other states that we commonly associate with 
being like opposition, integration, unification, are secondary. This idea of 
potential energy is a more profound idea than a field of forces (116). The 
problematic resolves these disparate orders of magnitude by organising a new 
dimension. This is not a dialectical resolution but an invention. Deleuze's sole 
reservation about Simondon's ethics that moves from the pre-individual to the 
transindividual through individuation is that it Might restore the form of a Self 
that Simondon had himself banished in his theory of disparitý- (118). However he 
beheves that Simondon has developed new concepts that transform the classical 
problems of philosophy. Throughout the next chapter Nve Nxill see how Deleuze 
himself mobihses these ideas as he constructs a thought without image. 
If thought only thinks by means of difference, it needs a rcvolution like the 
revolution that took art from representation to abstraction. "This is the aim of a 
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theory of thought without image" (1968a: 276). This would be a -, x-orld of pre- 
individual singularities and non-personal individuations. 
A world of dissensus, not consensus. A world of disparateness, not identitv. A 
world where the individual is dissolved and the pre-individual celebrated. This 
world would be a strange world indeed. Guattan calls it'chaosmosis'. 
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V. L the radical thought of empiricism 
The character of the world in a state of becoming as incapable of formulation, 
as "false", as "self-contradictory". Knowledge and becoming exclude one 
another. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, TI)e 11"illto Power. (1901: ý517, '8())- 
What dawns on philosophers last of all: they must no longer accept concepts as 
a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, 
present and make them convincing. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, TI)e if-'ill to Power (1901: §409,220). 
In a letter-preface to jean Clet Martin's book Vanafions, Deleuze confesses he has 
little use for the concept of the simulacrum aný- longer, despite the fact that this 
git, qj'Sense. This is concept recurs throughout Difýrente and Repefifion and Tbe Lo 
perhaps because it intimates something less than real, a 'mere effect' as Badiou 
might suggest. Instead Deleuze claims he has been trying to think of philosophy 
as a system. This system must be a heterogenesis, somettýng he feels has not 
really been tried before. There is a double turning away that installs a radical 
immanence. In line with his dedication to the concept of multiphcity, as revealed 
spectacularly in A Thousand Plateaus with Guattari, he seeks to explore the idea of 
transcendental empiricism. Throughout this chapter I -\vill explore the nature of 
this 'transcendental empiricism'. 
Kant distin ished between the transcendent (-\vhich appeals to principles beyond gui 
experience) and the transcendental (Nvhich are immanent principles within the 
hn-lits of possible experience). This distinction is adhered to, albeit looselv, bN 
Deleuze. While the Kantian transcendental is concerned with the waý-s that \%-c 
can know objects, Deleuze's transcendental concerns the conditions 
for real 
experimentation. It resounds xvith the force of Adorno's cry 
for 'the possibility of 
tl'Ungs being otheiNvisc'. 
Deleuze implorcs jean (Act Martin (and us) to kccp rcturrUng to the concrete and 
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not to give one concept a primacy over all others. This effort to th,, vart a 
totalising model or image of thought is also found in Guattari's Nvork on 
metamodelisation. The challenge is to proliferate possibilities of being and creatc 
networks and rhizomes to escape anN- given sN-stem of modelisation. 
The importance of distinguishing between transcendence and immanence was 
made clear in chapter 3 in relation to the thesis on umvocity. Here another term is 
introduced: the transcendental. It is important for Deleuze since he -\X-ants to 
retain a commitment to pluralism and empiricism, while not facilely , positivising 
all that IS. His philosophy of difference is developed in the hope of inventing a 
wild or radical empiricism-, 8 that can think becomings (relations, difference, 
process ... ), Without abstracting and extrapolating from things that already are 
(individuated). We learned about this project in the last chapter when I discussed 
Simondon's motivation for his theory of protesses of individuation. It is this 
impetus, combined with an allegiance to an immanent ethics, that enables us to 
understand why Deleuze seeks the conditions for the invention of the new. 
Bergson's Creative Evolillioli sought to eliminate teleology and mechanism from 
evolutionary accounts by emphasising the production of radical and itýilbreseeable 
novelty. It is this intuition that Deleuze picks up on as he seeks to reconfigure the 
conception of the transcendental. 
Transcendental philosophy, for Kant, sought to avold extrapolating the 
transcendental (the conditions of possibility) from the empirical; its status \vas 
that of a faculty that could le islate apn'Orl With regard to experience. He criticised 91 
a tautological account of conditions that required reference to the conditioned 
" Wahl discusses the idea of a radical empiricism in relation to Whitehead (1932: 219). He 
adds that the problern is between the relations (rapports) between the terms and their 
relations (i-elations). He returns to this theme saying this empiricism is not a theory of 
sensations like that of Hume (127). Deleuze praises Wahl at ýarious intervals and it seerns to 
rne that both he and Wahl were inspired bý William James's idea of a radical empiricism. 
Jarnes distinguished ordinarý empiricism frorn radical empiricism bN exploring a relational 
and empirical conception of actiNitý. Relations are themsel%es a part of experience. \\ahl 
agrees Nvith Whitehead and James that the task of philosophy must 
be to explain the abstract 
- not the concrete (1 334), a con\ 
iction DeleLize also holds dear. Yio\\e\ er the abstract must. in 
this context. be understood as a mode of generalising. Deleuze 
is a lover ofanother kind of 
abstraction. 106 
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(the aposlen'on). Undoubtedly Deleuze is indebted to a Kantian conception of the 
transcendental. He argues nonetheless that Kant fell into his own trap by 
extrapolating the conditions of possibility of the transcendental from the 
empirical itself. In response, Deleuze maintains that the transcendental must be 
explored on its own account and only this kind of exercise will enable us to 
discover multiplicities and the exercise of thought. As Daniel SM1'th savs, the 
conditions of possible experience become the genetic conditions of real 
expenence(1996: 29). 
Instead of being transtmdent principles of mere conditions, Deleuze develops a 
transcendental philosophy of internal genesis (1962: 91). He maintains that Kant 
failed in his project of immanent critique since his "[t]ranscendental philosophy 
discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned" (91). 
Deleuze's antipathy toward the ilhcit invocation of transcendent principles must 
not be confused with a negation of transcendental principles. When Todd Maý' 
takes issue with readings of Deleuze that present him as a philosopher of 
difference (that is, a thinker who privileges difference), he argues that difference 
and unity are intertwined at the surface. Without this, Deleuze's philosophy 
would be rendered incoherent (1994: 44). He says "'Me antitranscendental path 
that Deleuze has trodden requires him to reject the primacy of difference at the 
same moment that he rejects the primacy of un1ty" (44). May falls to comprehend 
that Deleuze's formulations such as 'One=Nlultiple' concern a specific 
understanding of the One, not as numerical, nor as unified, but as the inclusiN, e 
disjunction of the differences of differences. Rather than examining an 
ontolo ical account of difference, May contents hnnself with an epistemolo cal 91 10 
(and critical) claim that difference is a means to contest unifý'ing discourses (39). 
This waters down the radicahtý- of this enterprise folding it back onto a 
Hegelianism xhich claims that "a thought of pure difference is not a thotight at 
ti misunderstanding the nature all" (46). In sum, May lightly chas ises Deleuze for 1 
of his own project and for being so nalve as to try and think a thought of pure 
difference. 
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In the preface to the English edition of Dýýerent-e aiid Repefilim, Deleuze clairns 
that everythlng he has tried to do since has been connected Nvith this text, the first 
one in which he 'does' philosophy. His problems were the concepts of difference 
and repetition. Difference had tended to be subordinated to identitv, 
resemblance, opposition and analogy; repetition was also thought in this way. By 
"putting into question" the traditional linage of thought, these themes could be 
re-addressed. 
Deleuze suggests that the 'image of thought' chapter is the most important one in 
the book. He says "[i]t is therefore the third chapter which now seems to me the 
most necessary and most concrete (1994/1968a: xvii). The image of thought 
is not simply a question of thinking in accordance with a gl\-cn method, but it 
rests on implicit presuppositions. These ide and detern-une the process of ttying gui 
to think. We assume the good nature of the thinker and we take the process of 
recognition that forms a 'common sense' conjoining the faculties on a supposedlý 
same object. These images that thought gives to itself of what it is to think 
imprison thought, with ramifications that spread beyond the formally 
philosophical stage. The development of the concept of a rhizomatic thought that 
is in opposition to an arborescent thought stems from this research. 
V. ii. idealism or immanence 
It seems that Franýois Laruelle follows up on this thematic when he discusses the 
idea of a philosophical Decision. This concerns the presuppositions made 1)ý- 
philosophy concerning its own character. Laruelle argues that there is a 
philosophical Decision that expresses an autonomy of difference. He notes that 
some consequences of a philosophical decision are 
demonstrated in the 
contemporary situation whereby the necessity to -\vage an anti-humanist strut), gic is 
conflated with a refusal to recogruse a specific and positive essence of the 
human 
(1986: 10). 
11, the opposition of contraries 
is displaced and the thought of the With 1) ffcrence I 
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aporia, an aporia sterni-ning from the ontico -ontological difference linking Being 
to being, is positivised. The aporetic nature of this thought is revealed in a series 
of conjunctions such as the 'One-NIultiple'. Difference is explicitly constructed in 
opposition to presence and identity (though Laruelle remarks that such presence 
and identity fffl the essence of difference with a punfied presence and identity). 
In Deleuze's case the modus operandi of this theory of mLixtures is to create a zone 
of combat. Couplings and hierarchies are affirmed over and above the terms in 
combat. Differences are understood as relations of forces. The immanence 
celebrated is an idealist one, according to Laruelle. This idealism stems from the 
Diverse of distances of forces and perspectives. Scission while reconciled is not 
sublated. The concept of the a prion' no longer designates a space of the possible. 
Instead, the apn*On'consists of relations or non-relations as Indivisibles. 
The difficulties associated with the concept of the differential or problematic 
reveal themselves. According to Laruelle, thcN- are not unrelated to allegations of a 
pervasive idealism in Deleuze's thought. Idealism and materialism sen-c to 
indicate the prioritisation of a supplement of either idea of matter. The idealism 
of Deleuze-s thought could then be seen to emerge from the continuous and 
synthetic nature of the differential apn . on . S. 
Indeed, throughout Nielýýwl)e and Philosoply and Spznoýq and Me Problem qj'E%Pression 
this thematic is ftequently invoked. Portrayed as the struggle of active and 
reactive (passive) forces, differential and multiple themselves, activm, and 
becon-ung-active are valorised as the dimension constituting an ethical life. (I'his 
is not so straight-forwardly Machiavellian as it initially sounds. 
) In place of form 
is a being-able-to (ýowwh--M-e) that has at the core this concept of 
force. Laruelle 
contests the Undecidability inherent in this mode of philosophising. 
Identity is not cxpurgated but seen as derivative. Contradiction is thell the 
insidious underbcHy ()f Difference vie,, ved 
from the base depths. In Laruelle's 
vie-w, this is another repetition of the age-old greco-()ccidental questl()n 
'hoN,, - to 
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think duality-as-unity? ' - that is, the unit\- of passage from one contran- to 
another. In the case of Deleuze (and Nietzsche), the pathos of distance traverses 
the analytic of the Will to Power. The reciprocal symmetry comprising the 
unstable equilibrium of passage is a continuous one. The lo ic of this philosophy 91 
of Difference is to simultaneously purport to think the real as all (absolute) and 
conversely as Other. The disjunction of difference is seen as a mode of indivision: 
unitý, in Difference and Repetition is thus understood as the dorences of ýi#ýI-ences 
communicating through their differences. Being is definitively affected by the being 
that it conditions (1986: 31). 
Laruelle calls this indivisible or inclusive disjunction that is a unifying of 
opposites a kind of neo-Platonism, whereby the One is a unifying unity in a 
transcendental rather than empirico-ideal sense. Difference is immediately as One. 
The One is not transcendent - there is no exterior unity , 
governing contraries - 
instead the reign of the One is of division and distribution, not a transcendent 
model of causality. Although Deleuze would not call his conception of univocity 
a Neo-Platonism, Laruelle is correct in his assessment of the distributive rather 
than collective power of Deleuze's 'One-All'. 
A double turning away or double articulation can be understood as follows: 
Difference is interpreted as a function of disparity and multiphcltý- and as a 
I gn 1 ing function of unity. 
We saw in chapter 3 how Badiou argued that 1)ý- i, ing Bei 
two names transcendence was smuggled in the back door, and the virtual thus 
adopted the position of unilateral superiority vis-A-vis the actual. I addressed this 
criticism bý- explicating Spinoza's conception of the immanent cause. Laruelle, 
however, makes a different point. He argues that Difference draws its legitimacý- 
from itself. Difference, even if absolute and self-determMimig, retains a distinction 
of determining and detern-uned. This chiasm indicates what 
Lanielle calls "the 
absolute -idealist usage of Difference" 
(1986: 59). A continuous reciprocity ind 
t-c\-crsibiht-ý- governs here. There is a co-determination ()f 
Being and being. 
What then are some of the fcaturcs characterising this articulation ()f the rc,, tl 
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from other forms of orderingý Difference, as a philosophical decision, is not 
secondary but transcendental. It is neither category nor Ideal. Laruelle diagnoses 
the ontological proposition relating to Difference as follows, "Difference is 
Scission-immediatelý--as-L-nin-, a Becoming-as-Being [ ... ]" (39 )- 
Difference operates a genesis of empirical reality but it also attempts to re-unite 
the concepts of Being and One. Deleuze's non (? ) being or the 'problematic' 
operates as a concrete principle, or even apn'on'emotion ()r sensibility, positivising 
nothingness, making it different and multiple thus allegedly (and only allegedly), 
says Laruelle, re-invigorating and re-vitalising philosophical thinking. This self- 
proclaimed jolt of Frankensteituan electricity aruimates what would be a dead 
world of structuralism or Hegehanism. 
Deleuze wanted to grasp the conditions of reality (of real experimentation) since 
he believed that Kant's approach was too broad, inad%-crtentlN- niffiroring and 
generalising from the empirical. In turn, Laruelle levels this critique at Dcleuze, 
the apn'on elements are too abstract for Laruelle, since thcý- are too close to that 
from which theý, seek to escape and risk falling into the facticity of the givcti- 
"But the risk hes in confusing \vhat we must seek, their [that is, idealism and 
materialism] esseil,, ý, as a pn*on* and material differential elements, with the rclative 
and hence necessarily ideal structural version of this essence" J-aruelle, 1981: §27: 1 
105). Ideality is re-introduced into the concept if the differential elements are 
relative to one another, or alternatively if they are reciprocally determining. 
, \rc the relations of forces, ideal and continuous, so key to Deleuze's enterprise, 
simply indicative ()f a hidden idealism? Is that which is called the Real in Awi- 
Oedipus another appellation for Being, giving (as Badiou fears) a primacy of 
ideality over the rcaP D()cs the verý- relativity of the differential character 4 the 
relations of difference and their independence froin their terms or entities lead to 
a complex intertwining of- idealism and materialism, ot - continuity and cut, in the 
attempt by cach to sustain itself? Laruelle's conclusion is stark and clear. W 
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"By elevating it [Difference] in a circular fashion to the level where it becomes 
self-producing, that is, to the state of the tvllsa sili ('will to power'), the systems of 
Difference make ideaht\- self-confirming and render any genesis of ideality or its 
forms impossible. From this point of view Nietzsche, Heidegger and all the 
systems of Difference remain incapable of founding a genuinely immanent 
materialism,, a becoming-'material' of thought that is no longer a becoming- 
continuous, or of realising difference as a multiplicity beyond continuity itself" 
(1981 §27,105) 
Laruelle believes it is a transcendental illusion to claim that Difference determines 
the real. His own work attempts to display the presuppositions of philosophical 
thinking and to articulate the principles of non-philosophy, a philosophy of 
radical immanence in which the One is the condition of real critique, that brooks 
no transcendence. This One is the transcendental unreflective experience or 
immediate and non-thetic donation (oo itself. It is singular, autonomous and as 
such before any universal. The One is that which Difference does not recognise, 
while simultaneously requiring it (1986: 33). Laruelle sees the inflexion of 
Deleuze's fold, as is found in the concept of the 'difference of difference' (or 
intensity) in Difference and Repefifion as an instance of transcendence. His own work 
is a kind of 'meta -philosophy, questioning the presuppositions of philosophy and 
asking 'what is philosophy?, while staving off the trap of the philosophical 
decision. 
I agree with Laruelle that one can argue that a philosophical decision in favour of 
difference has been made in the case of Deleuze. However, Deleuze is himself 
aware of the presuppositions that philosophy rests upon in order to function. He 
says that "there is no true beginning in philosophy, or rather that the true 
beginning in philosophy, Difference, is in-itself already Repetition" (1968a: 129). 1 
want to explore this concept of difference that he develops in more detail. 
Indeed, I suggest that Deleuze's philosophy (like that of Spinoza) neither adheres 
to a supplement of the idea or of matter. Deleuze's primarý- concern is with the 
imposition of a particular model of thought that delimits the potentials for 
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thinking in advance. Unlike LarueUe, Deleuze's philosophy alxvays begins in the 
nu*ddle, hiteiwcýý-O: 11- Repetition. \. -,, 
Difference that is alreadN 
A lengthy quote from Brassier synopsises Laruelle's position. "For Laruelle, the 
fact that the univocity of Deleuzean immanence can be purchased only at the 
price of an irrecuperable excess of transcendence is neither an accidental nor an 
inconsistent aspect of Deleuze's thought; - it is a structurally necessary feature of 
all philosophical attempts to conceptualise immanence; one, moreover, that 
ultimately constitutes an invariant feature of the philosophical gesture per se. That 
Deleuze is obliged to think immanence transcendentlv, or to think multiplicity 
under the auspices of an uncircumventable unity, is not a question of 
philosophical inconsistency, Laruelle argues; on the contrary, it merely indicates 
the rigorous consistency of Deleuzean thought insofar as its internal coherence is 
regulated in accordance with the pernicious logic of the philosophical Decision" 
(2000: 207, n. 16). 
It is through the attempt to conceptuahse immanence philosophically that 
philosophical logic becomes circular, presupposing that which it seeks to explain. 
While acknowledging this important criticism, Laruelle's critique operates at a 
formal axiomatic level whereas Deleuze's praclical philosophy is both critical and 
creative; integral to the development of an immanent ethics. To create a 
philosophical approach one must invent a problematic that informs the concepts 
that one develops. In this chapter, I will focus on the problematic of a 'thought 
without image'. 
V. iii. the art of creating concepts 
By the time of writing 11"hat i's Philosopýy? l Deleuze seems more concerned with 
the necessity to be in and to create concepts than with constructing a beginning 1 91 
that eliminates both objective and subjective presuppositions. He and Guattan 
say, "Planes must be constructed and problems posed, Just as concepts must be 
created. Philosophers do the best they can, but they have too much to do to 
kno, \x- \N-hether it is the best, or even to bother with this question. Of course nc\x- 
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concepts must relate to our problems, to our history, and above all, to our 
becomings" (1991a: 27). The 'image of thought' chapter remains important 
because it emphasises the \-alues underlying the image that thought gives itself of 
what it is to think. Deleuze may not succeed in eliminating his own 
presuppositions when he tries to invent a neighbourhood of concepts that might 
be called a 'thought without image', but this is not his primary goal. 
The passages we will read, and the quotations cited, show us that at an earlý- stage 
Deleuze, inspired by Nietzsche, is fired by the prospect of creating concepts, 
concepts that Might prove useful for our time and our becomings. His tone is 
tempered by the time of writing What I's Philosophy?, perhaps because rattler than 
just getting down to the business of 'doing pHosophy', he and Guattari trN, to 
articulate 'what is it we have been doing all our lives? '. 
This contemplation does not negate their previous endeavours to 'do philosophy', 
because what they had been doing all along was nothing other than this "art of 
forming, inventing and fabricating concepts" (1991a: 2). They say that philosophy 
is not reflection, communication or contemplation (6). It is distinguished from 
the other (equally valid) ways of thinking: art which thinks through affects and 
percepts, and science which thinks through functions. Philosophy is not just a 
meaningless, indulgent and frivolous endeavour. However, it has been profoundly 
affected "by the general movement that has replaced Critique with sales 
promotion" (10) and the marketers and advertisers that say, "This is our concern, 
we are the creative ones, we are the ideas men! " (10). These inane rivals give 
philosophy, according to Deleuze and Guattarl, a fit of the giggles which wipes 
away its tears. They say that the (philosophical) concept posits itself as it is 
created. Philosophers are friends of the concept. 
Reading Dý#ýrentv and Repefifion in light of IVY)a/ IS Pbilosopbj? enables us to 
understand why Deleuze criticises what he calls a dogmatic 'image of thought'. 
This image of thought stifles the creation of concepts. However, the philosophers 
that he initially accuses of inventing 'a philosophy of representation' are portrayed 
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as conceptual personae in the latter text. It is subsequently no longer a matter of 
deciding which one invented the best concepts - Hegel and Descartes have totally 
different ideas of what it is to begin - but of seeing how their concepts resonate 
with one another, and transmute depending on the problems they are a part of If 
a concept makes us aware of new variations it may be 'better' than a previous 
one. Concepts can always be reactivated in light of new problems. 
V. iv. restoring the rights of immanence 
But deterritorialization is absolute when the earth passes away into the pure 
immanence of a Being-thought, of a Nature-thought of infinite diagrammatic 
movements. [ ... ] Deterritorialization of such a plane does not preclude 
reterritorialization but posits it as the creation of a future new earth. [ ... ] There 
is always a way in which absolute deterritorialization takes over from a relative 
deterritorialization in a given field. 
Gilles Deleuze and F6hx Guattarl, If"hat is Pbilosoply? (1991 a: 88). 
As Wl'hat 1S Philosqpýy? continues, we perceive that Deleuze has not turned his back 
on immanence. The most difficult problem remains - how to expel 
transcendence? The plane of immanence is the non-thought within thought. They 
surmise "Perhaps this is the supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think 
THE plane of immanence as to show that it is there, unthought in every plane, 
and to think it in this way as the outside and inside of thought [ ... ]- that which 
cannot be thought and yet must be thought the possibility of the impossible" 
(59-60). 
In Book V (ýpr. 23. sch. ) of the Ethit's, Spinoza wrote that we feel and experience 
that we are eternal (sentimits expefimitrque nos aeternos esse). This third kind of 
knowledge has often been presented as the thought of the pure cool geometrician 
whose thought impassively comprehends the nature of God and world. It is as 
though Spinoza sits on a pinnacle and gazes upon the world. Such a reading 
'forgets' the crucial words '-\x-e fiel and e. %pelieli, -e that we are eternal'. This 
'knowledge' is not an abstract theoretical knowledge, but a real experience of a 
prescnt eternity, through which Nve understand things as necessatý- from the point 
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of view of eternity. It is a concrete experience of beatitude irreducible to a statc 
of spatio-temporal actuahný, resembling rather what Deleuze calls the event, and I 
Ruyer names sunvl (an absolute and immanent survev without beginning or end). 
This is why it differs from the other affects for Spinoza. 
propose that Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the plane of immanence as 
absolute deterritorialisation draws close to Spinoza's concept of beatitudo. It is the 
revolutionary liberation of thought and being from the baggage of inadequate 
ideas, from superstition and ignorance. The consciousness ((-onseius) accompanying 
this experience is not a personal consciousness, but is an understanding of oneself 
as a part of nature (pars naturae). Eternity is found on earth and not in the skies. 
We cannot understand without loving. The Joy felt when one operates at one's 
maximum threshold transforms into love. Spinoza's intellectual love of God is a 
love without object and without subject. "This is why it constitutes the perfect 
form of human liberty and happiness" (Macherey, 1994: 152). This joy has 
nothing to do With satisfying a personal and egoistic desire, because it 
"tendencially enlarges the perspective of the mind to the whole of nature" (154). 
In fact, Macherey claims that this love of God (amor Dei) confers upon us the 
feehng of an impersonal dimension existing within us. 
We do not cease to love, but love with a greater intensity because we are 
reconciled with the nature of which we are a part (169). 1 am bound to other 
humans through a network of concrete determinations that expresses the infinite 
power of God. Love of God is not the love of the solitary hermit, but affirms on 
the contrary a solidarity with other humans. For Nfacherey, this constitutes the 
political dimension of the intellectual love of God, a love that comes from a 
tendencially collectivc practice (172). The agonistic relations that accompany the 
machinations of the imagination dissipate relative to this. Even the tendency 
toward umN-ersahsation of the common notions which explain things from a 
gcneral point of N-icw vanish. Here, this is a knowledge of singular tl-ýings (tqnitio 
rel-11PI i-1*11ýglllantpi) through , N-hich Nve are moved (q#itere). We lose our fear of death. 
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An ethics of hberation has thus truly commenced. 
SI pinoza speaks of this programme of action in clinical and diagnostic terms, 
explicating how we need to perfect the corporeal and mental aptitudes of the 
individual. Freedom liberates to the maximum the power of being of a tl-iing 
(186). Virtue (iirtus) is no abstract or theoretical quality, the mark of an ascetic; it 
corresponds to a flourishing expansive movement (a eudaimonia, no longer 
theoretical, and without telos). It is with respect to De Potentia Intellettils, seu de 
Libettate Humana, the last part of the Etbics, that Deleuze and Guattari say Spinoza 
knew that immanence was only immanent to itself They add that he "produced 
movements of the infinite and gave infinite speeds to thought in the third kind of 
knowledge. There he attains incredible speeds, with such lightening compressions 
that one can only speak of music, of tornadoes, of wind and strings" (1991 a: 48). 
In his seminars, Deleuze asks us to imagine Spinoza stroffing around, hving 
existence as a continuous melodic line of variation (24/3/78). This kind of 
existence hovers about the threshold of an absolute deterritorialisation. It awaits 
its creation which always takes place in a relative milieu. The distinction made 
between perceiving things from a global perspective (Natura Naturans) and from a 
partial perspective (Natura Naturata) in chapter 3 is useful here in order to 
elucidate some features pertaining to this distinction of absolute and relative 
deterritorialisation, a theme I will return to at the close of this chapter. 
V. v. the possible of the possible: a revolutionary becoming 
Instead of gambling on the eternal impossibility of the revolution and on the 
fascist return of a war-machine in general, why not think that a new type of 
revolution is in the course of becoming possible, and that all kinds of mutating, 
living machines conduct wars, are combined and trace out a plane of 
consistency which undermines the plane of organization of the World and the 
States. 
Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialovites. (1977: 147) [trans. modified]. 
In 11ý', fs(-as Ctitkal wid Clill/Cal, Deleuze has a piece called 'The Exhausted' on 
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Samuel Beckett (1993: 152--4). Written after the coRapse of the Berlin Wall, this 
essay returns to the theme of the possible, a theme discussed throughout the 
works on Bergson and in other texts such as Dý#ýreiit-e aiid Repefifim. Franýois 
Zourabichvih (1998) has written a very thoughtful commentary on this text. It is 
called 'Deleuze et le possible (de Finvoluntarisme en pohtique),. 
Zourabichvih reflects upon the proliferation of discourses proclairming the death 
of the possible and the reign of the free-market in the aftermath of the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. Thereafter, Fukuyama declared the End of History - in other words, 
the end of major ideological conflicts - and a number of thinkers proclaimed that 
no alternatives to 'liberal- democratic free-market capitalism' could exist. (A 
wealth of single issue movements today sound together to voice a challenge to 
such presumptions. ) Sounding like Hegel many years before, these thinkers were 
unable to see beyond their own horizons so convinced were they that their place 
and era embodied the Idea (of free-market, liberal democratic capitalism) come to 
fruition. Similar to evolutionary theorists of the past, they believed that this 
present would be the future for all societies. Such claustrophobic declarations 
sought to paralyse 'the possibility of things being otherwise'. In Dialques, Deleuze 
had sighed, echoing 1'Cierkegaard 'the possible, the possible, or I will suffocate'. 
Here he says "There is no longer any possible: a relentless (acharne) Spinozism" 
(1993a: 152). In light of the above discourses and Deleuze's own affection for 
SpMoza, Zourabichvih finds in this assertion a hint of sarcasm (1998: 336). 
Whilst Deleuze distinguishes between the exhausted and the tired, he is also 
saying that exhausting the possible is not at all that you think it is. "For Deleuze, 
two apparently opposed discourses coexist: to exhaust the possible/to create the 
possible" (337). Like Bergson, Deleuze contends that you have to create the 
possible; it is not given to you in advance and you do not have it until you have 
created it. This idea of creating the possible is also found in Spinoza. His ethics of 
liberation rests upon creating relations and compositions that do not pre-exist 
their creation. In addition, in 11"hat 1S Philosoph, ),? Deleuze and Guattari reiterate the 
cons tructivist dimension of their philosophy by showing limx- the plane ()f 
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immanence must be constructed. Rather than having a rigid, segmented 'molar' 
mode of existence in which possibilities are laid out in advance, they encourage 
an ethics of experimentation that seeks to explore one's capacities for exist-Ing and 
thinking. 
In this vein of thought, Zourabichvih adds that a revolution is not the reali. falion of 
b nin a possible but the openi*nýg oj' the possi' le (338). This ope ig of the possible is 
elaborated upon by Deleuze and Guattarl: "But the event itself is uncoupled or in 
rupture with causalities: it is a bifurcation, a deviation with respect to the laws, an 
unstable state that opens a new field of possibles" (1984: 75). While for Lacan the 
real is the impossible, for Deleuze and Guattari "within the real everything is 
possible, everything becomes possible" (1972a: 27). They say, "[t]here is only one 
kind of production, the production of the real" (32). How do these assertions sit 
with the Bergsonian critique of the retrospective illusion of the possible, and 
Deleuze's own distinctions between the virtual and the actual (which do not 
resemble one another) and the possible and the real (where the possible resembles 
the real)? 
Asking what this new field of possibles might be, Zourabichvili wonders if it is 
perhaps simply all that can be conceived, imagined, projected and hoped for in a 
given time. He soon demonstrates that this is not the case. When Deleuze 
described a mutation from a 'society of discipline' to a 'society of control' this 
was not, according to Zourabichvih, an opening of a field of possibles but the 
instigation of a new regime of domination. A field of possibles is not a "series of 
real and imaginary alternatives [ ... ] It now concerns the dynamic emergence of the 
new. It is the bergsonian inspiration of Deleuze's political thought" (339). There is 
a difference between a possible that is realised (Deleuze, 1966a: 96-7), and a 
possible that is tTeated. This insight helps to show us why the axiomatics of 
capitalism that constitute a relative deterritorialisation remain a mode of 
domination. Uthough it tolerates (and encourages) the creation of new degrees of 
liberty, this is within strict limits. The emergence of a force that threatened its 
axioms Nvould not be tolerated. Deleuze and Guattari profess that human riglits 
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will not make them bless capitalism; "[-\x-lhat social democracy has not iven the 91 
order to fire when the poor come out of their territory or ghettoý" (1991a: 107). 
The exercise of force and erection of barbed wire barriers to surround delegates 
at the recent W. T. O. conferences are an example of the response to irrecuperable 
differences and singularities. The fact that these singular movements act in 
commonality, whilst eluding a definable representational umbrella that might 
encompass them, makes them unknown quantities. T'he transversal relations that 
unify them embrace both commonality and singularity. 
The distinction between a realised possible and a created possible informs this 
chapter. just as Spinoza sought to open up different possibilities of living, 
Deleuze mobilises this concept of the possible to try to create spaces whereby the 
future can act upon the present. As Zourabichvili remarks, the inventions of new 
possibilities of life concern new ways of being affected. This is a kind of patl)os in 
which the possible is linked to power (puissance) and power concerns a differential 
distribution of affects. 
A political event is a new distribution of affects, "a new circumscription of the 
I. ntolerable". May 1968 expressed a moment of intoleration. It was a collectivc 
phenomenon that took the form "the possible or I will suffocate" as though 
society could not bear its existence any longer and cried out for change" (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1984: 76). But what precipitates this moment? 
In chapter 3,1 explained why Spinoza denies a role to the realisable possible. 
Rather than participating in the immanent movement of reality, this possible adds 
a supplementary dimension to reality. This does not mean, however, that 
Spinoza's system is arid and rigid. In fact, it concentrates upon the ways of 
opening up different modes of existence through an ethics of liberation. It is this 
understanding of the possibihtý- of things being otherwise that drives the Elthl*Cs. It 
does not rest upon a comparative model that measures different modes of 
existence against one another abstractly. Instead, it is necessary to experiment, 
and construct forms of association that cultivate the potentials of indn-iduals. 
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This process is one of becoming-active. 
By grasping the potentialities of an actual situation, we do not dra, \N- up a plan: 
rather, the unactualised dimension of a situation is perceived. "In concrete modes 
of existence, we perceive the possibilities offered to us, like so manv affectivc 
possibilities: these possibilities of life are the ways in which potentialities are 
distributed and condensed, in a given time and social field [ ... ] When, \,, -e grasp a 
situation as a pure possible, or in its potentiality, we evaluate these possibilities of 
life [ ... ]" (Zourabichvili, 1998: 343). This pure space of the possible was discussed 
in connection with Simondon's conception of the pre-individual. This possible is 
the virtual. It is not given in advance. Both Bergson and Spinoza critique the idea 
of a possible that can be realised. Both are interested in the conditions of real 
experimentation. It is this insight I want to follow up on through this chapter. 
The possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the event. It is a question of life. 
The event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity (new relations 
with the body, time, sexuality, milieu, culture, work ... ) When a social mutation 
appears, it is not enough to draw out its consequences and effects, following 
lines of economic and political causality. The society must be capable of 
forming collective assemblages that correspond to the new subjectivity, in such 
a way that it wants the mutation. That is a true 'reconversion' 
Gilles Deleuze and F61ix Guattarl, 'Mal 68 n'a pas eu heu'. Les Nouvelles, 
(3-9 mal 1984: 76). 
ypossi e', Zourabichvih ar es that part In a section headed 'C&, hýs, orpolilit's as onl N gu 
of this pro'ect must be to be done with chch6s. "Everything we see, say, live, even I 
imagine and feel, is always already recognised, carrying M advance the mark of 
recognition, the form of 'd6jA-vu' or 'd6JA-entendu"' (351). It is as though nothing 
is new, everyd-ling stays the same, nothing ever happens. The chch6, like the 
possible, is pre-existent. Zourabichvih returns to Kant to take issue with this 
conception of the possible. He claims that the transcendental is pre-formed since 
it maps out the conditions of possible experience, not real experience. BN- tracing 
the transcendental from the field of the empirical, noveltý- is eN-acuated from the 
field of thought. A real experience is an encounter that forces us to think that 
which cannot be thought. 
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V. vi. doxology and the State 
In our thought the essential feature is fitting new material into old schemas 
... ] making equal what is new. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Tbe If-illlo Pomer. (1901: ýý499,2773). 
The entire apparatus of knowledge is an apparatus for abstraction and 
simplification - directed not at knowledge but at taking possession of things [ ... ] 
Friedrich Nietzsche, TI)e Villto Power. (1901: 'ýý503,274). 
At the heart of Deleuze's critique of the image of thought hes a concept of the 
disparate. Deleuze's conception of a philosophy of immanence centres upon the 
immanence qf immanence rather than an immanence to something. By developing 
a philosophical account of univocity as the differences oj'differences, Deleuze 
seeks to hold out both an allegiance to a philosophy of immanence and a 
conception of a system that persists in a state of tension, a tension that is not 
impelled by any force exterior to the system. While Badiou finds a force of 
transformation and rupture in the stellar void, Deleuze's alterity is embedded within 
the system. For this reason Laruelle is correct when he observes that this 
conception of the real is both as 'all' and 'other'. However, Laruelle accuses 
Deleuze of being a philosophical idealist because of his development of a 
philosophy of force. Reading Deleuze with Spinoza and SiMondon, I challenge 
this assessment, showing how these thinkers sidestep this dualism. 
Rather than figuring out if an idea is Just or correct Vilste), Deleuze and Parnet sa\- 
we should look for a different idea so that something passes between the tx() 
(1977: 10). This is the encounter of thinking that takes one by surprise, opening 
new worlds. Philosophy has its own apparatuses of power, dictating how one 
thinks, what one can think, and whom one has to have read in order to be able to 
think. The State-form has provided a model for thought (13). "The cxercisc of 
thought thus conforms to the goals of the real State, to the dominant meanings 
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and to the requirements of the estabhshed order" (13). This contention informs 
the conception of the 'iMage of thought' developed in Dý#ýrol,, e aiid Repefilim. 
Deleuze and Guattari say if thought is not taken seriously and it is laughed at, this 
is all that is required. "Because the less people take thought serioush-, the more 
they think in conformity with what the State wants" (1980: 376). The destruction 
of a model of thought and the unleashing of other forces of thinking is the 
enterprise Deleuze undertakes in Difference and Repetition. The classical image of 
thought effects a striation of the mental space and it "aspires to universality" 
(379). A nomad thought challenges this image and refuses to be bound by it. 
Opinions or doxa shape what thinking is supposed to be. Differences are captured 
and contained through strategies of mediation. In chapter 3,1 outlined the 
primary points concerning the unlVocity of being. In his admiring reviews of The 
Lqgk of Sense and Dýfferente and Repefilion, Foucault surmises that "[t]he univocitý- of 
being, its singleness of expression, is paradoxically the principle condition -\'A-1ich 
permits difference to escape the dorrunation of identity, which frees it ftom the 
law of the Same as a simple opposition within conceptual elements" (1970: 192). 
Difference is not organised and divided through the categories. 
As we learned in the last chapter, from his 1956 essay on Bergson Deleuze tried 
to communicate the pressing need to develop a concept of difference-in-itself. He 
clarifies the impetus for this in Diffireme and Repetition by distinguishing between 
empirical difference and a concept that allows us to think difference. Arguing that 
difference is always subordinated to identity, analogy, opposition or resemblance, 
he concludes that these are features of a representationalist philosophy. For 
example, Aristotelian difference can only be thought through the principle of the 
excluded middle term. Deleuze says that specific difference is pure because it is 
formal; intrinsic because it operates in the essence; and qualitative to the c-xtent 
that the genus designates essence. Difference is thus synthetic; a specification 
added to a genus, chviding the genus and producing species. It is a formal cause. 
Since Aristotle's concept of being is distributive and hierarchical, lacking aný 
18") 
M-\DIC E\L-ýGE OFTHOUGHT -ý No, ý 
content, it chffers greatly from Spinoza's conception of univocal being. 
The classification and division of difference is not just a matter for arch- 
taxonomists like Linnaeus. The ordering and subordination of differences to 
general concepts is, undeniably, an everyday occurrence. The question of what 
makes a difference is often replied to in a comparative or negative fashion that 
indicates the 'difference -from' a previous state or another thing. A natural order 
appears to operate as we collate and categorise differences. Spinoza writes rather 
vitriolically of the way that people extrapolate from a distinctivc trait, creating a 
morass of superstition and ignorance. Indeed he eyes the usage of the generalising 
concept With some suspicion, understanding its utility as an abstract fiction and 
focal point for common imaginings, but wary of the insidious prejudices which 
can divide and destroy communities. 
When Spinoza discussed the mechanisms of the imagination, he described the 
ways in which we fit things into categories according to principles of recognition 
and association. This depends on the ways in which our bodies are affected by 
other bodies, and the images formed reflect the nature and dispositions of our 
own bodies rather than the nature of other bodies. Though we may collectively 
cluster images into similar categories for the sake of convemience, often the 
images evoked are very different and depend on our own experiences. Spinoza 
tries to encourage a capacity to think differentially rather than through empty 
generahsing, and stereotypes and prejudices. 
Michel Foucault famously began The Order oj'Tbznýgs with a poetic and hilarious 
quote from Borges's Via7'olies (1944). Borges describes the categorisation of 
animals in a certain Chinese encyclopaedia. In the passage that follows animals 
are divided into categories that tumble over one another from "a) belongilig to 
the Emperor" to "b) embalmed" to "k) drawn with a vety fine camelhair brush" 
to "m) having just broken the water pitcher" (Foucault, 1966: xv). The disturbing 
oddness of the juxtapositions reveals the dissolution of a common ground whei-C 
all these fantastical and real creatures might meet. No taming of these animals is 
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pernutted as they "threaten with collapse our age-old distinction bemeen the 
Same and the Other" (xv). The wildness of their being overspills any classification 
within a common ground or excluded middle. Borges "does a,, vay with thesile, the 
mute ground upon which it is possible for entities to be juxtaposed" (xvii). For 
Foucault these unravelled sites are called beterotopi'as "since they make it 
impossible to name this and that (xviii). Through what image of thought are 
things ordered? 
V. vii. the State versus the nomad: counterposing multiplicities 
On a superficial level at least, the distinction between the image of thought laid 
out in Different-e and Repetition and the idea of a new image of thought or a thought 
without image, runs parallel to the distinction of the two multiplicities, metrical 
and virtual. Reading A Tbousand Plateaus with Dorent'e and Repetition the recurrence 
of this theme is striking. Throughout Dorent-e and Repetition, Deleuze opposes a 
nomos of crowned anarchy to a representational identitarian image of thought. 
Similarly, in a more politicised environment, this duality occurs in 1227: TI)e 
Treatise on NomadolqV - The WlarMacbine. 
Spinoza's immanent philosophy countered the hierarchical Power of the State 
with the power of the tiomos. The State or polis divides up space, it segments, 
classifies and groups people and things and for this reason it is called an apparatus 
of capture, while the nomos is a distributive power since it distributes people in an 
open space. They can leap up anywhere. This strategy has been adopted ])ý- a 
number of intensively decentralised protest movements who use the element of 
surprise when mobilising resistance. The resonance of a number of singular 
groups creates an acephalous movement; one the polis finds both difficult to 
control and intensely threatening. 
TWO tVJ-)CS of space isomorphic -with the t-\N-o multiplicities (metrical and virtual) 
are discussed in this plateau. These are the smooth space of the tionios and the 
striated space of the State. In Proposition III of the plateau, Deleuze and Guattan 
seek to distinguish between a royal science, that \x-()rks through a hylomorpliic 
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model "u-nplying both a form that organises matter and matter prepared for the 
form (1980: 369), from a nomad science. A royal science copics government 
seeking to divide and organise its populace or matter. It homogenises matter in 
order to treat it. Converselv, a nomad science is laden vvith singularities ind 
presupposes another organisation of the social field. 
These models of science are named in the fashion of Plato's Titv(ielts. The first is 
called a Comparsll and the second is called a Dispars. The first involves extracting 
constants in order to form laws. The second places variables in continuous 
variation. Unlike the earlier matter-form distinction this is a matter-force 
distinction. "They seize or determine singularities in the matter instead of 
constituting a general form" (369). Such is the opposition of Igos and iiomos. The 
distinction relates to the treatment of the play of forces. 
In the first case, there is a treatment of forces or potenliae so that the space is 
striated, ordered, homogenised and made comparable. This kind of multiplicity is 
called metric, or arborescent, since it imposes its laws and dimensions 
indifferently regarcUess of the situation. The nomos or the dispars does not 
succumb to a Euclidean space; it is a hodological or haptic space. "A field, a 
heterogeneous smooth space, is wedded to a ven- particular type of multiphcm,: 
nonmetric, acentered, rhizomatic multiphc1ties that occupy space without 
44counting" it [ ... ]" (371). This is a search for the singularities of a matter. It is 
concerned with the pre-individual or the event of non-personal individuations. 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that these spaces or multiplicities operate as 
intelligence and intuition do in Bergson, since intelligence employs a (metrically) 
spatiahsed method to "solve formally the problems posed by intuition (37/4). 
1 1()'\vcver, flicy also ask whether thought can be extricated from the State niodcl. 
Rather than being gathered into an interior form, can thought become a sling- 
shot? 
79 See Deleuze (1968a: 161-2) for a discussion on the \\aý that Euclid kept geometrY in line 
with the principle of identit\, preventing it from becoming a geometrN of sufficient reason. 
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Does the immanent axiomatic of capitalism imply that the concept of the 'image 
of thought', premised as it is upon the State-form, is obsoleteý At the beginning 
of Dialoýgues, Deleuze discusses the relationship of philosophy and Power. He 
argues that "thought borrows its properly philosophical image from the state as 
beautiful, substantial or subjective interiority" (1977: 13). The goal of beconuing 
an official language of a Pure State means that philosophy adheres to the 
established order. (This is Nietzsche's criticism of Kant. ) There are mechanisms 
of exclusion to ensure that certain criteria are fulfilled conforming to the agreed 
procedures of how to have correct ideas. An example of this has been the 
imposition of an official language of the State that operates on a 'higher register' 
than all the dialects and minor languages scattered throughout a society. It is this 
image that philosophy has set up for itself, which in turn prevents it from 
functioning, that Deleuze takes issue with. For him, it is a question of breaking 
ftee from the repressive role of philosophy in order to invent his own approach. 
So what matters with the image of thought is not whether the comparison with 
the State-form is legitimate, or whether there is a new image of thought 
accompanying the axiomatics of capitalism, but the ways in which thinking is 
delimited and we are forced (or succumb) to thinking in accordance with a 
particular model. How is thought delineated, striated and deHmited? At stake is 
not an omniscient subject that would know everything but rather a Ný, -ay of 
thinking about thought differently or differentially. Thinking in accordance with 
recognIsed principles precludes this other thought (without image). 
V. viii. the idiot 
The image of thought imposes a model of thinking correctly that demands 
obedience. This reference is to Kant's philosophy of le islation. "When v. -C stop 91 
obeying God, the State, our parents, reason appears and persuades us to continue 
being docile because it says to us: it is y()u who are giving the orders" (I)eleuze 
1962: 92). Otherwise y()u are deranged or stupid: "the terrible Trinity of madness, 
stupidity and malevolence (1968a: 149) - those obstacles wher than error 
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than the dogmatic image must overcome. How can one then articulate a non- 
conformist thought? How can one deny the patently obvious? "[H]ow is s-tupiditý 
(not error) possibleý" (151). The new idiot, saý- Deleuze and Guattarl, is a 
conceptual persona who, unlike the old idiot, no longer strives for indubitable 
truths. It is a thought that thinks against reason. "The new idiot will never accept 
the truths of history" (1991a: 63). 1 am no longer myself I is an Other. This is 
thought as the dice-throw. 
But in reality, we encounter the tyranny of good-will, the obligation to think "in 
common" with others, the domination of the pedagogical model, and most 
importantly, the exclusion of stupidity - the disreputable morality of thought 
whose function in our society is easy to decipher. We must liberate ourselves 
from these constraints; and in perverting this morality, philosophy itself is 
disoriented. 
Nfichel Foucault, 'Theatrum Philosophicum'. (1970.18 1). 
Deleuze begins his chapter 'The Image of Thought' with a question on beginning. 
He says "Where to begin in philosophy has always - rightly - been regarded as a 
very delicate problem, for beginning means eliminating all presuppositions" 
(1968a: 129). Although philosophers may strive to eliminate objective 
presuppositions, a series of subjective implicit presuppositions shapes their 
philosophy. 110 Deleuze gives the example of Descartes' second meditation: 
Descartes did not want to define man as a rational animal since this presupposed 
the concepts of rationality and animality (129). In this way he could avoid 
defining humans through genera and specific differences. However Descartes's 
thought is laden with other presuppositions, that derive from opinion - "it is 
presumed that evetyonc knows, independently of concepts, what is meant by self, 
thinking, and being" (129). What appears to be a true beginning rests on 
presuppositions wrested from the empirical. Rather than trying to figure out what 
a true beginning might be, Deleuze takes a different trajectory, and this is \ý-hat 
most interests us. He asks what a subjective or implicit presuppositioti is, 
80 See also It'lica is Philosol)hY9, especially chapters 2 and 3) for this discussion of Descartes' 
challenge to objective presuppositions and his correlatiNe subjective presuppositions as he 
assurnes that e\ er\ one knows \\ hat thinking, being and 1. mean. 
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concluding that it comes under the surreptitious form of "Evcn-bodv knows 
That hint of sarcasm Zourabichvili spoke of earlier disparaged the presumption 
that the possible can no longer be created. Bý- making thinking function under the 
rule of the 'obvious' - "everybody knows what it means to think and to be" (130) 
- thought is imprisoned in a conservative world where the status quo is affirmed 
as a natural order, and differential thought is severed in advance. This is thought 
as opinion. And the consequences of this image of thought are pervasive and 
political. "Many people have an interest in sa ing that everybody knows 'this', that Yi 
everybody recogn1ses this, or that nobody can deny that. They triumph easilý- so 
long as no surly interlocutor appears to reply that he does not wish to be 
represented, and that he denies or does not recognise those who speak in his 
narne" (131). When Spivak criticised Deleuze for conflating I 'orstelllltýg and 
Darstellun she did not grasp the ed-tico-political undercurrent of Deleuze's 
critique of representation which hes precisely in critiquing all forms of mediation 
that deny or assimilate difference. 
Thought is paralysed if everything is set out in advance. Spinoza's quest for 
knowledge was kept a relative secret because he knew he would not last long if he 
was found to have thought 'differently', by questioning common sense. The most 
general form of representation is common sense, argues Deleuze, and this is 
understood as an "upright nature and good will" (131). A morality underlies the 
image of what it is to think. Thinking is presented as a quest for truth. Of course, 
Spinoza searched for true knowledge, but for him there was no model of what it 
is to think. The Etbics constituted a process of liberation of the activities of 
thinking and em-sting. 
Be yourselves - it being understood that this self must be that of others. As if we 
would not remain slaves so long as we do not control the problems themselves, 
so long as we do not possess a right to the problems, to a participation in and 
management of the problems. 
Gilles Deleuze, Dýl -ence and Repelition. (I 968a: 158). 
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If 'e%-erybody knows... ' and 'no-one can dený----' are utilised as weapons against 
critical thinking, what happens to that person who does not know or recognise 
the universality of the premises of what it is to think and to be? This is whN- 
subjective presuppositions are such an insidious method of oppression: by 
contending that a thought is free of objective presuppositions, it appears 
transparent, obvious and universal. This is how philosophy can claim to begin 
without presuppositions. What if one thinks other than what 'e-, -erybody knows'ý 
You used to be burned to death for it, now you can be detained or imprisoned, 
dismissed as insane or an agitator. By implicitly knowing what it means to think, 
one can mark out those who are not thinking and label them stupid, cN-il or mad. 
If through ill will a person does not know what eN-erý-body knows, this indiN-idual 
"is without presuppositions. Only such an individual effectiN-ely begins and 
effectively repeats" (130). 
A series of postulates, that is, implicit and pre-philosophical propositions, 
underscore philosophical thinking. These are borrowed from common sense. The 
image of common sense claims that "thought has an affinity with the true; it 
formally possesses the true and materially wants the true" (131). In accordance 
with this image everybody 'knows' what it is to think. Deleuze calls this image of 
thought a "dogmatic, orthodox or moral image" (131). A philosophy without 
presuppositions would embark on a radical critique of this image of thought and 
the postulates it relies upon. Thought could only begin to think if liberated from 
this image and its postulates. Truth is produced. It is not just a case of 
designation. Thought has been conflated with recogn1tion. Indeed people seldom 
think, except when forced to through a shock. Thought is a shock (echoing the 
disjunction of the faculties that occurs in the K'antian sublime"). 
Uthough Kant nught have overturned the prevaihng image of thought bý 
substituting, as he did, the concept of illusion for that of error, ultimately he did 
not renounce the presuppositions of kno,, vledge, morahtv, faith and so forth. 
81 This is discussed in Cinenta ?- The Fitne-Image. See also Deleuze"s discussion of the 
dissolution of the faculties (I 968a: 143) and his book on Kant. 
190 
A\O'\L-ýDIC 1--\L-ýGE OF THOUGHT 
Deleuze concludes consequently that "Critique has even-thing -a tribunal of 
justices of the peace, a registration room, a register - except the poN,, -cr of a new 
politics which would overturn the image of thought" (137). 112 
Deleuze's battle is with an image of thought that remains upright as it follows a 
model of recognition. He complains, "[s]uch an orientation is a hindrance to 
philosophy. The supposed three levels -a naturally upright thought, an in 
principle natural common sense, and a transcendental model of recognition - can 
constitute only an ideal orthodoxy" (134). This is the figure of the Ur-do. %-a. 
Thought for Deleuze is not about recognition, or rediscovering that which N,, -as 
latent. The image of that thought gives itself of what it is to think has been 
extrapolated from the most banal of empirical facts, Recognition. Even Kant's 
philosophy rests upon a psychologism which he tried to disguise (135). 
The intimate link between recognition and established values was condemned bN- 
Nietzsche in 'Schopenhauer as Educator'. One of the primarýl problems with the 
image of thought is that it is chsturbingly complacent. Nietzsche remarks 
vitriohcally that Truth may seem then to be "a more modest being from which no 
disorder and nothing extraordinary is to be feared: a self-contented and happy 
creature which is continually assuring the powers-that-be that no one needs to be 
in the least concerned on its account; for it is, after all, onlýý "pure knowledge.... 
(Nietzsche quoted in Deleuze 1968a: 135). The image of thought affirms 
established values rather than creating new values. The new is called difference: it 
springs from a terra in(, q , gnita- 
In Nieljýs-ýJ)e eiiid Philosophj, Deleuze states that the only form of critique is 'to 
phflosophise, %vith a han-imer'. Kant was, according to him, the first philosopher to 
engage in a total, positive and i-mmanent critique. However "[tihere has never 
been a more conciliatory or respectful total critique" (1962: 89). By only 
82 It is not Nvithin the scope of this thesis to assess the extent to NNhich Deleuze's critique of 
the model of recognition is a criticism of both Cartesian philosoph". especial1% the Second 
Meditation, and the Kantian harmonious exercise of the faculties, or to eNaluate the 
legitlrnacý of such a critique. 
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challenging t-laims to knowledge and truth, the values of knowledge and truth 
function unimpaired. Believing in that which it is criticising, this critique is- 
critique as justification. Consequently Deleuze (quoting Nietzsche) asks: "Is this 
the announcement of the great politics? " (90). 
Rather than measuring, judging and equalising life, thought must become the 
affirmative power of an active life, just as life would be the active force of 
thought (101). If knowledge legislates, thought becomes subjected to it. Instead 
Deleuze, with Nietzsche and Spinoza, calls for a thought that goes to the limits of 
what it can do. "Thinking would then mean discovefiq, ihmifiq, nmpossibilifies q1 
hfý' (101). Summarising the dogmatic image of thought, Deleuze says: we are told 
the thinker wants and loves truth, and thought, as thought, formally possesscs 
truth; we are diverted from the truth because of passions like the body and 
sensuous interests; thinking truthfully is a method through which we ward off 
error (103). Truth is presented in abstraction apart ftom the real forces that 
engender thought. But thought is an actlNlt-\,, an activity that can be controlled by 
reactive forces that remain external to it. Hence, the established order and current 
values reign with impunity. 
Truth, as we learned through Spinoza, must be evaluated in terms of a pluralist 
typology of modes of existence. We must ask 'what use is philosophyý'. It may 
critique dominant mý-stifications, however if it does not challenge its own image 
of thought, and if it does not act against its time, what can its critical task be? 
Nietzsche and Deleuze say that philosophy is the Untimely. I refer the reader to 
the notion of conatus in Spinoza's thought, a concept I explained in detail earlier. 
This concept demonstrates the way that thought is an activin-, and never simph, 
the exercise of a natural facultý-. Nietzsche's thought is a thought that is 
unequalisable: diapbora. It is a thought of difference and the disparate. "Truth 
depends on an encounter with something -\k-hich forces us to think, and to seek 
the truth" (1964: 16). 
Difference is crucified on the altar of the Samc once it "betomes (m oý)Iecl ol 
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representation alivajs in relation to a twit, eired identity, a jud ed analo, ed ,g 'D all IMI(olli 
opposi . /Z . oil or a perrei . Ped similitude" (138) It is alxvays mediated through recognition, 
distribution (rýpartifion), reproduction and resemblance (138). SIMondon's 
philosophy of the pre-individual sought to challenge these presuppositions by 
developing another kind of thought and another kind of ethics. The postulate of 
recognition leads us to the predominance of a representational image of thought. 
Once an empirical figure is elevated to the status of the transcendental this is "at 
the risk of alloNVing the real structures of the transcendental to fall into the 
empirical" (154). Under the essential forms of representation the image is 
hierarchalised. The imperatives of this kind of image are: compare, calculate, 
identify. 
V. ix. an encounter with Proust 
Deleuze's short monograph on Proust and Si , gns 
is ostensibly a commentary on A 
la Re6ýherrhe du Temps Perdit. Yet lurking in the pages of this book is the genesis of a 
new image of thought. Like C. S. Peirce, Proust proliferated a senuiotics of signs. " 
I want to concentrate on one particular aspect of the sign that shines through this 
text; the sign as disparate. This is an idea we are now familiar with. lnvoluntarý- 
memory is, for Deleuze, an example of a sign. It does not represent anything but 
is instead something which is and coexists with the present. Bergson called this 
memory the 'virtual', and Deleuze quotes Proust to explain it, "Real without 
being present, ideal Without being abstract" (1964: 57). With involuntary memorý 
we place ourselves immediately (without the mediation of representation) in the 
past. Involuntary memory (as in Zourabichvili's examples) is effectuated through 
a shock or an encounter: that is, a sign. 
The unstable opposition and qualitative transition that occurs in an encounter is 
the figure of a becoming-other. Proust's Nvork consists in establis, 11,11(. 1, transversals 
that leap from one -world to another without gathering the multiple into a unified 
wliole, bv affirmino, at once the unity of the multiphcltN' In all its fragyn-ients (11-2). 
8-' Deleuze discusses these in great detail in his t\\o cinerna books. 
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A sign is a fragment that is a power of nonconu-nUnication and 
incommensurability. It is the forcc of the unequal. Noncommunication and 
incommensurability are distances, but they are distances that are affirmed. "Time 
is precisely the transversal of all possible spaces, including the space of time" 
(115). It circumvents the whole. 
This idea of transversality allows the affirmation of distance in heterogeneitV. 
Rather than effecting a unifying operation, viewpoints communicate but "remain 
noncommunicating according to their own dimension" (149). The bumblebee is a 
profane transversal creature that causes "partitioned sexes to communicatc" 
(149). Difference is no longer suppressed with this idea of transversality, and the 
distance of unnatural couplings is affirmed. This understanding of the 
'disparateness' and distance of differences allows difference to be grasped as 
difference. 
V. x. swimming and thinking 
Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of 
recognition but of a fundamental encounter. 
Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. (1 968a: 139). 
Often when a speaker poses a problem, she already has the answer. Similarly an 
objection raised seeks to elicit a desired (and agreeable) response on the part of 
the thinker. Indeed Deleuze thinks that discussions never go any-, k-here because 
everyone is always talking about different things trying to reconcile others to their 
views. It was for this reason he was acutely warý- of discussions. "Questions al-C 
invented, like anything else. If you aren't allowed to invent ý-our questions \\-itli 
elements from all over the place, from never mind where, if people '1)()sc' them to 
VOU) VOU havcii't much to say" (Deleuze and Parnet, 19, -,: 1). Indeed strong 
advice is found in his assertion that "Fxciý- pl-fflosopher runs awaý- ', \-Ilcn lie or 
she hears someone say "Let's discuss this" " (I)eleuze and Guattarl, 199 1 a: 18'). 
The act of interrogation relies on both good sciise and commoii sciisc. 
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Problems need to be invented-, they do not exist ready-made. A problem is not 
just traced from a proposition. In IFI)at 1'S Pbilosophy, -, Deleuze and Guattari 
underline that propositions always refer to a state of affairs, i. e. they are 
referential. "The reallN 7 great problems are posed only once they are so Ived" 
(1968a: 159). The disparity that the problematic encapsulatcs is an immanent 
disparity engendered by the tension of material conditions. Bergson's question 
was always how do we invent good problems and distinguish true problems from 
those that are peripheral and insignificant: for example, 'whNý is there something 
rather than nothingý184 
While crediting Kant With inventing the problematic of the Idea, Deleuze 
maintains that the Kantian critique did not escape from the dogmatic image of 
thought (161). Ideas or problems are the differential elements in thought. The 
example Deleuze gives of this is swimming. Taking the Leibnlzlan description of 
the idea of the sea, Deleuze explains that it is "a system of liaisons or differential 
relations between particulars and singularities corresponding to the degrees of 
\-anation among these relations (165). To learn to swim MN-oh-cs conjugating 
"the distinctive points of our bodies with the singular points of the objective Idea 
in order to form a problematic field" (165). This is why Deleuze says that learning 
takes place in and through the unconscious. 
Let us recall the example of swimming presented in chapter 3. Deleuze, this time 
speaking about Spinoza, suggested that swimming was the art of composition of 
relations. It involves a graduated and continuous alteration of the relations of 
one's body with those of the waves. This differential field is a problematic 
because there is a disparity, eN-erything is not, nothing staN-s still. It is a turbulent 
'model' of continuous disequilibrium, or a continuity of the discontinuous. \()t 
only is the individual a sct of differential relations, but the indwidual enters into 
different sets of differential relations that are transformed by the threshold points 
of pre-individual sinoarities. 
84 Deleuze discusses this in his first chapter of Bci-gsotiism ( 1966a). 
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Similarlv, "[,, v]e never know in advance how someone x-vil-l learn: by means of 
what love someone becomes good at Latin, what encounters make them a 
philosopher, or in what dictionaries theNT learn to think" (165). We learn through 
signs; not through copying someone else doing something, but through a 
heterogeneity of relation (1964: 22). This art of experimentation does not discoivr 
but invents the potentials of the body and mind. However, if individuals arc 
prevented by rigid pedago ical models or strict disciplinary apparatuses from even 91 
beginning this venture, thought slides back into a ruminating model of 
recognition, something between Bergson's cows and a memorý T operating through 
recognition. Our Conclusion wil-l investigate another processual subjectivity that 
is not captured by these models. 
In some ways Deleuze's work could be read as a radicalisation of the Aristotelian 
concept of pbronesi's, an improvisational, practical knowledge required in situations 
like sea-faring where chance could not be eliminated or mastered. Tet-hlie, the 
name for the other practical knowledge that Aristotle discusses, is concerned with 
mastery and domination, while phronesis is concerned with "sensitivity and 
attunement" (Dunne, 1993: 256). Detienne and Vernant, according to Joseph 
Dunne, develop this theme of cunning intelligence or metis in their work, arguing 
that "this whole field of intelligence was systematically suppressed in the official 
picture of the Greek mind which was painted by philosophers [ ... ]" (257). Because 
of the heterogeneity of materials and circumstances at play these do not fall under 
any techne or set of percepts (259) and indeed no systematic body of knowledge 
can encompass them. These instances are not bound by general rules. It is in this 
way that phronesis can be likened to a praxis in other words, "a kind of activjty 
whose end is not outside it" (262). 85With phronesis there is no split bem-ccil its 
'possession' and its capplication'. It is because phronesis does not refer to an end 
external to itself, and its (good) action is its end, that the immanent ethics that 
85 Unfortunately it is not within the scope of this thesis to explore in more detail tile links 
between these ideas of phronesis and praxis and Deleuze's own *thought without image*. I 
refer the reader to Joseph Dunne's excellent book Back to the Rough GI-olold for a 
discussion of these ideas that is both scholarl-, and thought provoking. Dunne does not. 
lio\\ e\ er, suggest the connections I am making. 
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SI. pinoza sets forth may be seen to echo with it. Reading Simondon's critique of 
hylomorphism and atomism in the context of Deleuze's image of thought helps- 
to clarify this position. This brief discussion of phronesis as a knowledge that 
modulates in accordance with the situation helps us to understand one instance, 
in Aristotle, of a 'thought without Image'. 
: 'gns, Deleuze called the model of reco In Proust and S' gntion an 'objectivism', 
suggesting that this tendency is natural, or at least habitual (1964: 26). He saN-s, 
"We recogi-11'se things, but we never know them" (26). The art of experimentation 
that explores encounters falls prey to the easy facility of recognitions - it is easier 
to respond through chch6. 'Objectivism' operates by grouping tendencies 
together, and it also relies on voluntary memory that "recalls things and not 
signs" (28). Voluntary memory is a reconstitution of a present past. It is "relatiNc 
to the present which it has been, but also to the present with regard to which it is 
now past" (56). Voluntary memory is a mediated memory proceeding through 
snapshots. These ideas resemble Bergson's and Nietzsche's idea of intelligence as 
an operation which strives to possess and control things. Through intelligence 
"we discover only what we have given ourselves, we derive from things only 
that wl-iich we have alread)T put there" (1964: 94). It verifies our prejudices. On 
the other hand, a sign is pre-objective and pre-subjective. 
The something that gives rise to thought is "the being of the sensible. It is not the 
given but that by which the given is given" (1968a: 140). It is imperceptible, 
eluding the grasp of recognition and the operations of natural perception. This 
sensibility which can only be sensed is found at its limit, and this engenders a 
problem. Thinking is out of Joint. 
Plato's Repblit- distingw*shed between that which is an encounter, and that , vhich 
is recognised. Deleuze runs through a series of examples. Certain obicas, such as 
a finger, can be identified, and recognised. Ho-wever, at what stage is solilcom- 
bald, or when does something turn from hot to cold? It seems to me that the 
genesis of Deleuze's complex concept of becoming is found in seedling foriii 
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here. Becoming is a coexistence of contraries, it is not delimited but "the 
coexistence of more and less M an unh ted qualita i mi tive becoming" (141). 
Something soft is harder than something softer. Recognition tries to contain this 
4mad becoming' by measuring and limiting its quahtý-, relating it to something else 
(141). 
Nonetheless, Deleuze questions whether this qualitative becoming is less a being 
of the sensible than simply a sensible becoming. He also doubts that 
reminiscence, something enveloped in the object (You are the image of .. ) could 
be the object of a true encounter. Finally, the instance of a pure thought that can 
only be thought is also criticised. The form of real Identity or the Same informs 
this thought of 'Smallness that is nothing but small' and so on (142). In this Nx-aý, 
Plato paved the way for philosophies of representation and the dogmatic image 
of thought. 
This being qj'the sensible or that by which the i en is iven is intensity, or pure giv 1 bOl 
difference in itself This is a difference that is not subordinate to the demands of 
opposition, resemblance, identity and analogy, which remain only effects 
produced by this difference. CommunIcation is not then geared toward common 
sense and consensus but towards a communication of disparates, or differences 
of differences, effected through a 'dark precursor', or what Simondon called a 
crystalline germ. Antonin Artaud is given here as an example of an attempt to 
think somelIVIlgo, rather than striving to orient thought in accordance with a model. 
"He knows that thinking is not innate, but must be engendered in thought. He 
knows that the problem is riot to direct or methodically apply a thought wl-Lich 
pre-exists in principle and in nature, but to bring into being that which does not 
yet exist [ ... ] To think is to create - there is no other creation - 
but to create is first 
of all to engender 'thinking'in thought" (147). 
Nietzsche told us that concepts do not fall ftom the sky, purified arid polished 
The idea that phflosophy is the creation of concepts is, as wc havc seen, one of 
the main themes of 11"kil is Pbilosqpbyý In chapters 3 and 4 we learned ()f 
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Spinoza's m-imanent ethics and Simondon's conception of transduction, both 
attempts to create new, more adequate, vvavs of thinking and acting. DeIcLizc's 
critique of a dogmatic image of thought is another attempt to open up other 
possibilities of thinking and existing. Breaking with a model of recognition is 
more than a philosophical problem because the image of thought dictates what 
can be thought (at ai en time and place). By bolstering the set of values giv 
associated with the statits quo the image of thought has ramifications beyond 
immediate philosophical concerns. 
Remember how Tully critiques the main constitutional traditions for their 
conservatism, and their refusal to even think about inventing another 
constitutionalism that would no longer assimilate difference, and diversity and 
quell dissensus. Imagining possibilities is too often a simple extrapolation from 
the conditions of the present, constituting a supplement to that present through a 
retrospective illusion of what might have been (had things been otherwise). 
Creating the possible is, for Deleuze, gathering the forces of the unforeseeable 
future by opening up the possibility of things being otherwise. This is an ethics 
of the pre-individual. 
In IF"I)w I'S Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattan call the plane of immanence the 
image of thought. They say, "What thought claims bý- right, what it selects, is 
infinite movement or the movement of the infinite" (37). However, 
understandings of what is due to thought by right have vaned greatlý-. The plane 
of inunanence is pre-philosophical because concepts refer to a non-conceptual 
understanding. These are the internal conditions of philosophy since philosophý 
does not exist outside them (41). Creating concepts and constructing a plane of 
immanence is always an experimentation. 
It is vvith Sartre's impersonal transcendental field that the rights of immanciice, an 
immanence that is no longer an immanence to something or a Subject to which a 
field of immanence is attributed, are restored. This idea of an impei-ý()nal 
transcendcntal field crops up initial-ly in The L, ýgit, ql, S'ense and recurs in hillmiliellic: 
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a L#L. (Deleuze's last piece of writing). The idea that immanence is no longer 
immanent to something was one that Deleuze found intriguing, combining as it 
did with his theses on ufnvocity. This field is, as , -ý-c sa\,, - in the last chapter, both 
pre-sub'ect and pre-ob'ect. It is pre-individual. He thinks it is a radical empiricis'ni 
since it presents only events. According to Deleuze and Guattarl, only one 
philosopher has understood that immanence is only immanent to itself. Spinoza 
(48). 
Because Spinoza did not compromise with transcendence, Deleuze and Guattan 
call him the prince of philosophers saying, "[h]e discovered freedom exists only 
within immanence" (1991: 48). Our path is constantly beset by obstacles 
preventing us from understanding this. Maybe our propensity to simphý T reality 
and follow dom-inant opinions thwarts this enterprise. Or maybe this thought is 
simply intolerable. They suggest that there are an (infirnte) number of illusions 
that prevent us from grasping this difficult thought. Four of these illusions are 
named; we came across three of them in the last chapter on Spinoza. These are; 
the illusion of transcendence, the illusion of universals, the illusion of the eternal, 
and finally the illusion of discursiveness (where propositions are confused with 
concepts) (49-50). Given such difficulties it sometimes it seems as though we can 
only choose between transcendence and chaos (51). 
I have alluded to a number of the silent postulates at the heart of the dogmatic 
image of thought. These "crush thought under an image which is that of the 
Same and the Similar in representation, but profoundly betrays what it means to 
think and alienates the two powers of difference and repetition [ ... ]" (167). 1 waiit 
to return now to some of the ideas expressed in previous chapters. 
V. xi. culpable, complicit, co-opted?: philosophy versus capital 
In chapter 1,1 traced a series of examples of the -, vay in which difference as 
divcnsitý) was assimilated to a model of the Same; a model that claimed to 
be 
neutral but was riven by a series of silent postulates. james 'ruuý- showed 
liow 
these operated in the context of Canadian constitutional-ism. Diffcrcncc and 
, )(I() 
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diversitý- had been silenced by the 'neutral' idealised model of the homogeneou'S, 
nation-state. Fanon spoke to us of colonialism. He explained how the colonial 
enterprise engendered a manichean dialectics, whereby African colonial sublccts 
were not only presented as differing from the ideal-tý-pe model of humanin-, but 
also were portrayed as the absolute (and negative) difference-fi-ovi tl-ýs model. The 
series of postulates formed a subterranean level of presuppositions that 
'legitimised' a set of horrific practices. 
In response, Gatens and Lloyd called for the invention of better collective 
imaginings that do not presuppose an homogeneous and self-identical nation- 
state. They argue that responsibility must be taken. Spinoza engaged in a critique 
of the postulates at the heart of abstract universals, as he sought to show how an 
irnmanent ethics might operate. He opposed a moralistic (41omorpbit) image of 
thought to an ethics of experimentation. By interrogating the pre-erninence given 
to the individuated individual, Simondon opened a space for us to think of the 
pre-individual and trans-individual dimensions of the human, in other words, the 
non-human becorMngs of the human. Finally, in this chapter we explored the 
ramifications of the postulates underlying the dogmatic image of thought, and 
ventured into a realm of disparity, dissensus and difference to proffer a new 
understanding of the possible. Does the question I have reiterated a number of 
times throughout this thesis still overshadow us? Does philosophy falls prcý- to 
the clutches of capital, legitimating its expansion? We can conclude that a thought 
without image, a rhizomatic, acentered, nomadic thought is not just a superb 
description of the mechanisms of global capitalism in the era of 'societies of 
control', but constitutes a transformation of modes of acting and thinking. 
Modern philosophy's link with capitalism, therefore, is of the same kind as that 
of ancient philosophy with Greece: the connection of an absolute plane (ýf 
immanence with a relative social milieu that also fiunctions through 
immanence. 
Gilles Deleuze and Fclix Guattarl, 11'"bal I's Philosoph),, '(1991: 98). 
The immanent realisation of the axiomatic of capitahsm in the forni of the State 
, )() I 
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was discussed in chapter 2. A plethora of books and articles examining the poNver 
of multinational corporations over governments, and the close relations-hip 
enjoyed by these different organisations, seems to empirically validate this 
contention. However, philosophy is not just "an agreeable commerce of the 
mind, which with the concept, would have its own commodity, or rather its 
exchange value - which, from the point of view of a hvel\- disinterested sociability 
of Western democratic conversation is able to enerate a consensus of opinion 9 
and provide communication With an ethic (99). We do not need any more 
communication. Societies of control centre upon filling intensive space , vith the 
crackles of communication. We do, however, need resistance (108). 
Earlier I discussed Spinoza's concept of beatitudo, suggesting that it relates to 
Deleuze and Guattari's conception of philosophy as an absolute 
deterritonalisation. They say that it is philosophy that takes the relativc 
deterritorialisation of capital to the absolute (99). They argue that it is like 
Adorno's Negative Dialeai(ýs and at this utopian moment "[ .... ] philosophy becomcs 
political and takes the criticism of its own time to its highest point" (99). Absolute 
deterritorialisation corresponds to a critical point which connects it with a 
"present relative milieu and especially with the forces stifled by this milieu" (100). 
Zourabichvih's article names this critical point as the creation of the possible. A 
correlative transformation of powers of activity relates to a Spinozistic ethics. The 
struggles against capitalism must continuously begin over, as earlier struggles are 
betrayed (100). The reterritoriahsation that accompanies this absolute 
deterritorialisation is the reterritorialisation of philosophy on the concept. 
Affirming the signs of the present is not sufficient. Transformation comes from 
the signs of the future: the diiparate. "Thought thinks its own history (the past), 
but in order to free itself from what it thinks (the present) and be able fiiially to 
'think otherwise' (the future)" (Deleuze, 1986: 119). 81ý The philosophcl- cannot 
86 Resistance to the spatialisatiOn of time is eý ident in Bergson's work which seeks to 
imestigate tirne as duration and qualitative change. If time is understood on]\ III relation to 
the present as present-past and present-future, it is difficult to understand ho\ý tirne can pav-ý 
Moreover, as Deleuze will repeatedly tell us the time of the event cannot be captured in 
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create a people. A people is created through intolerable circumstances. At this 
moment, a critical point is passed. This idea of a disparity or tension that leads to 
transformation was the central theme of the previous two chapters. TI-ns is- the 
'problematic'. 
SI pinoza's immanent ethics demonstrated a way of thinking about relationahtý- that 
slipped between the discourses of liberalism and communitarianism. By reading 
Spinoza with Simondon, we sought to understand the processes of 
transformation that could lead to qualitative changes in existence. I shoN-, -cd hoa- 
the centrality of the individual human is displaced in favour of the conception of 
the human as a part of nature, a singular point in a nexus of forces. I also 
demonstrated through Simondon why we cannot presuppose an individual 
subject but must trace the complex lines of prot-esses of subjectification and 
individuation. One is always more and less than oneself Doubtless, there NN-. is all 
anthropocentrism in these accounts; this is inevitable. Let us now trý- to 
understand more of the non-human becomings of the human, exploring some of - 
the traits of an ecosophy. 
these categories. It is always already/not yet. The event of a battle cannot be located either 
spatially or temporally. Deleuze sometimes calls this time a dead or sterile time, pure 
reserve. This complication of the conceptions of time is key to understanding the concepts 
of difference-in-itself as a pre-individual singularity. This is part of Deleuze's anti- 
phenomenology that seeks to undermine the centrality placed on processes of natural 
perception. This new subjectivity does not have the natural subject as its locus. 
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VIA. lily-livered liberals 
Do I contradict myself? 
Very well then I contradict myself, 
(I am large, I contain multitudes. ) 
W-alt Whitm,, in, 'Song of Myself', Leates of Grass. (18-55: 1223), 
I resist anything better than my own diversity 
Walt Whitman, 'Song of Myself', Leaves of Grass. (1855: 63). 
Liberals often fall prey to the allegation that according to them 'anything goes. 
Rawls, for example, tries to subvert this by proposing a theory of Justice pre Mi 
upon the proposition that were reasonable persons to deliberate under a x-ell of 
ignorance, they could arrive better at an agreement as to how to weigh up 
(: lifferent goods. Throughout this thesis I have sought to show that claims to 
neutrality and objective universality are always tainted by an initial set of (moral) 
postulates. But maný- Might maintain that the key question continues to remain 
unanswered - how can we evaluate different cultural practices, and label them 
good or bad, moral or immoral? A problem with liberal tolerance is that it often 
deprives itself of a position to condemn atrocious practices, as it is sucked into 
the sceptics' quagmire of cultural relativism. We need to be able to resist 
patriarchal and racist forms of social organisation. We need to be able to develop 
processes of sIngularisation that affirm and embrace altenty, without denying the 
possibility of an ethical evaluation of immanent modes of existence. 
It was this difficult ethical question that I addressed in my chapter on Spinoza. 
An immanent ethics sounds like an oxymoron to many. Wliat kind of 'an ethic', 
could it be without principles and rules, or without a stringent dcontolo, cal 91 
1 immanent nI appr(), tch? Spinoza's conviction that -\N-e can have ic iteria for cvaluýitiiig 
modes of existence rested upon an understanding of the Ind, vjdUal as- 11cce,; Irfly 
relational, wid as a degree of power -a conatus. Against an imperialistic thought 
he 
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sought local and singular solutions to problems. Ethics is not just a process of 
deliberating about actions. It is a process of becoming-active. Eflucs, that is, 
ontology. 
I contend that the most fruitful way to develop an immanent ethics is to 
understand the pre-individual and transindividual dimensions of the midiN-idual, 
and if Spinoza does nothing else, he certainly emphasises this point when lie 
asserts that the human is a part of nature. Shifting the debate from the individual 
in this manner does not constitute semantic slippage, but engenders a critique of 
the postulates that provided a ground for that individual of ethics. Both 
deontological ethics and morality employ a conception of the human that is 
already individuated-87 
Can embracing the complexity of humans, including their non-human becorrungs, 
really be considered another example of the postmodern prochN-ity for 
abstraction? We haN, e learned that the individual is constituted by differential 
relations and a degree of power corresponds to these. Cotiatits is essence as 
activity. Before subject and object, we are all multiplicities. In fact, Deleuze and 
Guattari introduced the concept of multiplicity in an attempt to escape from 
allegiances to either subject or object. A multiplicity is "alreadj omposed q1' 
, geneous 
terms 1/1 gmblOSI*S [ ... ]"(1980: 249) and as it passes thresholds it is betero 
transformed. We cannot understand individual identities if we presuppose them. 
Rather than presupposing sub'ect and object, we must trv to understand theii- 
processes of emergence. We do this through developing a theon- of affectwity. 
Affects are pre-personal: they are becomings - passages that have a 1-c', ility that is 
irreducible to their former or end states. The process of becormng-actN-c inv()IN-cs 
organising encounters and composing relations so as to maxinuse active 1()\ fLil 
87 Peter Singer's large edited volume on Ethics does not. as far as I can see, contain so much 
as one reference to Spinoza. I believe this indicates the waý that Spinoza's thinking is out of' 
joint NNIth the dominant traditions on ethics. An interesting and useful project would 
be to 
compare Spinoza's work with the dominant approaches to ethics and to sho\\ \ýhat makes it 
incompatible ýNith them. To some extent (and largely irnplicitlý since I do not refer often to 
specific ethical theorists) I ha\e tried to do this in mN thesis. 
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affects. Since the individual is a necessarily relational being, an cthics pren-ýiscd 
upon a strictly autonomous and independent individual is inoperable in this 
context. Instead of classiý'ing a being in advance and attributing a set ()f 
properties to it, a symbiotic approach promotes alliances, contagions and 
unexpected couplings. Ethics involves multiplying relations, and not just with 
other humans. An ethics of the pre-individual rails against the values of the 
dominant image of thought. It creates new values and new modes of valonsatioll, 
a heterogenesis resisting a tendency toward homogenesis. 
Spinoza shows us that an ethics need not employ abstract principles that compare 
modes of existence. Seedlings of Marx's definition of human essence as ac6-, -ltN,, 
and his corresponding critique of alienation, can be found in the E//VCS. That text 
aspires to create and cultivate the potentials of the human, tearing humans aNN-, iN- 
from abstract essences, and those inflated towering images of themseIN-cs that 
dream of Man occupying a site somewhere between profane nature and sacred 
God. Through loving and accepting our finitude, we find eternity on earth. 
Ethics involves developing inimanent criteria to evaluate different modes of 
existence. It does this by examining whether an action Involves a relative 
decomposition of relations, where a composition of relations might have been 
constructed. This is why an ethics must be one of experimentation; it is a process 
of becoMIng-active. 
The shame of being human... For Deleuze and Guattarl, "we also experience [this 
shame] in insignificant conditions, before the meanness and vulgarity of existence 
that haunts democracies, before the propagation of these modes of existence and 
of thought-for-the market, and before the values, ideals, and opinions ()f our 
time. The ignominy of the possibilities of life that \,, -c are offered appears from 
within. We do not feel ourselves outside of our time but continue to undergo 
shameful compromises with it" (1991a: 108). Throughout this thesis I 
hax, c 
emphasised the importance not only of a re, q'slall, -e to the present, but the ncccs,,, ItN. 
to engage in a positivc endeavour to construct other possibilities ()f 
In-ing. As 
"m 
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with Deleuze and Guattari, this motivation stems from etl-ýico-pohtical concerns - 
the possibility of things bet-omi'ii ,g otherwise. 
My account of processe's of 
individuation challenges the neo-liberal conception of the individual. Not ()IIIN- are 
we, as Deleuze and Guattari tell us, contemplations - contractions of air, , vater 
and minerals - the disparateness that is a part of our becoming means that no 
matter how ri idified, ossified and absolute our existences become, a singularitV 91 
may qualitatively transform these modes of existence. 
VI. H. a critical freedom 
Haecceities are simply degrees of power which combine, to which correspond a 
power to affect and be affected, active or passive affects, intensities. 
Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialooues. (1977.92). 
It was SiMondon who (inadvertently perhaps) drew out some of the key themes 
in Spinoza's Etbics d-irough his theory of processes of individuation. Like Spinoza 
he neither began with the individual or with a principle of individuation, but With 
a philosophy of force, of potentia. Although Spinoza did not articulate a theory of 
metastable being, he did develop a conception of differential relations and force 
that make it relatively easy to draw his philosophy close to that of Simondon, 
something Deleuze seemed to do in his seminars. Parado. xicaHN-, becoming 
becomes the model of being. 
Deleuze always professed his allegiance to a philosophy of immanence. 13ý- 
positing an ontology that presented being as incompatible with itself, more than 
unity and more than identity, SiMondon's work profoundly influenced Delcuze's 
philosophy of difference, allowing him to continue to develop a conception of 
univocal being in terms of power (potentia). If disparateness and dispantýý arc 
primary in relation to identity, then alterin- is a constitutive part of any s\'stcm, 
without that system being shot through with lack. The possible ()f the possible is 
thus a dimension of aiiv systern. By understanding identity as secondan-, Dclcuzc 
and Guattari developed ways, of circumventing identities, transforming and 
disrupting them through the unnatural couplings theý- called bccorrungs. If the 
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pre-individual and the transindividual are key dimcnsions of tilc individual (a term 
which is but an abstraction xvithout the invocation of these aspects) the 
conditions for the production of the new can be activated bv constructing a 
disparateness, by t-reafiq a possible to issue a transformation. 
In the critical literature terms like 'pre-individual singularities' and 'difference-in- 
itself' are often introduced wi 11 as important to me to ithout being explained. It -\x- 
situate these concepts rather than relying on tautologies such as 'difference-in- 
itself differendates itself It was also crucial to show that the pre-individual is not 
Just 'pre-' relative to the individual (like the cells in our bodies, or our ancestors) 
but expresses the reality of the potential energy of a metastable being. Pre- 
individual concerns the disparateness that is resolved through the inventive 
process of individuation, a process that is itself alwaN-s relative. Deleuze calls this 
process - the actualisation of the 617tual. Singularities are intensive and are not 
localisable. The pre-individual and the transindividual are dimensions of humans 
that reveal the non-human beconUngs of the human. The human spills over into 
other worlds. 
VI. iii. pragmatics and incorporeals 
In order to address the implications of an ethics of the pre-mdividual, I took issue 
with an identitarian image of thought that could not affirm difference and 
disparity. Here I tried to show that the image we have of what it is to think and to 
be may stifle the creation of other potential modes of existing and thinking. A 
hierarchical order that seeks to fit singularities into categories maý- be toying with 
concepts that are too baggy for their content. By devcloping an image of thought, 
or a thought without image, that could affirm difference, singularitý-, disparateness 
and dissensus without ttying to force these into ill-fitting uniform concepts, %ve 
further our idea of an ethics of the pre-individual. Rather than an imperialistic 
thinking, -\ve need to develop knowledges to deal with local and siligular 
problems. SiMondon's idei of transduction and Deleuze's thought without iilligc 
show how this approach involves an in,, -cstigation ot - the non-human or prc- 
-, ()S 
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human world. 
An example of how we might go about this is given in -,, 'I 
Uolo-aild Plateaus. 
Arguably, Deleuze and Guattari's conception of an image of thought is extendcd 
to their observations on the pragmatics of language. According to them, it is a 
grave rniistake to reduce the economy of language to signifying linguistics. The 
dominance of the signifier means that other serruotic fluxes have been silenced. 
-kU manner of a-signifying 'sign machines' are at play in the construction of 
subjectivities from genetic codes to sporting activities. Rather than concentrating 
on a formalistic account of language, Deleuze and Guattari draw out the non- 
discursive and implicit presuppositions that provide a ground for the functioning 
of language. For example the words 'I swear' undergo a continuous variation 
depending on whether they are spoken in the courtroom, bN- a teenager to her 
parents, to a lover, to a boss. What about your face? Are ý-ou too earnest? Are N-ou 
fidgeting? Do you gaze at the floor? All of these signs transform the statement 
made. 
The incorporeal transformations effected by the speech act depend on the 
collectiN-e assemblage of enunciation and the concrete machinic assemblage. 
Language is an anonymous murmur that speaks through us; this is wliýý there is 
never an individual statement but only ever a collective assemblage of 
enunciation. This collective assemblage does not just refer to a xvider social group 
but to a multiphcity including technological, economic, social and cultural 
components. Hence, dismissing racist and sexist language as 'onlýý \,. -()rds' belies 
the sedimentation of practices and non-discursive presuppositions that giN-cs 
these words a real transformational power. Different traits such as the timbre of a 
N-oice, or the shape of a nose may indicate a di-\-ergence from a standardiscd 
I nhercnt in model of normality. Guattan thinks that there is a universal racism 1 
white capitalist faciality (1979: 91). Someone smiles too xldelY, a face is too old, 
or a particular set of features unleashes N-, ()Ience (Guattari notes the immediate 
and often hostile response to a face in the exclamations of 'it's a Jew, an arab, a 
Rather than affiriTiing a multitude of difference,,, pre-personal singular 
2) 
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traits are forced into categories of recognition. To remedy such prejudice, it 1s 11 ot 
sufficient to simply alter linguistic terms, but one needs to explore those hiddci, 
factors that pervade the social practices and the image of thought of a socien-, 
bringing them to visibility. On the one hand, this involves a struggle on the level 
of 'molar' identities which seek for recognition and this goes some way to ahcniig, 
the way in which a dominant order operates. On the other hand, a disparateness 
needs to be created to effect a quahtative transformation in modes of existence. I 
outhned this operation in chapter 5. In tl-iis way the capacity that an image of 
thought has to impose identities regardless of context is weakened. The ctl-iico- 
political task is to invent creative instances that transgress pre-established 
schemas. 
Those kinds of statements indicate the sedimentations of practices that 
oftentimes rest upon unspoken prejudices and assumptions about the groups ()f 
people they refer to. This is why Deleuze's idea of the linage of thought is so 
important. It exhorts us to never accept statements at surface value but to dra\\- 
out the postulates that they rest on, especially when those people \N-ho make them 
profess their neutrality and objectivity. Our possibilities for acting and existing are 
limited by the image of thought of a given soclety. We need to develop iic\\- 
images of thought, or even a thought without linage. Perhaps the acentred 
networks of the rhizome can provide ways of escaping an arborescent image of 
thought by bringing new connections into play, providing instead an image of 
thought that can cope with differences and singularities. 
Guattari reveals himself to be close to Simondon and Spinoza in his 
understanding of the pre-individual, the individual and the transindlN-idual. fie 
develops these themes in a concrete way emphasising, as Simondon did, that the 
"non-human pre-personal part of subjectwitý- is crucial since it is frorn this that its 
heterogenesis can develop" (1992a: 9). Subjectivity is produced by the confluctice 
of manN, forces, and cannot be reduced to a successlN-c series of psycho-gclictic 
stages. We do not know what we are. just as an ethic,, -, ()f the pre-IndIN idiial 
capsize,, the stabihty of the individual, so too does it enl(rendcr another thought ot 
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subjectivity. Unlike in Heidegger's work, the singularit: y of A Life is not revc,, iled 
in the moment of dying. By thinking singularity aside from individuality in the 
process of becoming, lived existence can also be affirmed. I want to sho\x- no\v- 
how Guattari brings together these concerns as he develops his concept ot - 
prot, essual subjectivity. 
VI. iv. subjectivity before the subject 
I prefer a sense of progress that says 'what are the possibilities we can develop 
out of the presentT 
bell hooks in conversation with Paul Gilroy in Paul Gilroy, Small I as. (1 993b: 218). 
Subjectivity does not fall from the sky; it is not written in chromosomes that 
sectors of knowledge and work must end up with the atrocious segregations 
that humanity knows today. 
,, 
phies sch * analyliques. (1 989a: F6hx Guattari, Cartoura 1ý0 
A retrospective appraisal of F6hx Guattan's life leads R6n6 Sch6rer to concludc 
that his thought is dominated by one constant - býý processes of subjcctification. 
His molecular revolution consisted of an appeal for a triple ecology that extended 
from the natural, to the social and the mental. This is called an ecosophý, (1994: 
63). 
Guattari's logic is one of becornIngs and multiplicities. Indeed, Sch6rer claims that 
subjectification and multiplicity are a pair (63). A primary mistake has been to 
reduce a process of subjectification to an instance of subjectivity enclosed in the 
unity of the subject. Like Simondon, Guattari is more interested in exploring the 
process of subjectification that involves a transductive relation to the , ý, -orld, t11: 111 
viewing the subject in a static and identitarian way. Developing a subjec iN-ity that I ti I 
does not rest on the ground of subject and substance is the aim of his philosopliy. 
This is integral]\- bound up with an ethics which privilel,, cs the 'minot'. Ratliet- 
than speaking of the 'subject' he prefers to speak of t-oniponews of sulýe(-1ý11'ý-xlwi, 
each working more or less on its (1989b: 36). These components 
do not 
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even necessarily pass through the inchvidual. 
Nicolas Bourriaud also claims that the notion of subjectivity is centril to 
Guattari's enterprises. He says that the ultimate finaht\- of subjectivity is 
none other than an individuation that always remains to be conquered" (1994: 
79). Guattan's work is a massive attempt to denaturalise subjec ivity. __\othing is I ti i 
less natural than subjectivity, nothing is more produced. "Subjectivity is the set of 
relations that are created between individuals and vectors of subjectification, be 
they individual or collective, human or non-human" (82). 
In chapter 2 we looked at some of the Nx-ays in which subjectivities were produced 
and modelled. Our ethical choice now is to either reiýy, reduce and scientise 
subjectivity, or to try to grasp its processual nature. Guattari describes this choice 
in clear terms; "There is an ethical choice in faN-our of the richness of the 
possible, an ethics and politics of the virtual that decorporeatises and 
deterritorialises contingency, linear causality and the pressure of circumstanccs 
and significations which besiege us. It is a choice for processuality, irreversibility 
and resing-ularisation" (1991a: 29). 
Guattarl wants to create a conception of a subjectivity that traverses and connects 
different domains. The identity of this subjectivity can only be understood as 
partial, and it does not know the traditional boundaries that theories of identity 
have been prone to adopt. Donna Haraway's figure of the cyborg communicates 
some of its features. Writing against Western origin myths of umity, the cyborg 
occupies a partial and ironic place, where kinship with animals and machines is 
not something to be feared. Haraway tries to occupy a borderland bct-%ý-ccii the 
self, an illusion of the autonomous One, and the other, , \-hich she sees as 
"mu-Itiple, \x-ithout clear boundap-, frayed, insubstantial. One is too fcNx-, but t, \N-() 
are too many" (199 1: 1 Negotiating this boundary is something \x-c have tried 
to do by showing the danger of myths of purity of identity. Hara\N-, ty call', for 
partial translations, and Deleuze and Guattari trcileratc trans\, crsJ 
communications, or becomings. Relations have their ()\\-ii reality over and abm-c 
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their individuated terms. 
But how is subjectivity produce& Guattari says this has nothing to do \x-Ith a 
return to traditional systems of binary opposition like base- superstructure models. 
There is no fixed hierarchy of the sermotic re isters that come to produce 1 91 
subjectivity. He points out that stock markets are very sensitive to changes in 
opinion, something made clear bNT the recent col-lapse in the stocks of new 
technology and web companies. Subjectivities are susceptible to consen-atlN-c, 
reterritoriahsations which can have a massive impact on the subjectn, c economies 
of mflhons of people. Given archaisms and technological innovation can happflý- 
go hand in hand, Guattari thinks it is time "to forge a more transvcrsahst 
conception of subjectivity, one which permits us to understand both its 
idiosyncratic territoriahsed couplings (Existential Territories) and its opening onto 
value systems ýncorporeal Universes) with their social and cultural implications" 
(1 992a: 4). 
For instance, the impact of the sennotic productions of the mass media on 
subjectivities is enormous. Unfortunately, at the moment people appear to be 
condemned to a deadening influence of the mass media (5). This does not mean 
we should reject technological innovations, however. Guattan believes that 
subjectivities can work for better or for worse. The media need to be re- 
appropriated and re-singularised. Other possibles need to be created to bring Lis 
toward a post-media era. 
In an interview with Olivier Zahm, Guattan states his belief that all societies alm 
to produce subjectivity. He says "I start from the idea that subjectivity is ak-ays 
the result of collective assemblages, which also imph- not only a mulfiphcln- of 
individuals, but also a multiplicity of technological, machinic, economic - Ictol's... 
'i multipliciti, of factors which Nve could call pre-personal sensations" (19921): 49- 
50). For Guattarl, processes of subjectification are not just delimited to thc 
anthropolo ical sphere, since the), extend into becomings -animal, bcconling's- 91 
vegetable, the social field, the technological field and to othei- rich and I- 
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heterogeneous domains. To try to contain these processes of subjectification 
wltl-dn the social field is alreadv reductionist. 
with this approach he explicates a number of Simondon's intuitions. 'ITie 
individual involves both pre-individual and trans-individual dimensions NX-1,11ch 
modify and constitute it as they are modified in return. The human is not cut off 
from the mammals or microbes, from plants and minerals and rays of sunshine, 
from the technolo 'cal formations that shape her possibilities of beino,, fr()m the 91 11) 
incorporeal universes of music and poetry, from the workplace, from media 
stereotypes. Subjectivitý- cannot be understood in isolation from these and many 
other factors. 
Guattari emphasises the potential zones of resistance corresponding to a 
heterogenesis of subjectivitý- in contradistinction to the homogenesis ()t capitalist 
subjectivity, a subjectivity of generalised equivalence. He asks, "can we not find 
transversal connections bet-ween the practices of heterogenesis of the itidIN-IdLial 
subjectivity and a recomposition of social life, undertaking an ethico-political 
responsibility for political objectives, including planetary and ecological ones" 
(1992a: 153). We can recompose subjectiN-ity in matiy xx-ays; looking at the 
television is important, but also gazing at the stars at night, accepting one's 
finitude, through poetn- and music, and in a million and one other ways (154). 
Guattarl thinks that poetry is just as important as N-itamin C. 
Vim. processes of emergence 
Indeed, I think subjectivation has little to do with any subject. It's to do, rather, 
with an electric or magnetic field, an individuation taking place through 
intensities (weak as well as strong ones), it's to do with individuated fields, not 
persons or identities. 
Gilles Deleuze, "ýeoolialions. (199(),, 1-. 9')). 
'strangeness of being' eludes us, muses Guattari quoting, Witkiewic/ (199-1v 
19). Drawing mi the xork of Daniel Stern, a psychologist, lic proposcs- ail 
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emergent subjectivity. Psychoanalytic approaches tended to centre on the effect 
of the family on the individual. Obviously parental figures are i ortant in the IMP 
world of the child, but she is not positioned solely in relation to them. Initially 
her world is a pre-personal, pre-individual one rich in vibrations, deep reds, gasps 
of laughter, rough surfaces and bitter tastes,, and the child weaves these elements 
together and into herself creating tapestries and patterning herself and the world 
in an ongoing feedback of qualitative transformation. Rather than a unified self, 
there is a multiplicity of larval selves contracting sensations like habits. This is an 
autopoletic creation. Prior to the age of about two the emergent self does not fit 
into prepared categories such as self and other, male or female. Its relation Nvith 
the world is more complex, pathic and fusional. (Bergson once likened the world 
to more or less contracted vibrations that connected the infra-cosrruc to the 
cosn-uc. ) 
Spinoza did not envisage Nature to be a pure, pristine wilderness; a prelapsarian 
Eden. Naturing Nature named an ontology of becoming, a process of production 
that did not oppose Man to Nature, but understood the human to be a part of 
nature. An ethics of the pre-individual does not map out individuated spheres in 
advance; constructing oppositions between nature, culture and technology is 
anathema to our analyses. Indeed the problem is to grasp complexity and 
heterogeneity in their movements rather than always trying to fit them into pre- 
existing categories. This is the aim of a transcendental empiricism. 
Guattan developed an ecosophy that comprehends the psyche, the socIUS, and 
the environment. He draws our attention to the struggles for singularisation on 
the part of a wide variety of groups from the retired, to women's movements, to 
oppressed workers in the underdeveloped world. In addition, the virtual ecologies 
of aesthetic practices are also in danger of being destroyed 
by capitahst 
subjectivity. Since his death we have seen the prohferation of social movements 
that combine social justice issues with environmental concerns and creative 
enterprises. These emblematise a capacity to affirm 
differences xvhile acting in 
concert. These grassroots movements speak for themselves. 
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Political, environmental and mental ecologies are not opposed to one another 
because in order to address an environmental problem a nexý- universe of values 
must be invented, and this means a new ediico-pohtical engagement. A -\vholc 
system of modehsation'8needs to be incarnated, in order to support this uni'verse 
of values, comprised of different social and analytic practices (Guattan, 1996: 20). 
Rather than a totalitarian approach to identities, we need to affirm and respect 
heterogeneity and singularity. He says "Let's get out of consensual politics and 
accept the alterity of the other, her difference; from this ethical movement that 
revives the other something may emerge" (23). When Simondon argued that Nve 
need to comprehend the process of individuation rather than conceiving of a 
reality comprised of individual and discrete identities, he made an ethico-pohtical 
move in favour of dissensus and difference. Instead of a logic of exclusive 
disJunctions that can tell immediately who belongs in what categories, boundaries 
are made fuzzy, allowing us to "comprehend the articulation of different 
machinic, social, biological, neurological, ecological, etc. strata" (26). 
Symbioses of different fluxes may be permitted to flourish once the individual is 
not dehtnited, classified, segregated and isolated in advance. As Spinoza said - we 
do not even know what a body can do. "Furthermore, if we consider the plane of 
consistency we note that the most disparate of things and signs move upon it: a 
semiotic fragment rubs shoulders with a chemical interaction, an electron crashes 
into a language, a black hole captures a genetic message, a crystallisation produces 
a passion, the wasp and orchid cross a letter... " (Deleuze and Guattarl, 1980: 69). 
Instead of beginning with individuated forms and contents, a pre-individual field 
is a field of singularities. 
The conjunction AND brings together diverse fluxes like the ray of sunlight and 
n-nnerals in the soil inventing new forms. Guattarl's processual subjectivltý- that docs 
88 See Guattari (1989a) and (1992a) for an account of his concept of modelisation. Rather 
than using a single or dominant manner of modeling reality, he wants to suggest a more tý - 
pragmatic approach that can draw upon the pertinent features of different models depending 
uponthe problematic to be addressed. See also pl-36 ofthis thesis. 210 
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not have the subject as its end is mirrored bý, Sitnondon'spro6, esses of individuation 
that view the unitý- and identity of the individual as but a limited phase in an 
ongoing process of singularisation from which individual and milieu emerge, but 
onl)- relativelý,. What is real is the becoming and not the "supposedly fixed terms 
through which that which becomes passes" (Deleuze and Guattarl, 1980: 2138). 
An inclusive disjunction makes a relation of the non-relation. It preserves 
heterogeneity. We create mutating existential territories that create cartographies 
of these dimensions. 
In the final chapter of his book CbaosmoS1*S Guattari turns to the idea of the 
ecosophic object. Through the media, biology, computers and 
telecommunications out mental coordinates are being destabilised. The 
underdeveloped world continues to suffer, the environment is being steadilý 
contaminated, and as President Bush made so clear recently when he rejected the 
IZ-yoto Protocol, the system is incapable and unwilling to construct a "social 
economy adapted to the new technologies" (Guattarl, 1991a: 119). Publicised 
ecological crises are "traced to a more general crisis of the social, political and 
existential" (119). How can we invent another image of thought? "[Hlow do we 
change mentalities, how do we reinvent social practices that would give back to 
humanity - if it ever had it -a sense of responsibility, not only for its own 
survival, but equally for the future of all life on the planet, for animal and 
vegetable species, likewise for incorporeal species such as music, the arts, cinema, 
the relation with time, love and compassion for others, the feeling of fusion at the 
heart of the cosmos? " (119-20). 
Theories of ideology often ran up against the following objection - if the masses 
are suffering from 'false consciousness', if thq do not know their own interests, 
why should they act any differently? Invoking a revolutionary vanguard, or even 
an organic intelligentsia, imposes a top-down order that claims to kno,, N- what is 
best for the masses. Like Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari think that desirc is 
primary. \Ve are attracted to certain modes of existencc, and this shapes our 
interests. Guattari says that we need to understand the modelisations of existence 
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that different people invest in. We need to be able to affirm dissensus in order, 
perhaps, to 'rhizomatise' that other modelisation, such as the support for the 
BNP or Le Pen. If we engage in an ideological standoff each position becomes 
ossified ri id and incommunicado. By no means am I suggesting that support for 3 91 1 
the BNP is equally as valid as anti-racist action groups; however, the factors that 
lead people to support such groups are usually complex and often contradictory. 
Sometimes it is because people feel alienated that they are attracted to these kinds 
of organisations. What cause can it serve to exacerbate that alienation by isolating 
those supporters? Instead, we should try to understand, and potentially transform, 
those conditions that have led them to take such a position. As Lenny Bruce once 
said, liberals understand everything except people who don't understand them. 
VIM. an ethics of the pre-individual 
In the midst of this state of affairs, a shaft of meaning must be discovered, that 
cuts through my impatience for the other to adopt my point of view, and 
through the lack of good will in the attempt to bend the other to my desires. 
Not only must I accept this adversity, I must love it for its own sake: I must seek 
it out, communicate with it, delve into it, increase it. With it, responsibility 
emerges from the self in order to pass to the other. 
F6hx Guattari, 'Remaking Social Practices'. (1992d: 271-2) 
An ethics of the pre-individual provides a different way of seeing, being in, and 
making the world. It does not turn a blind eye to oppressive practices, social 
formation, and the exercise of Power, but seeks to critique the manner in which 
these factors stifle potentia, the power to create transversal relations, and to 
enhance one's power of thinking and existing through multiplying relations and 
forming commonalities of singularities. 
Old social formations are not viewed with nostal ia by Deleuze and Guattarl. 91 
Their negative appraisal of capitalism does not mean they cannot see the 
potentials unleashed by its movements, even as it 'reterritoriahses' on the nuclear 
family and ethnic nation-state. The undecidability inherent to the capitalist 
axiomatics, due to its unquenchable desire for innovation, means that 
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crevolutionary fluxes' are both encouraged and contained. Opposing a capitalist 
homogenesis need not take place through a romantic mý-th of the local, or an 
appeal to a patriarchal family system. An ethics of the pre-individual does not 
fetishise the human but thinks before and beyond it to invent new possibilities of 
existence. It is through the impersonal dimensions of the human, those pre- 
individual and transindividual dimensions, that new singularities can be liberated, 
rupturing the melancholia of the 'one-dimensional man. 
By understanding the human to be a part of nature we can affirm the non-human 
and pre-human dimensions of the human. We no longer presuppose the human. 
Different spaces and rhythms are no longer dimensions that the individual moves 
through but they constitute the non-human becon-ungs of the human, modifying 
abilities to affect and be affected, diminishing or increasing powers of existing 
and thinking. An ethics of liberation comprehends these pre-individual 
dimensions of the human, these components and factors that constitute the 
individual. just as an ill-designed architectural space can dampen one's feelings of 
safety, one's contact with a community, a capacity for aesthetic pleasure and 
possibilities of movement, we find that many other factors like the media, 
technologies, biologies, music, financial markets, cultural practices, family 
relationships also serve as pre-individual vectors of subjectification. If we are 
trying to develop an ethics it cannot just concern human-human relationships 
because humans involve so many other dimensions. The ontology developed 
throughout this thesis cannot be separated from an ethics. 
N4 first chapters concentrated heavily on the idea of Potestas; the \vays in which 
people are prevented from multiplying relations and expanding their capacities to 
think and exist, prohibiting their rights to singularity. A commonality of 
singularities operates like the distributive smooth space of the commons. 
Countering the allegation that philosophy is enthralled to capitalism, I tried to 
show how capitalism, despite operating in an immanent fashion, blocks, co-opts 
and circumvents those potentials and becomings that threaten its fundamental 
premise of production for production's sake. Value systems other than the 
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pursuit of profit and economi 11 ti ities ic efficiency need to regulate human social ac ivi i 
(Guattari, 1989b: 64). "What condemns the capitalist value system is that it is 
characterized by general equivalence, which flattens out all other forms of value, 
alienating them in its hegemony" (65). Patton argues that implicit in the 
Deleuzian ethic is a concept of critical freedom. This is characterised by its focus 
on "the conditions of change or transformation in the subject, and by its 
indifference to the individual or collective nature of the subject" (2000: 83). 
Guattari wonders how we can speak of liberty in universes that do not know 
deliberating subjects. He asks what a machinic liberty might beý Like Spinoza, he 
thinks it is always a question of degree. First of all we need to accept that 
different assemblages, be they material, social or biological, are capable of 
'machining' their own fate and creating complex and heterogeneous universes. 
We then need to nurture more unnatural couplings, since the subject and the 
machine are no longer separable from one another (1979: 165-6). By putting 
different codings from images and gestures to the social and political field into 
play, we embark on an experimentation on the real. just as SIMondon emphasised 
our non-individuated or de-individuated dimensions as he tried to explain the 
ethico-political force of the concepts of the pre-individual and transindividual, 
Guattarl contends that an ethics based on the individual ignores complexity and 
heterogeneity. Qualitative transformations in modes of existence and social 
organisation can only be effected if we take a schizoanalytic approach that does 
not favour one theoretical approach, or system of modelisation, above all others. 
This is why he strives to develop an ecosophy. 
Deleuze and Parnet tell us that there was never any question of opposing the 
State-form with a spontaneous dynarmc. A logic of multiplicities develops 
different ways of organismg or composing relations, creating symbioses and 
sympathies. No identities are preserved. There are no external referenccs. A 
pragmatics precludes the intrusion of an overarching solution to our ills. There 
are no eternal truths. This radical democracy stretches beyond even Whitman's 
honzons. 
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I celebrate myself, and sing myself, 
And what I assume you shall assume, 
For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you. 
cSong of I. Walt Whitman, Myself' Leares of Greiss. (1855: 6'). 
We need to love, and not fear, the unknown. We need an ethics and politics of 
singularity, an ethics and politics of the pre-individual. Through dissensus and 
disparateness we can create other possibles; we can precipitate a sý-stem into a 
state of disequilibrium; we can challenge the status q1to - the dominant image of 
thought. Philosophy involves both critique and construction. We cannot tear 
down edifices to be left standing amongst the ruins. When asked about ethics in a 
seminar, Jacques Dernda declared 'we are all Abrahams'. Rather than hovering 
over that abyss, I have tried to engage the undecidability and risk involved in 
ethics in a positive way. Instead of concentrating upon the aporetic deliberation 
involved in making ethical decision, I have argued that ethics concerns practices 
of living. However, an immanent ethics means that we need to develop different 
conceptions of the human. Undoubtedly my account has been anthropocentric, 
but I have removed the human from its pedestal. I ha%, c not argued that Microbes 
have as much a right to life as humans as radical ecologists sometimes do - nature 
involves both symbioses and destructions: our ethics is always relative to what is 
good for us. Anything else would be untenable. 
But this by no means constitutes an implicit recommendation of neo-hberahsm; 
the individual is not autonomous or independent but relational. Spinoza's ethics 
would not be functional if he presupposed the individuality of the individual; he 
emphasises processes of emergence and creation, our thresholds and limits, our 
powers of existing and acting. Our ethics involves multiplying relations therebN- 
increasing our joyous affects. My focus has not been centred upon the 1*1IdiI)idIIa1i_0, 
of the human, but on the non-human, pre-indi6dual and transindiN-idual, 
, gulan*s 
fion. Bý- refusing to make of beconlings of humans - those processes of fi'ti a 
the human an abstraction, I sought to sho\-, - how an ethics of the pre-indwidual is 
not onIN- an interesting and novel approach but a necessary one. Our anti-human 
humanism brings the human back down to earth. 
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